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Executive Summary
This report investigates the international law and policy challenges to the determination of the
international shipping industry’s contribution to climate change mitigation efforts through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations and the
competent intergovernmental organization with respect to shipping in international law. The report sets
out the international legal framework that serves as context for the IMO efforts, the challenge of
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping and the process and issues in
determining the industry’s ‘fair share’ of mitigation efforts and potential legal pathways. The report
concludes with general, policy and legal considerations that have a bearing on the current and possible
future directions of the nascent IMO strategy and potential legal pathways.
General considerations include the observation that the complexity and uncertainty underscoring the
development of the IMO strategy call for a long-term planning instrument which is integrated, and in
particular is systemic in scope, flexible in approach and adaptive in application. As other regimes and
sectors progress in developing and delivering on mitigation efforts, care should be exercised in
considering lessons and tools from other sectors for application to shipping, given its uniqueness and that
other sector experiences emanate from different contexts and considerations. Given continuing
significant differences on GHG issues in the IMO, it would be of concern if the prospective IMO strategy
is not adopted by the usual culture of consensus that has helped shape the IMO as a successful regulatory
body.
Among the policy considerations explored are the overall goal, key milestones toward the goal, measures
and timelines to achieving the goal, and reporting a review. A critical starting point will be the
determination of the industry’s fair contribution to the goals of the Paris Agreement and the overall
climate mitigation effort expected from the sector. Key milestones include the peak year, the rate of
emission reduction once emissions have peaked and a timeline for full decarbonization, explored in the
context of short, medium and long-term targets and a combination of measures that work together
effectively toward the ultimate goal and interim targets. Among the potential tools considered are
technical and operational regulations, market-based mechanisms (MBM), and mechanisms to review and
adjust both the targets and role of the measures to achieve them. A key consideration was the opportunity
to synchronize efforts of the IMO with commitments, review cycles, mechanisms and institutions under
the Paris Agreement.
Legal considerations are underscored by the global nature of maritime regulation, the necessity to
anticipate the steps needed to secure universal acceptance and uniform application of the measures
adopted in or under the IMO strategy, and relationship with other global and regional regimes. The
potential relationship to other treaty regimes needs to be studied. It is likely that traditional maritime
regulation alone will not be sufficient for the mitigation effort, and that novel measures and possible
linkages with other global and regional regimes may be needed. While the MARPOL convention, as the
lead IMO instrument on prevention of pollution from ships, can be expected to continue to play a major
role, it is likely that a future introduction of an MBM will require a new and separate instrument. It is
likely that future IMO regulation of GHG emissions will be challenged to be coherent within the
industry’s regulatory system. While maritime regulation has well-developed principles and procedures,
it will be important to harmonize mitigation regulation with other maritime regulatory concerns. Also to
consider is whether States should be encouraged to extend international rules and standards to domestic
shipping to facilitate consistency across all forms of shipping. Finally, the IMO strategy will need to give
thought to how it will facilitate compliance with its spirit and letter.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the report is to investigate the international law and policy challenges to determine
the international shipping industry’s contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions through the efforts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and to identify
issues and possible legal pathways.
In its seminal resolution adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015
(UNSDG), the United Nations General Assembly underscored the need for “urgent action on
climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations.” 1 In
recognizing climate change as one of the greatest challenges of our times, the resolution recognized
the wide range of impacts and that many least developed countries (LDCs) and small island
developing States (SIDS) will be seriously affected.2 It called for “the widest possible international
cooperation aimed at accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions.”3 There is a
commitment to adopt policies to promote sustainable transport systems.4 Several goals address the
global climate change response directly or indirectly.5 The expectation is for a planetary response
within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
(UNFCCC)6 as the primary international and intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global
response to climate change.7
The legal context of this report is the scope, functions and interactions of a number of major
global regimes, namely and primarily: the Paris Agreement, 2015, 8 pursuant to the UNFCCC with
respect to global efforts to address climate change generally; the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS),9 with respect to atmospheric emissions from ships resulting
in pollution of the marine environment; the IMO system of global maritime regulation and most
especially the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/78

1

Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly on 25 September 2015, UN Doc Res A/70/L.1 (21 October 2015) [UNSDG], preamble.
2
Ibid para 14.
3
Ibid para 31.
4
Ibid para 27.
5
For example Goal 7 aims at ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all and, among
other, calls for doubling the global rate of improvement of energy efficiency and enhancement of international
cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology by 2030. Also relevant are Goal 12 to ensure
sustainable consumption and production patterns, and Goal 13 to take urgent action to combat climate change and its
impacts. Ibid.
6
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21
March 1994) [UNFCCC]. We refer to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement collectively in this report as the UN
Climate Regime. Article 4.1(c) of the UNFCCC requires Parties to promote and cooperate in the development,
application and diffusion of technologies, practices and process that reduce or prevent greenhouse gas emissions from
the transport sector.
7
In addition to the UNFCCC, the UNSDGs expressly recognize this primary role. UNSDG, supra note 1, para 31.
8
Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (entered into force 4 November 2016)
[Paris Agreement].
9
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16
November 1994) [UNCLOS].
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(MARPOL),10 with respect to the regulation of air emissions from ships on international voyages.
To a lesser extent, the framework instruments of the World Trade Organization (WTO)11 and the
European Union (EU) policy and regulation concerning monitoring, reporting and verification of
carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport are also set out as part of the larger context.12
While international shipping emissions are not included in any of the current individual State Party
commitments under the Paris Agreement, they could be included in the future at the discretion of
individual Parties, and are captured under the collective goals and the Global Stocktake. The
international expectation is that the IMO will facilitate the determination of the shipping industry’s
fair contribution consistently with the spirit of the Paris Agreement.
Of special and central significance for this report is the interaction of the Paris Agreement
and IMO regimes. The Paris Agreement provides the framework for the adoption of national
contributions determined at the national level,13 establishes the collective goals, and takes stock of
progress toward the collective goals through five-year review cycles.14 The expectation of the IMO
is that the shipping industry’s contribution will be determined at the intergovernmental
organization level because the industry is globalized and transnational. The two regimes are guided
by different principles that shape how the respective contributions will be made, particularly
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) under the
UNFCCC and with the addition of ‘in the light of the different national circumstances’ (CBDRRCNC) in the Paris Agreement on the one hand,15 and ‘no more favourable treatment’ (NMFT)
under the IMO conventions16 and related enforcement arrangements on the other hand.17
The IMO has been working on GHG emissions from ships for well over a decade.
International shipping was the first industry to actually adopt measures with respect to such
emissions at a global sectoral level, consisting mainly of technical (energy efficiency), operational
(vessel management) and more recently fuel-related measures. At this time it is unclear whether
10

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340 UNTS 184, as
amended by the Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973,
17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 (entered into force 2 October 1983), as amended [MARPOL].
11
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154 (entered into
force 1 January 1995); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 120 (entered into force
1 January 1995); General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183 (entered into force 1
January 1995).
12
EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Integrating maritime transport emissions in the
EU’s greenhouse gas reduction policies, COM (2013) 479 final (28 June 2013); EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon
dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC, [2015] OJ, L 123/55.
13
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13.
14
Ibid art 14.2.
15
Ibid art 2.2. The principle is discussed in more detail below in this report. See also, Yubing Shi, Climate Change
and International Shipping: The Regulatory Framework for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Brill
Nijhoff, 2017) [Shi], at 81.
16
For example, MARPOL, supra note 10, art 5(4).
17
NMFT is the basis of regional arrangements for port State control, i.e.: Europe and the North Atlantic (Paris MoU);
Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West
and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU);
the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU) and the Persian Gulf (Riyadh MoU). For links to each MoU, see “Port State
Control”, IMO (2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org>. See also Shi, supra note 15, at 91.
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technical and operational measures, although essential, may be insufficient on their own to enable
the industry achieve the long-term goal of decarbonisation and hence parallel discussions on
market-based mechanisms (MBM) have been conducted. In 2014 the divisions and controversies
over the discussion on MBMs prompted suspension from further formal discussion by the IMO’s
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC),18 although the topic was considered again
by the first two meetings of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions
from Ships (ISWG-GHG) in June and October 2017 for possible inclusion in the future
comprehensive IMO strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships, referred to in this report
as the IMO Strategy.19 At the time of writing, the ISWG-GHG is deliberating on the initial strategy
for the industry’s share and its delivery, to be further considered at a third intersessional meeting
and by MEPC 72 in April 2018, in accordance with an agreed roadmap and adoption in 2018.20
This report’s ultimate focus on the legal aspects of the expected contribution of the
international shipping industry necessitates comparative consideration of initiatives at other levels.
First, the experience in the determination of contributions of other industries, most especially civil
aviation as another globalized industry, may be informative. The parallel regime of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provides an opportunity to understand
analogous opportunities and constraints in determining the international shipping industry’s
contribution. Second, the EU efforts in regulating GHG emissions at the regional level have
pressured the IMO to produce an effective strategy, and failing which there is the very real prospect
of an EU approach to reduce European-related shipping emissions.21 Third, the prospect that the
UN climate regime will conclude through its Global Stocktake exercise that the international
shipping sector is not making an adequate contribution to the global effort, potentially warranting
Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement engaging more actively on this issue, provides
important context for the work of the IMO. At the same time, there are significant opportunities
for cooperation between international regimes, such as with the UN climate regime on
transparency, technology and MBMs.22
In exploring the constraints and opportunities in determining the shipping industry’s
contribution, the report considers the principles and methods of maritime regulation and explores
the tools and procedures available to the IMO. The IMO’s mandate and traditional approach to
maritime regulation will be tested to their limits. The report discusses the technical nature of
maritime regulation and considers legal pathways for adopting an MBM measure, should it be
needed.
18

Report of the MEPC on its 65th Session, IMO Doc 65/22 (24 May 2014) [MEPC 65 Report], at 44.
Report of the first Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships
(ISWG-GHG 1), IMO Doc MEPC 71/WP.5, 30 June 2017 [ISWG-GHG 1 Report]; Report of the Second Meeting of
the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG 2), Note by the
Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 72/7 (3 November 2017) [ISWG-GHG 2 Report].
20
Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18 (11 November 2016) [MEPC 70 Report], at 50–
51; Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18/Add.1 (11 November 2016), annex 11.
21
For a study exploring possible EU unilateral action on GHG from the maritime sector on the basis of the sovereignty
enjoyed by Member States in their ports see Aoife O’Leary, David Holyoake and Marta Ballesteros, Legal
implications of EU action on GHG Emissions from the International Maritime Sector (ClientEarth, 2011), online:
ClientEarth <https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2011-11-01-legal-implications-ofeu-action-on-ghg-emissions-from-the-international-maritime-sector-ce-en.pdf>.
22
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 6 (market-based mechanisms), 10 (Technology Mechanism), 14 (Global
Stocktake).
19
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The consideration of how the international shipping industry’s fair contribution might be
achieved also brings into play the relationship between multilateralism and unilateralism,
including regionalism, in law- making. Maritime regulation aspires to achieve global uniformity
in State practice, in contrast to the flexibility inherent in national or regional approaches endorsed
under the Paris Agreement. Historically, maritime regulation has experienced instances of
unilateralism that at times appeared to undermine global efforts at achieving uniformity and at
other times actually triggered the eventual adoption of higher global standards. 23 The EU’s
position, albeit at the regional level, will be important to consider in this respect.
This report starts by setting out the international legal framework with particular focus on
the UN climate regime, international law of the sea and international maritime law on pollution
prevention from ships, and also considers legal issues with respect to international trade law and
EU regulation. The latter two are considered only in general terms as they could potentially
constitute separate lines of inquiry on their own right and are not the focus of this report. The report
next addresses the challenge of regulating GHG emissions from international shipping by
explaining the commercial and operational life of the ship, implications of its mobility,
consequential global governance of the industry, how maritime regulation works, IMO efforts in
regulating GHG emissions, and the range of actual and potential measures for GHG regulation
from ships considered to date. Discussion of lessons from other sectors follows, in part to illustrate
the efforts undertaken in these sectors, and in part to explore whether there are useful experiences
for international shipping to draw upon. Thereafter the discussion addresses the core purpose of
the report, namely the key issues for the determination of the ‘fair share’ and potential legal
pathways, including the management of uncertainty, prospective vision and timeline, role of
maritime regulation, potential role of market measures, equity issues, compliance system, interregime consistency and complemenarity, and IMO leadership. The report concludes with
observations on general, policy and legal considerations for near future and long-term work on the
IMO strategy.

23

See Stuart Hetherington, “The Elusive Panacea of Uniformity: Is It Worth Pursuing?” Paper presented at the
AMTAC Annual Address 2013 Sydney (18 September 2013), online: AMTAC <https://amtac.org.au/publicationspapers/>.
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2.
2.1

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Evolution of the UN climate regime

The origins of the international climate change regime can be traced back to a series of United
Nations General Assembly resolutions adopted in the late 1980s. These resolutions resulted in
the negotiation of the UNFCCC, which was adopted at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, entered into force
in 1994 and established the architecture for subsequent climate change agreements. The General
Assembly resolutions also resulted in the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) to give scientific and technical advice to negotiators and policy
makers. Since 1990, the IPCC has prepared five comprehensive assessment reports on the state
of the science on climate change, each at critical junctures of the development of the climate
change regime as well as, on request, more focused reports on issues ranging from land use
change and forestry issues to carbon capture and storage. The most recent synthesis report was
released in 2014 to inform the negotiation of the Paris Agreement. 24
The UNFCCC continues to serve as the foundation and provides important institutions,
goals, and principles for the climate regime. The overall goal of the UNFCCC, described in Article
2, is to stabilize GHG concentrations at levels that prevent dangerous human interference with the
climate system, ensure that the rate of change allows nature to adapt, to not threaten food
production and to allow sustainable development to take place. This overall goal is refined through
additional principles set out in Article 3, including equity for present and future generations,
CBDR-RC, and the need to take precautionary measures to anticipate and mitigate, prevent or
minimize the effects of climate change.
The UNFCCC is the ultimate source of the mandate of the UN climate regime over the GHG
emissions from international shipping. The foundations for this mandate include the goal in Article
2, the principles in Article 3 and reference to efforts to reduce emissions from transportation in
Article 4.1(c), in combination with the powers of the COP set out in Article 7. Key among these
powers is the general power to implement measures to meet the Article 2 goal and to more broadly
ensure the effective implementation of the convention. The need to mobilize finance is specifically
referenced, providing the basis for carbon levies and other economic measures. A key potential
limitation of the specific mandates set out in Article 7 is the focus on Parties rather than private
actors, although measures directed at private actors are not specifically excluded.
The first substantive agreement following the UNFCCC was the Kyoto Protocol,
negotiated in 1997.25 While the key principles of the international climate change regime were
accepted in 1997, the rules for implementation took much longer to develop. Most of these
rules were finalized at the 7th Conference of the Parties (COP) in November 2001 in
Marrakech. The package of rules required to implement the Kyoto Protocol was then formally
adopted at the first meeting of the parties to the Protocol in Montreal in 2005. Upon its entry
into force in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol became the heart of the international climate change
24

IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014).
25
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS
148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [Kyoto Protocol].
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regime. It established the first binding emission reduction targets for each of the ‘developed
countries’ listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC for 2008 to 2012, the first commitment period. 26
At the core of the Kyoto Protocol are the GHG emission reduction targets for developed
States. Each Annex I country was assigned a negotiated combined emission reduction target for
the six gases covered in the Protocol. The target was expressed relative to emissions in that State
in 1990 and presented in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions. This emission
reduction target was then translated into emissions permits assigned to each Annex I Party for the
five years of the 2008 to 2012 commitment period. These permits are called assigned amount units
(AAUs), and are the foundation of the emissions trading system under the Protocol.
The flexibility mechanisms established in the Kyoto Protocol are the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), Emissions Trading (ET) and Joint Implementation. They were included in the
Kyoto Protocol, at least in part, in recognition that the State-specific targets for Annex I countries
provided only a crude tool for balancing the relative responsibility, capacity and potential of Parties
to the Protocol to reduce emissions. In that respect, the mechanisms provide a degree of flexibility
to ensure that if meeting one Party’s target through reductions turned out to be disproportionately
expensive or technically difficult to achieve, that Party had the option to delay reductions in its
own country and instead support reductions in another country by using the flexibility
mechanisms.
A further objective of one of the flexibility mechanisms, the CDM, was to address capacity
concerns in developing countries (those not listed in Annex I). Some developing countries were in
the process of making major capital investments in energy-producing and consuming technologies,
and the flexibility mechanisms reflected the Parties’ recognition that there would be significant
long-term benefits to find ways to influence the choices made by developing countries at this stage
of their development.
The dual purpose of the CDM, therefore, was to offer Annex I Parties a compliance
alternative where domestic emission reduction has become too expensive, while at the same time
providing developing countries with assistance in the form of technology transfer to encourage a
more sustainable lower emissions development path. The parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed that
if reductions could be achieved more cost effectively in a developing country that has no reduction
target, that country should be able to join forces with an Annex I Party to achieve those reductions.
In return for providing this assistance, an Annex I Party would receive CDM credits that it could
apply towards its emission reduction targets.
The form of assistance was left somewhat open, but in order to receive the credits, the Annex
I Party had to demonstrate that the emission reductions achieved were additional to those that
would have been achieved if the assistance had not been granted. The term used to describe this
requirement is ‘additionality’. It means that the assistance provided in return for the credits must
enable the reductions. The assistance will usually take the form of financial support through the
26

Joanna Depledge, “Chapter 2A: The Legal and Policy Framework of the United Nations Climate Change Regime”
in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University
Press, 2017) [Klein et al] 27; Meinhard Doelle, From Hot Air to Action? Climate Change, Compliance and the Future
of International Environmental Law (Carswell, 2005).
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purchase of the CDM credits. It could, however, take the form of providing access to technologies
in return for CDM credits, or the transfer of expertise needed to implement a CDM project. The
Kyoto Protocol’s ET system establishes the rules under which the various forms of emission
credits or units created under the Protocol can be traded, taken out of circulation, used for
compliance or saved. Through emissions trading, Annex I Parties can make use, in meeting their
emissions targets, of credits or units held by other Annex I Parties, or generated under the CDM.27
Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol were designed to ensure that decisions about
compliance and the use of the mechanisms are based on accurate, reliable and consistent
information from all Parties. To this end, Article 5 requires Annex 1 Parties to put in place a system
for national emissions estimations on an annual basis in accordance with agreed-upon
methodologies. Parties are required under Article 5 to include emissions from domestic shipping
in their national systems, but not those from international shipping. Article 5 allows for
adjustments to be made to the emissions estimation if approved methodologies are not followed.
Article 7 requires Parties to use those national systems to report annually on emissions by source
and removal by sink, again in accordance with approved methodologies. Article 8 provides for
review, verification and adjustment of the information provided by expert review teams to ensure
that Parties’ annual reporting on emissions and sinks is accurate, consistent and complies with the
agreed upon methodologies.
The Kyoto compliance system is unique among compliance systems for multilateral
environment agreements (MEAs). On the one hand, it built on a long tradition among MEAs to
facilitate compliance through capacity-building, dialogue and transparency. On the other hand, it
recognized the need for strong and consistent enforcement to establish a carbon market and to
ensure that parties will make the investment needed to meet their emission reduction targets. The
result was a compliance system that seeks to facilitate and to enforce, using parallel processes
where required. This meant that compliance issues that are deemed important for the functioning
of the trading system are subject to enforcement and facilitation, whereas matters not considered
critical for the carbon market are only subject to facilitation. Facilitation and enforcement are
carried out by separate branches of the compliance committee. Only the enforcement branch can
impose penalties.28
Decision 2/CP adopted by the 3rd UNFCCC Conference of the Parties alongside the
decision adopting the Kyoto Protocol, requests further elaboration on the inclusion of
emissions from international shipping to individual Parties. However, Parties have not yet
agreed on this elaboration. In parallel, Article 2.2 the Kyoto Protocol requests Annex I Parties
to pursue limitation or reduction of emissions from that sector, working through the IMO. No
elaboration on the inclusion of emissions from international shipping to individual Parties was
included in the Kyoto rulebook, nor agreed under in negotiations on the implementation of the
27

There has been much criticism of the environmental integrity of the CDM, with a recent study by the Institute for
Applied Ecology in Berlin suggesting that most of the credits granted were for projects that would have proceeded
without the support from the CDM mechanism. See Martin Cames et al, How Additional is the Clean Development
Mechanism?
(Institute
for
Applied
Ecology,
2016),
online:
IAE
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/docs/clean_dev_mechanism_en.pdf>.
28
See Meinhard Doelle, “Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons for MEA
Compliance System Design” (2010) 1 Climate Law 237. See also, Jutta Brunnee, Meinhard Doelle & Lavanya
Rajamani, Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Change Regime, (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This resolution followed an effort to include
international shipping within the emission reduction commitments Parties agreed to take on
under the Protocol. 29
The effort to include international shipping had been initiated with a UNFCCC secretariat
report that identified eight options, which were then reduced to five options through
deliberations by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).30 The
five options selected by the SBSTA included the ‘no allocation’ option, as well as allocation
to the State where the bunker fuel is sold, allocation to the State of registration or ownership
of the vessel, allocation to the State of origin or destination of the vessel, and allocation to the
State of origin or destination of the cargo or passengers. 31 No options have been selected from
these five, and all remain open for adoption in the future. Addressing the emissions from this
growing sector remained important for the achievement of the ultimate objectives of the
UNFCCC, and therefore resurfaced once the attention of Parties to the UNFCCC turned to the
post-2012 negotiations.
Informal efforts to start negotiations on the post-2012 regime commenced once the rulebook
for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 2001. By 2002 in New Delhi, the
EU started to focus on post-2012 negotiations. However, the United States (US) was not willing
to allow a formal negotiating process to be started and the developing world was unwilling to
discuss emission reductions outside the developed world because in its view North America,
Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan had failed to lead by example, and insufficient progress
had been made on adaptation.32
Negotiations for the post-2012 regime did not formally proceed until the Conference of the
Parties/Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) in December 2005 in Montreal. It took a decade for
these negotiations to be concluded successfully in Paris in December 2015. Emissions from
international shipping and aviation remained on the agenda throughout these negotiations. Efforts
to bring international shipping under the UNFCCC initially took place under the Bali Action
Plan (from 2007 – 2012) and then under the Durban Platform (from 2012 – 2015) that provided
the basis for negotiating the Paris Climate Agreement. 33 It is worth noting that the Bali Action
Plan specifically provided for international transport under Cooperative Sectoral Approaches,
the only item under the Bali Action Plan that resulted in no agreed outcome.34

29

The implication of the reference to the IMO in Article 2.2 has been the subject of considerable debate within the
climate regime as well as the IMO. For an overview, see Shi, supra note 15, at 94.
30
Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Doc
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (7 April 1995), art 1(f), at 16.
31
See Sebastian Oberthür, “Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International
Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol” (2003) 3:3 Climate Policy 191, at 193.
32
Meinhard Doelle, “The Cat Came Back, or the Nine Lives of the Kyoto Protocol” (2006) 16 J. Env. L. & Prac. 261.
33
Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Doc
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008) [Bali Action Plan] at para 1b(iv).
34
Doha Decisions 1-10/CP.18, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (28 February, 2013).
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2.2

The Paris Agreement

The key elements of the approach to climate mitigation in the Paris Agreement consist of a
collective long-term goal with a number of elements, nationally determined mitigation efforts,
five-year review cycles of progress in implementing individual efforts toward the collective goals,
and a commitment to increase ambition as part of the five-year review cycles to ensure the
collective long-term goals are met. This section offers a brief overview of these elements.
The first of the key elements of the Paris Agreement is its set of long-term goals. The
objective of keeping global average temperature increase to ‘well below’ 2° C and the aspiration
to limit this increase to 1.5° C are at the heart of the Paris Agreement.35 The temperature goal is
supplemented with a commitment to ensure emissions peak as soon as possible, and to reach a
balance of emissions removals in the second half of the century. Arguably, 1.5 °C has now become
the ultimate standard against which the success of collective mitigation efforts under the UNFCCC
will be measured, and it seems likely that 1.5 scenarios being explored by the IPCC will conclude
that GHG emission neutrality will have to be reached before 2050.36 This ambitious set of longterm goals provides an important foundation for each State’s future nationally determined
contributions (NDCs), their justification on the grounds of equity, and the five-year cycles of NDC
communication and the Global Stocktake. Over time, as the IPCC completes its scenario work, the
‘well below 2’ and ‘1.5° C’ goals can be expected to shape further discussions on elements of the
long-term ambition, such as specific time frames for the expressed need for global emissions to
peak as soon as possible and for reaching a balance of emissions and removals.37
The long-term temperature goal also provides important context for other key elements of
the Paris Agreement, particularly adaptation and finance. 38 Meeting the long-term goal is an
essential pre-condition for successful adaptation efforts, and finance in turn is critical for meeting
both the mitigation and adaptation goals of the Paris Agreement. Important connections are made
to poverty eradication and sustainable development. Through the process to be designed for the
Global Stocktake under Article 14, the long-term goal articulated in Article 2 is expected to
become the ultimate guide for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.39
The starting point for mitigation in the Paris Agreement is the overall mitigation effort,
largely represented by the individual NDCs measured against the long-term temperature goal, but
supplemented by efforts outside the UN climate regime, such as efforts of the IMO, ICAO, and
initiatives under the ozone regime to eliminate the use of HFCs.40 Parties recognized in Paris that
the initial NDCs would not add up to an adequate collective effort in light of the long-term goal.
NDCs are therefore to be strengthened every five years starting in 2020, informed by the 2018

35

Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 2.1.
Andreas Fischlin, “Chapter 1A: Background and Role of Science” in Klein et al, supra note 26, 3 [Fishlin]. For
updates on progress on the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5º C, online: IPCC <www.ipcc.ch>.
37
Halldór Thorgeirsson, “Chapter 7: Objective (Article 2.1)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, at 123.
38
Irene Suárez Pérez & Angela Churie Kallhauge, “Chapter 12: Adaptation” in ibid at 196; Jorge Gastelumendi &
Inka Gnittke, “Chapter 14: Climate Finance (Article 9)” in ibid at 239.
39
Jürgen Friedrich, “Chapter 19: Global Stocktake (Article 14)” in ibid at 319 [Friedrich].
40
Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Hydro Fluorocarbons, 15 October 2016 (not in force), online:
Montreal Protocol <http:// conf.montreal- protocol.org/ meeting/ mop/ mop- 28/ crps/ SitePages/ Home.aspx>.
36
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Talanoa Dialogue (the facilitative dialogue under the UNFCCC on ways to increase ambition),41
and then every 5 years starting in 2025, following a global stocktaking exercise carried out two
years before each updated NDC is due.42 The Paris Agreement offers important guidance on how
Parties are to determine the adequacy of their NDCs with respect to mitigation.43
Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement provides that Parties will aim to reach global peaking of
emissions as soon as possible, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter on the basis of science
and equity. Parties recognize that it will take longer for developing country emissions to peak,
putting pressure on developed countries to accelerate their emission reductions to achieve a global
peaking as soon as possible. Parties are to achieve a collective balance between emissions and
removals of GHG from the atmosphere in the second half of the century, suggesting that GHG
concentrations should stabilize and start to decline sometime after 2050.44
These provisions offer some clarity on the scale and allocation of mitigation efforts, and
create a number of procedural obligations, but they neither provide a method for determining
appropriate NDCs for individual Parties, nor a legal obligation to fully implement NDCs and meet
targets set. It is noteworthy that the long-term mitigation goals are framed in technology-neutral
language and thereby leave open how much specific technologies, from renewable energy to
carbon capture and storage and the enhancement of sinks, should contribute to the effort. The
additional guidance for Parties on what is expected of them takes on added significance as the
Paris Outcome explicitly recognizes that there is an ambition gap between commitments made by
Parties to date and the long-term goal. The ambition gap is quantified in Decision 1/CP.21 to be
upward of 15 gigatonnes by 2030, based on the 2° C goal.45
The Paris Agreement affirms the importance of the enhancement and conservation of sinks,
and specifically mentions forests in this context. 46 The Agreement confirms that international
emissions trading and other market mechanisms are acceptable tools for Parties to meet their
emission reduction goals, as long as they increase the level of ambition.47 The Agreement sets out
general principles for the use of market mechanisms, such as the avoidance of double-counting,
environmental integrity, robust accounting and transparency. The Paris Agreement also makes
provision for non-market approaches to assist Parties with the implementation of their NDCs.
Detailed rules for these various mechanisms will have to be established before a thorough
assessment of their environmental integrity and their potential to contribute toward the ultimate
objective of the Paris Agreement can be carried out. These provisions of the Agreement offer
41

Established by COP 23 in November 2017, the Talanoa Dialogue now has an active online platform that enables
submission of inputs by Parties and stakeholders. Welcome to the Talanoa Dialogue Portal, online: UNFCCC
<talanoadialogue.com>.
42
The Paris Agreement, supra note 8 refers to highest ambition and the need for progression (art 4.3), and new NDCs
every five years (art 4.9) informed by the Global Stocktake (arts 4.9, 14).
43
Harald Winkler, “Chapter 9: Mitigation (Article 4)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, at 141 [Winkler].
44
Ibid.
45
Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 1/CP.21, Report of the Conference of the Parties on
its Twenty-first Session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, Addendum, Doc
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016) [Decision 1/CP.21] at para 17.
46
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 5.
47
Ibid art 6.
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possible tools for addressing GHG emissions from international shipping, should the results of the
Talanoa Dialogue or the Global Stocktake under Article 14 lead Parties to conclude that
insufficient progress on this issue through the efforts of the IMO risks undermining the goals of
the Paris Agreement. They also offer important avenues for collaboration between the UN climate
regime and the IMO, such as on transparency, technology, and implementation of a market-based
mechanism for the sector.48
The transparency rules apply to all Parties, with some modest differentiation, mainly through
a commitment to flexibility and support for developing countries. For all Parties, the information
they submit will be subject to a technical expert review and a multilateral, facilitative consideration
of progress. Importantly, flexibility with respect to transparency is specifically linked to capacity,
not to the broader concept of CBDR-RC. Special accommodations are included for the LDCs and
SIDS.49 Transparency is a focus of capacity-building efforts under the Paris Agreement, a signal
that developed State Parties are motivated to help build capacity in developing countries in order
to minimize differentiation on transparency.50 This signal to a nuanced approach to differentiation
should facilitate discussions under the IMO to resolve the relationship between CBDR and
NMFT.51
The Paris Agreement signals the intention to build on and enhance transparency
arrangements under the UNFCCC, including national communications, biennial reports and update
reports, international assessment and review and international consultation and analysis. 52 It
specifically calls for more regular and comprehensive reporting, a more harmonized verification
process, 53 and common modalities, procedures and guidelines. 54 The Paris Agreement offers a
surprising level of detail on accounting and reporting in the 15 paragraphs of Article 13. This is
further supplemented with specific references to transparency in key provisions on mitigation,
adaptation, finance and capacity-building.55 Detailed rules are currently being negotiated. It is
unclear at this point whether the transparency rules will include any obligation to report on
emissions from the international shipping sector beyond the current guidelines for preparing
national inventories. Parties, of course, are free to include international shipping in their NDCs in
some form, and can report on emissions from the sector.
The establishment of a five-year review and ambition cycle, including the Talanoa Dialogue
in 2018 and the Global Stocktake process starting in 2023, constitute another core element of the
overall effort to ensure the goals of the Paris Agreement are met through the collective efforts of
Parties in cooperation with other regimes. The Global Stocktake set out in Article 14 covers
mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support. The first Global Stocktake is to take
place in 2023, in time for the revision of Parties’ NDCs by 2025. The goal of the Global Stocktake
48

Andrew Howard, “Chapter 11: Voluntary Cooperation (Article 6)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, at 178.
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 13.7–13.10; Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45, at paras 89–90.
50
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 11, 13.15; Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45, at paras 84–88.
51
Yamide Dagnet & Kelly Levin, “Chapter 18: Transparency (Article 13)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, 301 [Dagnet
& Levin].
52
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 13.4.
53
Through a technical expert review, see ibid arts 13.11–13.12.
54
Ibid art 13.13.
55
Ibid arts 4.8, 4.13, 6.2, 7.5, 9.7, 11.1. Transparency is referenced throughout Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45;
Dagnet & Levin, supra note 51.
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is to enhance both national action and international cooperation, a clear signal that international
shipping will be an area of focus for the Global Stocktake. The Talanoa Dialogue, an initial,
stocktaking process among Parties, initially called the ‘facilitative dialogue’, is scheduled for 2018
and will serve as a first experiment with this review and ambition cycle under the Paris
Agreement.56
The compliance mechanism is to be facilitative, non-adversarial, and non-punitive in nature
and applies to all Parties.57 The compliance committee is to consist of 12 members with relevant
technical expertise, with membership determined in a manner similar to the facilitative branch of
the compliance committee under the Kyoto Protocol.58 The committee is directed to be sensitive
to national capabilities and circumstances of Parties in carrying out its work.59
The transparency provisions with respect to Parties’ implementation of their NDCs, in
combination with the Global Stocktake and the compliance system, are at the heart of the process
put in place under the Paris Agreement to ensure progression of individual and collective ambition
toward the long-term goal. The basic elements are in place in the form of Articles 13 to 15, and
they appear sound. However, the detailed rules have yet to be finalized. Furthermore, the success
of the transparency, review, stocktaking and compliance approach in the Paris Agreement in
increasing ambition sufficiently to meet the long-term goal will ultimately depend on many factors
outside the purview of the new climate regime, most notably the economic, political and social
circumstances in key State Parties.
The Paris Agreement does not repeat the call in the Kyoto Protocol for Parties to work
through the IMO to address GHG emissions from international shipping. The legal status of the
Kyoto Protocol, and with it the status of Article 2.2, are unclear at this time. This raises interesting
questions about the potential impact for the mandate of the IMO in case of the formal and complete
replacement of the Kyoto Protocol with the Paris Agreement.
Furthermore, it is important to point out that the draft negotiating text of the Paris Agreement
did include proposals from some parties for specific reference to international shipping and
aviation. The draft text included the following options:
“23bis. [In meeting the 2˚C objective, Parties agree on the need for global sectoral emission
reduction targets for international aviation and maritime transport and on the need for all
Parties to work through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop global policy frameworks to achieve
these targets].”60
“47.5 Option (a):
56

Decision 1/CP. 21, supra note 45, at para 20. See also, Friedrich, supra note 39.
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 15.
58
Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45, at para 102. Interestingly, there is no reference back to the detailed rules of
procedure developed for the Compliance Committee under the Kyoto Protocol.
59
Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 15.2. See also Yamide Dagnet & Eliza Northrop, “Chapter 20: Facilitating
Implementation and Promoting Compliance (Article 15)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, 301 [Dagnet & Northrop].
60
Outcomes of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences held in Lima in December 2014 and in Geneva in
February 2015, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 68/5 (18 February 2015), at 3.
57
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…
b. Encourage the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime
Organization to develop a levy scheme to provide financial support for the Adaptation Fund.
c. In establishing the levy scheme, ICAO and IMO are encouraged to take into consideration
the needs of developing countries, particularly the LDCs, SIDS and countries in Africa heavily
reliant on tourism and international transport of traded goods.”61

These proposals were not included in the final version of the Paris Agreement. For now,
international shipping has not been included in the emission reduction commitments of Parties in
the form of their NDCs. There has also been no change in the emissions that Parties have to account
for under the Kyoto Protocol. Reporting obligations under the Paris Agreement are still being
negotiated. Of course, as indicated above, there is nothing in the Paris Agreement to prevent a
party from reporting on emissions from international shipping, or from including international
shipping in some form in its NDC. While the Paris Agreement does not mention emissions from
international shipping, and the IMO is continuing its efforts to develop a strategy to address them,
the absence of any reference to this mandate in the Agreement has the potential to strengthen the
hand of the UN climate regime going forward. If it had made specific reference to the IMO, the
result may have been to discourage Parties to the UN climate regime, from taking responsibility
for these emissions. By remaining silent on the efforts of the IMO, it remains somewhat uncertain
to what extent the UN climate regime can be taken to have endorsed the mandate of the IMO or to
have delegated the issue to it. It may also affect the relevance of CBDR in the IMO’s efforts to
regulate emissions from the sector.62 In practice and for practical purposes, the IMO is using its
treaty mandate to lead the shipping industry’s efforts and it has reported to the UNFCCC process
and structures. What is clear is that the UN climate regime will continue to monitor progress as
part of the Talanoa Dialogue in 2018 and the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement
thereafter, and that the pressure on Parties to the UN climate regime, who are also IMO Member
States, to act in case of inadequate progress at the IMO will remain.
So what avenues are there in the Paris Agreement to become more actively involved in
efforts to reduce emissions from international shipping and aviation? Most importantly, perhaps,
unlike the Kyoto Protocol with its focus on the emissions of developed country (Annex 1) Parties,
the overall focus of the Paris Agreement is on global emissions and a global temperature goal of
‘well below 2° C while striving for 1.5° C. Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement refers to all
emissions, and does not exclude emissions from international shipping. Article 4(4) refers to
developed countries ‘undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets’.
The expectation is that both the Talanoa Dialogue and the Global Stocktake under Article
14 (including the science input from the IPCC) will include emissions from international shipping.
In addition, the issue remains on the agenda of the SBSTA, the subsidiary body of the UN climate
regime mandated to provide information and advice on scientific and technological matters. This
provides the possibility, if all else fails, of revisiting, and taking a decision on the five options
identified by the SBSTA in the lead up to Kyoto, and thereby clarifying and standardizing the
allocation of emissions from international shipping to Parties. Finally, Article 6, dealing with

61
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Ibid at 4.
See Yubin Shi, supra note 15, at 94

20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274

REVISED THIRD DRAFT REPORT
market and non-market mechanisms, may provide avenues for measures under the Paris
Agreement to address emissions from international shipping.63
All this means that, at a minimum, every five years, starting in 2018 with the Talanoa
Dialogue, and in 2023 in the form of the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement, Parties
should receive reports on emissions from international shipping as part of the overall exercise to
determine progress toward the temperature goal. In a scenario where Parties are meeting or
exceeding their individual mitigation commitments, but the collective effort continues to fall short
due in part to insufficient efforts to reduce emissions from international shipping, the pressure for
the UN climate regime, or Parties thereto, to take charge of these emissions will be immense.
A critical element in ensuring the international shipping sector will do its part will be full
transparency. One option would be for the IMO, or State Parties as part of their NDC submissions,
to report on emissions from these sectors as part of the Talanoa Dialogue and the Global Stocktake.
As important will be reporting on efforts and targets going forward, and consistency of
methodologies for estimating and reporting on emissions from shipping between the IMO and the
UNFCCC. For the Talanoa Dialogue, a particularly important question will be the contribution of
the sector to closing the 2030 emissions gap. Of course, individual Parties can also be asked to
report on emissions from these sectors in their inventories under Article 13. Either way, it will be
critical that accurate and consistent information about emission trajectories in the international
shipping sector is available every five years starting in 2018. Ideally, this would lead to an
assessment of what approaches have been implemented, which have been effective and which have
not. This will allow Parties to the UN climate regime to determine, in the context of the overall
five-year review and stocktake cycles, whether adequate efforts are being made outside the regime
(or collaboratively), or whether it is time to take additional measures either within the UN climate
regime or collaboratively between the UN climate regime and the IMO. In practice, since Parties
to the climate regime and IMO Member States are the same actors, consistency should be expected.
In addition, as discussions on sources of funding for climate mitigation, adaptation and loss and
damage continue under the UN climate regime, the idea of imposing a levy on emissions from
international transport is likely to continue to surface in the climate negotiations.64
In short, the effort to influence, control and eventually eliminate GHG emissions from
international shipping and aviation within the climate regime or in coordination with it is far from
over. Full transparency during the review and stocktake cycles will be critical to ensure these
sectors contribute their fair share to the global effort. Since States are Parties to both the climate
and maritime regimes, they would benefit from exploring opportunities for consistency and
cooperation, including the possibility to utilize institutions and instruments under the Paris
Agreement for market mechanisms, finance and technology to help with speedy and effective
implementation of measures negotiated under the IMO process. In the short- and medium-term,
until technology breakthroughs point to a clear zero emission path for shipping and aviation, these
63

As discussed in Section 5 below, the potential under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is, of course, not limited to
situations where the Parties to the UN climate regime conclude that efforts by the IMO are inadequate. There is every
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technology under Article 10, transparency under Article 13and the Global Stocktake under Article 14.
64
The sharing of proceeds under Article 6 for international transfers of emissions obligations (ITMOs) provides a
sound basis for implementing such a levy under Article 6.
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sectors may need to take further efficiency measures, take measures to accelerate technology
breakthroughs, or both, to make a fair contribution to the global effort. A more controversial option
would be to fund emission reductions outside the international shipping sector in some form.
Aviation has taken tentative steps in the latter direction. In the long-term, the science is clear that
meeting the temperature goal set in Paris will require a “balance of emissions and removals”, and
very likely significant net negative emissions, making anything short of a zero emissions solution
for these sectors untenable.65
2.3

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

With 168 State Parties66 at the time of writing and as the “constitution for the oceans”,67
UNCLOS has an important role to play in providing the jurisdictional framework applicable to
international shipping and substantive rules for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. In Part XII of the Convention, Article 192 establishes a generic duty for all States to
protect and preserve the marine environment.68 In a recent Annex VII arbitration under UNCLOS,
it was held that the “obligations in Part XII apply to all States with respect to the marine
environment in all maritime areas, both inside the national jurisdiction of States and beyond it.”69
Article 192 concerns “the positive obligation to take active measures to protect and preserve the
marine environment, and by logical implication, entails the negative obligation not to degrade the
marine environment.”70 The tribunal observed that there is a body of international environmental
law that informs Article 192 and it is generally to the effect that States should ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control should respect the environment within their jurisdiction and
beyond. Consequently, States have a positive duty to prevent or at least mitigate environmental
harm. As an integral part of the corpus of international environmental law, the Paris Agreement
serves to inform the content of Article 192. The consequence is that the positive duty concerning
atmospheric emissions is not territorially bound and applies equally to all States with respect to
the airspace under their sovereignty and to their ships in any location.
More specifically with respect to shipping, UNCLOS stipulates a duty to take measures to
minimize pollution from vessels.71 It further provides for all States to “adopt laws and regulations
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the
atmosphere, applicable to the air space under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their flag or
vessels” bearing in mind “internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures.” 72 This duty extends to taking other necessary measures “to prevent, reduce and

65
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control such pollution.” 73 For these purposes, States are encouraged “to establish global and
regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control
such pollution” through the IMO or diplomatic conference. 74 UNCLOS State Parties have
performed these responsibilities through the IMO with the adoption of MARPOL Annex VI in
1997 and its numerous amendments (infra).
The extent to which and the manner how State Parties may regulate and enforce atmospheric
pollution from ships is subject to the jurisdictional provisions in UNCLOS. The flag State has
primary jurisdiction over its ships irrespective of location and on the high seas that jurisdiction is
exclusive with very few exceptions.75 The flag State’s jurisdictional rights are subject to the duty
to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over its ships76 and to ensure compliance by its ships
with applicable international rules and standards adopted by the IMO for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution of the marine environment.77
Coastal States enjoy limited jurisdiction over foreign ships as they exercise their navigation
rights in accordance with the UNCLOS. In the territorial sea they may adopt laws and regulations
with respect to the exercise of innocent passage, including for “the preservation of the environment
of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof”.78 In theory, this
legislative power could apply to atmospheric emissions from ships. However, “[S]uch laws and
regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships
unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.” 79 The logical
consequence is that unilateral rules and standards on atmospheric emissions inconsistent with
MARPOL Annex VI may not be legislated and enforced. The coastal State has a duty not to hamper
navigation by imposing requirements on foreign ships “which have the practical effect of denying
or impairing the right of innocent passage.”80 In turn, foreign ships exercising innocent passage
have a duty to comply with coastal State laws.81 Passage which involves “any act of wilful and
serious pollution contrary to this Convention” is not innocent and is “considered to be prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State”, 82 potentially entailing enforcement
consequences.83 An analogous regime applies to passage in archipelagic waters in the absence of
archipelagic sea lanes.84 Where archipelagic sea lanes are established through the IMO, foreign
ships are required to observe the sea lanes and routeing measures that are adopted for that
purpose.85 During transit passage through straits used for international navigation, the coastal State
enjoys less jurisdiction over foreign ships. The power to legislate is limited to “the prevention,
73
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reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulations
regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait.” 86
Atmospheric emissions from ships could be characterized as noxious substances because of their
environmental and public health impacts. Foreign ships are expected to comply with such laws.87
A separate provision requires foreign ships to observe the broader duty to “comply with generally
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from ships”.88
In general, port entry is a privilege, not a right 89 and when a vessel enters into port
voluntarily it is implicitly submitting itself to local law and jurisdiction. In turn, the port State,
which enjoys sovereignty over its internal waters (which include port waters), has the sovereign
right to exercise jurisdiction and enforce its laws and regulations.90 Under the Convention and
Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 192391 State Parties undertake to grant
access to the ships of other State Parties to the ports under their sovereign authority on the basis
of reciprocity and equality of treatment, including dues and charges of all kinds.92 And under the
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1967,93 State Parties have further
committed to adopt “all appropriate measures to facilitate and expedite international maritime
traffic and to prevent unnecessary delays to ships and to persons and property on board.”94 State
Parties “undertake to co-operate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in
formalities, documentary requirements and procedures in all matters in which such uniformity will
facilitate and improve international maritime traffic and keep to a minimum any alterations in
formalities, documentary requirements and procedures necessary to meet special requirements of
a domestic nature”95 and for this purpose to cooperate through the IMO.96 As will be seen below,
port States play an important role in the enforcement of air pollution rules under MARPOL Annex
VI (infra). A port inspection regime has been designed for this purpose through the IMO. Further,
under UNCLOS, port States have an important role in assisting a coastal State pursue proceedings
against a foreign ship within whose jurisdiction she may have discharged pollutants into the marine
environment, including atmospheric emissions.97
The enforcement of atmospheric pollution from ships is couched as a duty for all States
“within the air space under their sovereignty” (i.e., internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic
waters) and for flag States with respect to their ships on the basis of the international rules and
standards for such pollution adopted through the IMO.98 States have a duty to adopt laws and
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regulations and take other measures necessary to implement the IMO rules.99 The performance of
this duty is performed through the implementation and enforcement of MARPOL Annex VI, an
optional annex. By and large, and considering some textual ambiguities or inconsistencies, the
jurisdictional and substantive atmospheric pollution provisions described above are
complementary to the development of the MARPOL Annex VI regime with respect to GHG
emissions.100
2.4

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended by and
incorporated in the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL),101 is the most important international maritime
convention for the prevention of vessel-source pollution. MARPOL consists of a framework
convention as amended by the protocol of 1978 and six annexes, the first two of which are
mandatory while the rest are optional. There are 155 State Parties to the convention proper and
mandatory annexes (oil pollution; noxious liquid substances in bulk) representing 99.14% of global
tonnage.102 Optional annexes III (harmful substances carried in packaged form), IV (sewage), and
V (garbage) also enjoy high subscription levels. 103 Annex VI was introduced into MARPOL
through the Protocol of 1997.104 Although optional, Annex VI has 88 State Parties representing
96.16% of global tonnage. Annex VI is the regulatory vehicle for GHG emissions from
international shipping. In principle, States that are not Parties to Annex VI are under no legal
obligation to implement and enforce those rules.
The technical regulation of shipping in MARPOL occurs in the annexes, as well as ancillary
codes (which may be mandatory or voluntary) and guidelines. The implementation and
enforcement of MARPOL standards is a responsibility of all State Parties. In addition to the
jurisdiction of the flag State, port States play an important role in enforcing MARPOL on the basis
of the NMFT principle which guides inspections of all ships irrespective of flag and irrespective of
whether the inspected ship is flagged in a MARPOL State Party or not. Thus, although a State may
not be under a legal Annex VI obligation because it is not a party to that instrument, in practice the
owners of ships registered under its flag have to consider that Annex VI standards would still be
applied to their ships while trading in a foreign port where Annex VI is applicable law.
MARPOL is a key convention enforced in regional memoranda of agreement on port State
control between national maritime administrations. With adoption facilitated by the IMO, these
regional agreements are potentially vital for the enforcement of GHG regulations under Annex VI.
Ships voluntarily calling into a MARPOL State Party port or anchorage are inspected regularly for
compliance with the international rules and standards of selected maritime conventions, including
99
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MARPOL. 105 Inspectors note and report deficiencies and the ensuing sanction could be a
reprimand, a requirement to rectify the deficiency and in the case of serious deficiencies can include
port detention until the deficiency is rectified. Occasionally, a ship may be permitted to embark on
a restricted voyage to another port to rectify the deficiency. Port detention is a powerful incentive
for ships to comply with international standards. Port detentions can be very costly for any
shipowner or charterer, as it could entail loss of charter days, loss of lay time potentially incurring
demurrage charges (liquidated damages as a penalty), additional berth costs and late delivery of
cargo in violation of applicable just-in-time delivery terms.
In actuality, MARPOL is not solely focused on the prevention of pollution of the marine
environment. The definition of “harmful substances” includes “any substance subject to control by
the present Convention,” 106 and “discharge” includes “emitting”, 107 thus including Annex VI
emissions. Annex VI addresses air pollution through emissions of ozone depleting substances,
sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds, particulate matter and
shipboard incineration.108 Relevant to the reduction of GHG emissions, pertinent measures include
mandatory technical and operational energy efficiency measures, namely the Energy Efficiency
Design Index (EEDI) and Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP),109 both discussed
below in this paper, as well as new fuel reporting requirements. Developing countries are assisted
with respect to the implementation of these technical rules.110 Annex VI also regulates the sulphur
content permitted in bunkers.111
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Annex VI places restrictions on atmospheric releases in designated emission control areas
(ECAs) designated by the MEPC on the basis of proposals by State Parties. 112 ECAs are areas
“where the adoption of special mandatory measures for emissions from ships is required to prevent,
reduce and control air pollution from NOx or SOx and particulate matter or all three types of
emissions and their attendant adverse impacts on human health and the environment.”113 To date,
ECAs have not been adopted for the regulation of GHG emissions and it remains to be seen
whether they could constitute tools for this purpose at the regional level. The above definition of
ECA appears generic enough to support a proposal of the designation in specific marine regions
to achieve regional environmental goals, presumptively also for GHG emissions.
The comprehensive approach to vessel-source pollution is a major strength of the MARPOL
system. However, there appears to be a disconnect between, on the one hand, the optional character
of most of its annexes, including Annex VI, and on the other hand the general obligations under
UNCLOS for the protection of the marine environment at the global and regional levels without
excluding particular sources of pollution. 114 In practice, and for the purposes of this report,
although not all IMO Member States are parties to Annex VI, the annex applies to State Parties
representing the bulk of global tonnage. It is conceivable that tonnage may be moved to registers
of non-State Parties, but as observed earlier those ships will still be subject to port-State inspections
enforcing Annex VI standards in foreign ports.
2.5

World Trade Organization rules

While it is unclear to what extent the rules of world trade could potentially have a bearing on
aspects of the discourse on the regulation of GHG in international shipping, it is appropriate to
brief overview of the topic as some IMO Member States have flagged a potential relationship
between prospective MBMs in shipping and WTO rules (infra). In responding to a request for
clarification by the IMO Council the WTO Secretariat identified a number of rules in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947/1994 (GATT 1994), 115 the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, 1994 (TBT)116 and General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1994 (GATS)117
that may be taken into account in the discourse on MBM.118
GATT rules that appear to be relevant for MBMs include: general most favoured nation
treatment (MFN); national treatment on internal taxation and regulation; freedom of transit; nondiscriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions (Article XIII); and general exceptions
112
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(Article XX). As a key principle in trade law, the MFN principle is not only in the GATT119 but is
to be found also in the TBT120 and GATS121 agreements. It prescribes non-discrimination between
like products and services from different trading partners. The GATT national treatment principle
prohibits tax or charge discrimination between domestic and foreign products, and that foreign
products should not be provided with less favourable treatment than domestic products (e.g., a
measure which modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of an imported product).122
Freedom of transit entails passage through the territory of WTO Members without discrimination
with respect to flag or origin and including no less favourable treatment in relation to charges,
regulations and formalities. 123 This amounts to identical level of access and equal conditions
during transit.124
The GATT permits exceptions, which could serve to justify an MBM that might otherwise
be found in violation of the MFN and national treatment principles.125 These include measures
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” 126 and measures “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”127 If a measure is captured under either
of those specific exceptions, it can be justified provided that it is not “applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade”.128
The TBT Agreement has many underlying principles in common with the GATT 1994, but
it is less stringent, and its Articles contain several built-in exceptions. The three relevant
obligations under the Agreement are described in brief. They comprise: a non-discrimination
obligation closely resembling those found in the GATT; a requirement that technical regulations
“not create unnecessary barriers to trade or be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a
legitimate objective”; and a requirement that domestic standards mirror international ones
wherever international standards are present.129
It is noted that unlike significant portions of air transport, maritime transport services are not
excluded from the scope of GATS. Further, GATS has a broad application covering measures that
directly govern the supply of services as well as those designed to govern other areas but
nevertheless affect trade in services peripherally. 130 Relevant GATS provisions include MFN
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treatment, 131 national treatment, 132 market access, 133 and additional commitments. 134 Unlike
GATT, GATS allows members to unilaterally opt out of certain provisions by attaching a list of
exemptions as a special schedule to the Agreement. This opt out mechanism applies to the MFN,
national treatment, and market access provisions in GATS. The additional commitments provision
allows further customization of the Agreement for Member States.135 It should also be noted that
GATS includes an exception provision identical to that found in GATT, namely “necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health” and is subject to a similar test.136
Maritime transport services are temporarily subject to different treatment under GATS given
that negotiations are still underway. Accordingly, the four relevant provisions of GATS are
inoperative until negotiations have concluded. Members are free to undertake their own
commitments in the meantime, but they will be allowed to withdraw or revise these commitments
up to 60 days before the close of negotiations. They must also finalize their unique exemptions by
that time. Finally, no members are permitted to adopt any measures affecting trade in maritime
services while negotiations are ongoing unless those measures are in response to other measures
adopted by other nations and are adopted with a view to maintaining or improving the freedom of
maritime services. Further, no measures which would improve a member’s “negotiating position
and leverage” are permitted.137
A recent study has observed that the regulation of the response to climate change and world
trade have proceeded predominantly in silos, thus with no consideration of issues of consistency
between the two regimes. 138 Reporting primarily with respect to the WTO rules and dispute
settlement procedures applicable to international trade in goods and the potential relationship to
national measures adopted in response to climate change, the study observed that the two regimes
appear to be headed towards a collision.139 This would occur where a Paris Agreement State Party
and WTO Member adopts a climate response measure that potentially conflicts with the MFN
clause. As noted earlier, under the Paris Agreement State Parties will make NDCs and it appears
that 45% of these could consist of trade measures likely to be based on process and production.140
It is arguable that a similar concern could arise with respect to services which, while governed by
the GATS, is subject to analogous principles. The study’s author further comments that in the case
of inconsistencies between the two regimes, such as where a trade dispute arises, the WTO rules
and dispute settlement procedure are binding on the WTO Member State. This is to be contrasted
to the NDCs under the Paris Agreement, which are voluntary, and the absence of a dispute
settlement system under that agreement. To avoid looming conflicts and in the absence of a carbon
adjustment measure, the study makes a compelling argument that WTO Member States should
131
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consider adopting a climate waiver to the regime’s rules.141 Clearly this study and others142 call
for integration, or perhaps better coordination, between the two regimes and that conflict between
the two regimes with respect to international shipping, if it arises, should not stand in the way of a
fair contribution of the sector to GHG emissions.
2.6

European Union GHG regulation

A fear of shipping industry operators has long been the prospect of having to cope with a variety
of different unilateral national or regional mechanisms for GHG reduction in the sector. Such an
approach, according to an industry view, would fly in the face of the aspiration of uniformity in
maritime regulation, potentially throwing international shipping into disarray, and distort trade and
world markets.143 The EU has worked for some time to advance the debate on global regulations
for the reduction of GHG emissions from shipping. It has also exerted pressure on the IMO to
progress with its deliberations on GHG reduction in the sector. The progress in the IMO has been
perceived as being too slow. Being convinced that pressure on the IMO is needed to allow for
progress, the European Parliament has recently suggested to incorporate shipping into the EU’s
existing land-based ETS. In turn, this initiative has raised significant concern at the IMO, in
particular because the concerned parties feared this could undermine global efforts to reduce GHG
emissions from international shipping at the global level.144
A European Commission (EC) communication issued in 2013 starts out by indicating a
strong preference for global regulations to address GHG emissions from international shipping.
The EC then proceeds to propose a systematic and gradual three-step approach for integrating
maritime GHG emissions into the EU’s existing commitments. 145 The first step involved the
creation of an emissions monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system for ships using EU
ports. The second step foresaw the creation of reduction targets in the maritime sector. The third
step contemplated the eventual introduction of some form of MBM.146 At the time same time, and
on different occasions since then, EU institutions have indicated a preference that the IMO be the
body to set targets and to adopt measures for the maritime sector.
The purpose of the MRV system is to provide reliable data on vessel emissions that can be
tracked and used to assess operator contributions. While bunker delivery notes tracking individual
vessel fuel consumption were already being issued in 2013, there existed at the time no mechanism
for reporting or verification. This was essential in order to combat fraud and increase accessibility
of information while not placing an unreasonable burden upon operators. The EC thus sought to
141
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introduce a regional system as a pilot project that could be tweaked and eventually be projected
onto the global stage.147 In addition, it could facilitate integration into the carbon market, should
international shipping either be integrated into the EU carbon market or a dedicated MBM be
developed for the sector.
The EU MRV system covers all ships over 5,000 GT calling at EU ports, including those in
Norway and Iceland.148 Operators of such ships are required to submit their own monitoring plans
for approval before the first year-long emissions reporting period149 beginning in 2018.150 These
monitoring plans will take into account types of fuel used and must contain a mechanism for
tracking consumption.151 Data from each reporting period will be published by the Commission in
June of each year.152 Vessels making fewer than 300 voyages during each reporting period are
required to submit a single aggregate report with detailed information on each voyage undertaken
during the year. Vessels making over 300 voyages during a reporting period are permitted to
submit a simplified report, provided they visit only EU ports. 153 All emission reports must be
approved by an accredited verifier154 before they are submitted to the EC in April of each year, via
a dedicated online information system that became operational in July of 2017.155 Beginning in
2019, all participating vessels will be required to carry on board a document of compliance.156
The MRV implementation appears to be making good progress, which bodes well for the
eventual adoption of a similar system at the global level and administered by the IMO. Some
industry players, however, remain skeptical about the feasibility of the MRV, particularly with
regard to the verification mechanism. 157 There are concerns that the EU MRV, which is more
demanding in terms of data recording and reporting than current IMO requirements, will run
parallel to the IMO system, thus causing unnecessary duplication. Whether the EU initiatives will
be embraced in whole or in part by the IMO, and despite the peer pressure exerted on the
Organization, the MRV system should be seen as a useful pilot project that will aid IMO efforts in
developing an effective and transparent monitoring system for GHG emissions. The Union
certainly has expressed readiness to consider the appropriateness of an alignment of the EU MRV
to the IMO model once the latter is adopted. Since the adoption of the IMO Data Collection System
for emissions from ships and of the remaining guidelines on functioning of the system in July
2017, the Commission has started work on the comparison of the two systems with a view of
alignment, as foreseen in the EU MRV Regulation. The Commission is expected to adopt a
proposal in 2018 which will then be considered by the European Parliament and the Council.
147
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Looking to the second and third steps of its proposed approach depicted in 2013 by the EC,
and using the opportunity of the revision of the ETS directive, a proposal to the European
Parliament envisaged the incorporation of shipping to and from EU ports into an arrangement for
a Maritime Climate Funding (as a modification to the existing ETS Directive) by 2023, if the IMO
does not adopt a ‘comparable system’ by 2021.158 In its amendment, Parliament recognized that
the existing ETS is the primary tool for achieving long-term climate and energy targets, but that
this tool must be “complemented by equivalent additional actions taken in other legal acts and
instruments dealing with greenhouse gas emissions from sectors not covered [under it]”.159 It was
implied that the IMO, as a key body responsible for one of those sectors, was expected to adopt
effective measures in a timely manner. 160
Assuming no ‘comparable system’ to the ETS is developed by the IMO by 2021, the EU
proposed to determine an allowance for the maritime sector in line with other land-based
continental sectors by 1 August of that year. This allowance would then be added to the total EU
quota, thus gradually integrating shipping trading in EU ports into the emissions allowance
auctions. Of the revenues generated from such auctions, 20% would be allocated to a Maritime
Climate Fund, the purpose of which would be enhancement of in-sector technological and
operational innovation with an eye to reducing CO2 emissions. The EU scheme contemplated the
eventual adoption of some form of international agreement regulating GHG emissions in the
maritime sector, at which point “amendments in order to ensure alignment with [such an]
agreement” will be proposed, considered, and voted upon.161
It is difficult to assess the substance of the proposed ETS on shipping for a variety of reasons.
The proposal was cast in general terms and contained no specific emissions allowance for shipping,
but merely a broad statement that one would be set in accordance with other sectors. Its 20%
revenue allocation to a Maritime Climate Fund appeared to be borrowed from proposals discussed
at the MEPC. Thus, the only assessment of including shipping in the ETS would have been a
comparative assessment with other sectors.
Unsurprisingly, the IMO’s and shipping industry’s responses have been critical of the EU
initiative for the reasons already touched upon. 162 There was even concern expressed in the
European Parliament, albeit by a minority, that the proposed measures would encroach upon the
mandate of the IMO.163 The proposed amendment was not accepted by Council, but the underlying
158
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concerns appear to have been taken on board.164 Following tripartite negotiations involving the
European Parliament, the Council, and the European Commission a compromise text was proposed
as a recital in the amended ETS Directive providing that action either at the IMO or EU should
start from 2023, including the preparatory work on adoption and implementation of emission
reduction measures.
Effectively, the EU appears to be expressing some degree of deference to continued IMO
efforts in pursuing its roadmap, but leaves open the possibility of EU regional action if progress at
the IMO is deemed insufficient in the next few years. In this respect it is relevant to acknowledge
that the EU, to be able to deliver on its commitments under the UNFCCC, also depends on aviation
and shipping to deliver. If somehow these sectors would be less involved in the realization of the
necessary reduction of emissions, other industries within the EU would be faced with a situation
that they have to compensate and do more. These other industries will pressure the EU institutions
on taking action, knowing there is much more that can be done cost-effectively to reduce the GHG
emissions from shipping.
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3.

THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING GHG EMISSIONS FROM
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

How, why and in what respects is the governance of international shipping different from other
industries and with what significance for determining mitigation contributions? The answer helps
to explain why the task of developing the international shipping industry’s contribution to the
global response to climate change was not directly addressed by the Paris Agreement and deferred
to the IMO as the competent international organization on the matter. The question further provides
insights into the problématique of maritime regulation and the issues that will need to be navigated
by the IMO in developing an appropriate regulatory approach to GHG emissions.
3.1

Commercial and operational life of the ship

The diversity of actors involved in the operational life of a ship poses challenges in distributing
the load of emissions reductions. A ship’s energy use and efficiency starts with its construction to
standards designed to achieve cargo-carrying capacity, optimal fuel use and emissions outcomes.
Construction of a new ship will be guided by international rules and standards applicable to its
class, including prospective standards with effectiveness at a later date, as well as market demand
and finance. 165 The duration of a ship mortgage will vary and will usually have lengthy
amortization periods followed by a balloon payment. 166 Thus, to meet new energy use and
efficiency standards a new build will have to consider mortgage costs in addition to crewing,
operations, maintenance, insurance and other expenditures. Moreover, during her life cycle it is
likely that a ship may have to implement newer equipment standards requiring retrofitting and
incur new mortgage costs. A shipowner will tend to take actions to optimise the earning capacity
of the ship throughout its life, or at least during her ownership, until her withdrawal from service
and eventual recycling.
The ship is composed of a cluster of technologies relevant for air pollution and GHG
regulation.167 The hull will have a hydrodynamic design to maximize the use of its propulsion and
energy savings. The propulsion machinery and propeller will vary and will potentially be operable,
with modifications, to use different types of fuels. The propeller itself will be engineered to
overcome resistance and generate adequate thrust. From an operational perspective, the higher the
speed employed to expedite the movement of the vessel, the greater the fuel consumption. Some
ships will have scrubbers to help filter particularly harmful emissions, such as particulate matter.
The master, officers and crew will be trained and certified in accordance with international
standards in order to navigate the ship in a safe, environmentally responsible and economically
efficient manner.
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Ships cannot all be regulated in the same manner. There is a wide variety of classes of ships
to service a range of general and specialized trades or to perform particular functions or services.168
Each type of ship has to be classed separately and while there are safety and environmental rules
of general application, there are also requirements specific to the type of ship and its operations.
For example, not all ships are able to perform safely and as intended simply by reducing speed or
changing fuel. A ship needs to maintain a particular minimum speed, depending on its class,
purpose and navigational conditions, to ensure manoeuvrability, engine considerations and safe
operation. While low speed results in lower emissions per ton mile,169 the consequence is longer
voyages and in turn more ships or voyages by the same ship to carry the cargo of the trade route
concerned. Also, a concern of slow speed in a voyage charterparty is that it might militate against
early arrival in a congested port to factor potential waiting times for a berth. The carrier will have
contractual obligations to arrive and discharge cargo in time and failing which lay time (the
contractual time allocated for unloading cargo) could be exceeded and demurrage (liquidated
damages for exceeding lay time) consequently incurred. In practice, these risks would likely be
addressed by industry model clauses (e.g., virtual arrival clause 170 ) or adjustment of contract
terms.171
Opportunities to control emissions may not necessarily be in the owner’s control. The ship
may be operated by a management company or perhaps even chartered. Indeed, a vessel may be
chartered and further sub-chartered. On a bareboat charter the owner parts with possession and
control of the ship (without passing title) and the charterer is responsible for hiring the crew,
operating the vessel, insuring it and securing its necessaries, including bunkers. Thus it is often the
responsibility of the charterer to operate the vessel in an environmentally efficient manner and the
charterer will therefore be responsible for securing cargo to earn freight, purchasing fuel, operating
her at various speeds and ultimately producing emissions. A charterer, whether bareboat or on time
charter (lease of a ship for a specific period of time), will want to maximise the earning power of
the ship by contracting as many voyages as possible. Speed is an important consideration and fewer
cargo runs for a ship may reduce the value of its time charter.
The typical ship used for international shipping is an instrument of international trade. It
remains in business as long as it services maritime trade. The extent of the fleet, ship composition
and size are all factors determined by the current or expected volume of global and regional trade.
Over the course of the 20 to 25 year average life span of a ship, many market and technological
factors intervene to determine how that ship is managed. The downturn of various trades in recent
168
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years saw many ships, including container vessels, sent to recycling well in advance of the average
life span. Their operation was no longer commercially viable. 172 A ship is able to remain in
business and recover its costs if her shipowner, operator or charterer secure cargo for carriage on
a fairly frequent if not continuous basis. Cargo brokerage, another aspect of the international
shipping industry, plays an important role in supplying business. Often, the carriage of goods by
sea is simply one leg of a multimodal voyage. Hence the emissions for the ton mile (amount of
cargo carried by mile) may include other forms of transportation such as road and rail, as well as
carriage on board of other vessels providing feeder services to regional and smaller ports. The
contract of carriage integrates the various modes into a unified service. Contemporary transport is
largely guided by just in time delivery to reduce warehousing costs. The ship itself performs the
function of a floating warehouse. Indeed, cargo may be sold at sea, perhaps more than once, and
its delivery may be directed to different ports where the consignees (buyers) are located. Hence,
the operators of ships will value flexibility to maximise use of their ships in the service of trade
between States.
Not all ships are engaged in maritime trade and the carriage of passengers by sea. The wide
variety of classes of ships mentioned earlier includes other vessels that service shipping generally,
as well other specialised services to maintain navigation aids, support other ocean uses such as
aquaculture, offshore oil and gas industry, and wind farms. These vessels may consume more fuel
per mile than other ships because they are workhorses of the industries they service, such as
offshore service vessels that depend on high torque power. In general, while ships provide trade
and specialised services, they also receive a range of other services from supporting vessels and
ports. Some of these vessels may not be engaged in international shipping. Thus, there is a wide
range of international and domestic shipping emission sources.
All ships are subject to construction, equipping, crewing and fuel standards and rules. These
are not only those adopted by the IMO, but may also include requirements adopted at the national
level and sometimes at the subnational level.173 There are usually requirements at the industry level
as well. For example, independent classification societies, which play a critical role in ensuring
that ships are built, equipped and operated according to international standards, also have class
rules. There are several such societies, the major ones being members of the International
Association of Classification Societies, and from time to time member associations produce and
update unified requirements.174 These are vital because they frequently provide the necessary level
of detail (e.g., harmonised definitions), which the original IMO rule or standard might not possess
or upon which an IMO rule depends.
All ships currently require bunkers for their operation, although the types of fuel used vary
substantially according to IMO standards, class rules and expected operations. The bunker industry
is yet another aspect of the international shipping industry. There is a complex multi-party
172
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production chain leading to the availability of bunker fuel. The bunker industry relies on the
refining industry to produce the wide range of fuels needed, including heavy bunker C (tar like), a
range of heavy and light diesels, biodiesels, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and so on. In turn,
refineries rely on oil and gas producers from developed and developing countries. Not all refineries
are equipped to produce the wide range of fuels needed by the bunker industry. Refineries receive
heavy to light crudes and process these on the basis of their capacities. It has been reported that
LNG, modified diesel and biodiesel could cost respectively 20%, 70% and 480% more than regular
low cost bunker fuel.175 A recent report indicates that the LNG bunkering market, although facing
infrastructure challenges, is expected to grow exponentially as a low cost alternative to reducing
shipping’s carbon and air emissions footprint, and in particular to meet Sulphur emission
requirements by 2020.176 While LNG is an increasingly popular fuel of choice for these reasons,
there are concerns. First, infrastructural challenges restrict the trade of LNG-powered ships to ports
where LNG is in supply. Second, there is risk that LNG-powered ships could become stranded
assets as decarbonization efforts are ratcheted up. Third, LNG is associated with methane leakages
into the atmosphere as a result of venting, leakage and slippage.177 This is worrisome as methane
is a far more powerful GHG than CO2, potentially undermining general efforts to reduce GHG
emissions from international shipping. In any case, LNG should be considered a transitional fuel
on the road towards decarbonization.
A further point concerning bunkers is that historically the maritime sector (as well as
aviation) have benefitted from tax-free fuels and frequently also other privileges, such as no excise
taxes, turnover taxes, value-added tax and low corporate tax rates.178 This privileged fiscal status
has been explained “in large measure from these sectors’ international status: they do not naturally
belong to any one particular country. Nor are they part of any international agreements that limit
taxation in aviation or extreme tax competition in shipping.”179 Further explanation includes the
high risk undertaking to provide shipping services and their essential role in global logistics and
supply chains.
3.2

Mobility of the ship

Ships are very mobile property, both as instruments of trade and also as objects of trade themselves.
Ships have the nationality of the State where they are registered. While there are several States
that own national shipping companies, the vast majority of commercial ship ownership is private
and structured in a manner to facilitate its finance and risk distribution. Ownership is divided into
a number of shares each one of which may have multiple owners. In traditional registers the ship
175
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must be beneficially owned in the State of registration. In contrast, in open registers (also known
as flags of convenience), ownership may be held by foreign interests. The registration of the ship
may be changed with ease so that over the course of their lives, and until deregistration for
recycling, most ships will have had different nationalities.180 Registration usually changes because
of change of ownership, a ship has been chartered, or an owner’s desire to cut down costs. Crewing
cost savings feature prominently because open registers permit the hiring of international crews,
however other cost-saving incentives play a role as well, such as expenditures incurred in
complying with flag state regulations and taxation. Thus a ship may be owned by interests in one
or more States, uses as a base or is operated from another State, and services the trade of other
States around the world without necessarily ever calling into the port of registry.
While servicing international trade a ship will traverse ocean spaces subject to the
jurisdiction of other States and call into numerous foreign ports. In between she will navigate the
high seas. The mobility of ships has long been protected as the traditional freedom of navigation,
which emerged early in the international law of the sea and remains today one of the most protected
(and regulated) ocean uses. Today the freedom of navigation consists of a cluster of international
navigation rights depending on the marine space traversed, such as innocent passage through the
territorial sea 181 and archipelagic waters, 182 archipelagic sea lanes passage in archipelagic
waters,183 transit passage through straits used for international navigation184 and the freedom of
navigation in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the high seas.185 Accordingly, in the
interests not only of unimpeded international regulation, but also maritime trade, it is considered
essential that the rules and standards for ships and their operations are global in nature and
application. When desirable, regional rules that find general acceptance tend to concern specific
considerations to a particular geographical area, such as load line requirements for particular
trading regions,186 or where the rules for a region are set in an IMO maritime convention.187 If
individual States or States at the regional level were to adopt rules for emissions from international
shipping outside of the IMO, there could be adverse consequences for the general expectations of
universality and uniformity of international maritime regulation, the protection of international
navigation rights, and potentially the availability of shipping to service maritime trade.188
3.3

Governance of international shipping

In addition to the global and transnational nature of international shipping, a further justification
for the IMO’s development of the industry’s contribution to climate change response is its
competence and work record. Based in London, United Kingdom (UK), the Organization was
180
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conceived by an international convention in 1948 as an intergovernmental technical consultative
organization189 and first convened in 1959 a year after that instrument entered into force. Since
then its mandate has evolved substantially and in particular as an international regulatory body.190
Although the IMO is not the only international organization with competence in shipping matters,
it is widely recognised as the leading body for the regulation of international shipping. 191 At the
time of writing, the IMO has 172 Member States and three associate members representing 97.28%
of global tonnage.192
The UNCLOS designates IMO as the competent international organization with respect to
international shipping in numerous provisions. 193 Its core mandate is more fully set out in its
constitutive instrument as the provision of “machinery for co-operation among Governments in
the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting
shipping engaged in international trade” and “to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of
the highest practicable standards in matters concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.”194 The IMO is responsible
for more than 50 conventions and agreements and the number of subsidiary instruments it adopted
(codes, recommendations, guidelines and other instructions) exceed 160, 195 easily making
international shipping the most regulated ocean use.
Although GHG regulation is not expressly mentioned in the IMO’s constitutive instrument,
the powers of the Assembly (the Organization’s highest decision-making structure) include
“adoption of regulations and guidelines concerning maritime safety, the prevention and control of
marine pollution from ships and other matters concerning the effect of shipping on the marine
environment assigned to the Organization by or under international instruments, or amendments
to such regulations and guidelines which have been referred to it.” 196 These other instruments
include MARPOL for which the IMO provides, among others, secretariat functions. More broadly,
the current Strategic Plan of the IMO is couched to pursue sustainable shipping. 197 An important
189
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focus in Strategic Direction 7 is “contributing to international efforts to reduce atmospheric
pollution and address climate change.”198
Meeting biennially, the Assembly may recommend to Members the adoption of new
regulations and guidelines.199 The Secretariat has also provided important support in generating
and disseminating important information and discussion documents, such as the three studies
concerning GHG emissions from ships (infra). The IMO Council, the Organization’s executive
body, has also stepped in on the GHG issue as needed. However, the structure directly responsible
for the environmental aspects of shipping is the MEPC, established in 1973 as a result of the
‘Torrey Canyon’ casualty in 1967. Its terms of reference encompass regulatory responsibilities
assigned by maritime conventions (e.g., MARPOL), consideration of enforcement measures,
technical assistance and cooperation on marine pollution, and cooperation with other regional and
international organizations. 200 The MEPC coordinates closely with other IMO structures,
including the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and Legal Committee. Whenever issues arise
which require legal interpretation, the MEPC refers such questions to the Legal Committee. The
MEPC and MSC are assisted by a complex system of sub-committees.201 On air pollution generally
and the GHG issue the MEPC has conducted much of the in-depth work through working groups
and expert groups that meet both during and in between committee sessions.
While IMO rules and standards may be adopted on the basis of majority voting, in practice,
decisions are generally adopted by consensus, thus frequently achieving a high degree of support.
There have been instances when consensus was not achieved and instead a proposed resolution
containing new rules and standards was put to a vote. As will be seen below, this was the case
during development and adoption of GHG regulations under MARPOL Annex VI. At times, new
regulatory initiatives have been proposed by such organizations. The regulations are adopted and
eventually enforced with no more favourable treatment for any particular flag State or industry
actor. After all, flag States and industry actors are engaged in global competition while deriving
commercial benefits from international maritime trade.
Since the establishment of the IMO the process of maritime regulation-making has evolved
from one characterised by dominant diplomatic processes and under the tight control of Member
States (and State Parties to conventions) to a more inclusive one. In the contemporary setting, the
process enables the participation of non-governmental organizations that are granted consultative
status. On the basis of criteria set out in an Assembly resolution,202 the Council grants consultative
198
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status to applicant NGOs that are able to make a substantial contribution to IMO work usually
through the provision of information and expert advice. 203 Consultative status requires an
undertaking to support IMO activities and disseminate its work, as well as granting reciprocal
privileges to the IMO.204 While organizations with consultative status have no voting power, they
enjoy a broad range of participatory privileges, including the ability to submit documentation for
consideration in the various structures of the Organization as well as addressing meetings on being
recognized by the chair.205 The list of NGOs with consultative status is reviewed periodically and
over the years it has grown to include organizations from all sectors of the shipping industry,
maritime labour, environmental and other non-governmental organizations.
A former chair of the Legal Committee observed that “active industry participation in the
work of the Committee is evidenced by the presence of a large number of observer delegations
representing every sector of the maritime industry” and “are given wide latitude to intervene and
contribute to the work of the Committee.” 206 There are numerous examples where shipping
industry organizations played critical roles in the development of international standards. 207 As
observed elsewhere in this report, the proposal for a roadmap for IMO regulation of GHG
emissions originated from industry organizations. One view is that “the shipping sector have been
shown to be more influential in affecting the views of decision-making state delegations than those
representing environmental interests.”208 This has been evident in the development of the Polar
Code where the instrument’s environmental provisions were narrowly focused on pollutionprevention whereas environmental NGOs advocated for a broader environment protection
approach so as to include anti-fouling systems and ballast water concerns in polar waters. 209
Similar NGO concerns have been expressed in the deliberations on GHG emissions from ships.
Regulation theory suggests that tripartism in responsive regulation, that is involving a public
regulating authority, a regulatee and public interest groups, provides for better cooperation and
checks on regulatory capture. 210 In practice, the degree of influence exerted in the IMO by
organizations with consultative status may be more nuanced. Delegations of Member States are in
control and while some may include industry representatives, most do not. Perhaps the degree of
influence organizations with consultative status exert in any particular IMO structure or process
depends on issue sensitivity and willingness of Member Delegations, or at least some of them. On
203
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some environmental issues, such as particularly sensitive sea areas, the contributions of
environmental organizations played a key role in informing the development of an international
standard.211
In general, international rules and standards adopted by the IMO apply to ships on
international voyages. Indeed, IMO technical regulation generally targets ships rather than States.
In exercising effective jurisdiction and control States are expected to apply international standards
developed for ships. The regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping poses the most
difficult challenge. Ships also operate on purely domestic trades, known as cabotage, where the
ports of departure and destination are in the same State, or services an offshore activity in waters
within the jurisdiction of the port State. The distinction is important because NDCs under the Paris
Agreement capture the latter, but not the former. The consequence is that not all ship emissions
will necessarily be addressed by IMO regulation. In addition to cabotage, other potentially
excluded vessels include fishing and recreational vessels. However, in other areas of maritime
regulation, some States have extended the application of IMO regulation to domestic shipping in
the interests of consistent safety, security and environmental regulation. This can again be expected
with respect to GHG regulation of ships on domestic trades and, as observed earlier, their
emissions can be expected to be captured by NDCs.
3.4

Principles and process of maritime regulation

Maritime regulation involves a highly structured and lengthy deliberative process aimed at
promoting universality of participation in the maritime conventions and uniform implementation
of rules and standards. The process is not necessarily always exclusively technical and a degree of
politicisation of some issues has occurred. As mentioned earlier, in pursuit of global uniformity,
the basic policy underlying the application and enforcement of IMO conventions is NMFT in
international shipping, whether the institution concerned is a maritime administration or an
industry operator. When a particular maritime administration does not possess the technical
capabilities needed to implement international rules and standards, technical assistance is readily
available and provided. The usual regulatory process is accompanied by capacity-building
analysis.
International maritime regulation is also guided by rationales of compelling necessity,
functionality and pragmatism. Regulation serves the need to have the highest practicable standards
to ensure and facilitate maritime safety, marine environment protection, security and ultimately
the flow of trade. The opening statement of the Organization’s strategic direction 14 provides that
“IMO will seek to ensure better regulation through a systematic approach and that its instruments
are free from administrative requirements that are disproportionate, obsolete or unnecessary.”212
In 2015 the IMO Assembly further refined the regulatory process through the adoption of
six basic principles to guide regulation-making in a systematic manner and to ensure consistency
211

For example, for an insight into WWF’s influence in amending guidelines on particularly sensitive sea areas, see
Revision of Resolution A.720(17), Report of the Drafting Group, IMO Doc MEPC 43/6 (3 December 1998). Other
areas where environmental NGOs had substantial influence include anti-fouling systems, underwater noise, and
individual PSSA designations.
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IMO Strategic Plan, supra note 197, SD 14.
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throughout the Organization.213 First, the regulation must be necessary, i.e., there is an evidenced
compelling need with respect to the operational, technical and economic impacts and actual
benefits derived. The proposed regulation is not or cannot be fully or partially addressed in an
existing instrument or by other means. Second, the regulation must be consistent with other
existing maritime regulations. For example, the proposed regulation should not contradict or
undermine an existing rule or standard. Third, the proposed regulation must be proportionate to
the issue addressed. It must be balanced and take into account its direct and indirect impacts.
Fourth, the proposed regulation must be fit for the intended purpose so that it produces the expected
outcome. Fifth, the proposed regulation must be resilient so that it is able to adapt to technological
change and capacities. Sixth, the proposed regulation must be clear. It is to be drafted in simple
and unambiguous terms to facilitate its implementation and enforcement. In recent years, the
general approach taken in maritime regulation is goal-based, that is aimed at achieving a particular
outcome rather than solely providing prescriptions for specific standards or conduct. This approach
provides the persons addressed by the regulation a measure of flexibility in the process of
compliance while meeting the intended regulatory outcome.
Technical regulation on the basis of goal-based standards is further supplemented by
standards developed by the International Standards Organization (ISO), 214 in particular by
technical committee ISO/TC8 focusing on ship and marine technology. 215 In addition to the
establishment of the goal, goal-based regulation includes compliance with functional requirements
and verification of conformity. These standards directly or indirectly support the development and
implementation of IMO regulations and assist innovation. Standards developed to date include
vessel efficiency216 and standards for general GHG emissions.217 The value of ISO standards is
that they enhance transparency of key processes, such as reporting and verification as well as
facilitating compliance with IMO regulations.
Each IMO committee has its own guidelines on method of work. For example, the MEPC
and MSC have a well-defined process.218 Guided by compelling need, the typical process provides
for three steps, namely data gathering on an issue proposed for regulation, analysis of the data
gathered, followed by decision-making on an appropriate rule and standard, if needed.
Recent submissions to the Council have proposed further structuring of the rule-making
process to ensure a higher level of scrutiny of the compelling need and appropriateness of the
proposed rule and standard.219 While the proposed refinements have not been adopted, they are
213

Principles to be Considered when Drafting IMO Instruments, IMO Assembly Resolution A.1103(29) (26
November 2015), annex.
214
International Standards Organization, online: ISO < https://www.iso.org/home.html>.
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ISO TC 8: Ships and Marine Technology. Online: ISO < https://www.iso.org/committee/45776.html>.
216
In particular measurement of changes in hull and propeller performance, which are important for determining vessel
efficiency and consequences for emissions, resulting to date in ISO 15016:2015 guidelines for the assessment of speed
and power performance, usually applied during sea trials. Ibid.
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For example the ISO 14000 series aim to provide clarity and consistency for quantifying, monitoring, reporting,
validating or verifying GHG emissions. Ibid.
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Guidelines on the Organization and Method of Work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine
Environment Committee and Their Subsidiary Bodies, IMO Doc MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.4 (10 June 2015).
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Submitted by Jamaica, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Panama, the United Kingdom, BIMCO, IACS, ICS,
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expected to receive further consideration in due course. The proposals suggest that it would be
useful to distinguish between (1) the development of new codes or chapters to an existing
convention, (2) amendments to existing instruments and (3) amendments requiring minor changes
to existing instruments. The regulatory process would take into account the following factors:
Step 1 – gathering sources of reliable data and collective experience that could be used in the
assessment of the compelling need for IMO to address an issue in its regulatory framework,
including such aspects as availability, consistency and accessibility of data; and consideration on
how other industries address these issues, capture data and apply risk-based methods in developing
regulations;
Step 2 – considering whether IMO action is necessary now, in particular when issues are uncertain
and the impact of a new regulation is difficult to estimate or when it is known that other measures
to address the issue have already been agreed or recently implemented in the industry that address
the issue (e.g. answering the question whether action by IMO is really needed and identifying the
scale of the problem that the new regulation should solve);
Step 3 – using cost-effectiveness and impact analyses to estimate short-term and long-term benefits
due to the implementation of the new regulation (e.g. in terms of enhancement of safety of life at
sea, or protection of the marine environment) and associated costs (including potential negative
consequential impacts in other areas, difficulty in practical application, legislative and
administrative burdens);
Step 4 – assessing the availability of suitable technologies to be installed on new and/or existing
ships and estimating a realistic time frame for their implementation to assess whether a system or
a technology will be available to meet the objectives of a new regulation, and available from a
commercially competitive market;
Step 5 – evaluating the transparency and robustness of approval procedures for possible new
equipment to ensure compliance with both regulatory and operational requirements;
Step 6 – considering the impact on manufacturers to produce and deliver the required systems (e.g.
whether suitable facilities are available to install these technologies and a realistic time frame for
their implementation, to reach the required production volumes) with possible contributions of
individual manufacturers and/or manufacturer associations;
Step 7 – assessing the availability of clear and unambiguous criteria for surveying, inspecting and
testing new technologies on board. The situation should be avoided when properly used and
maintained type approved systems, in accordance with requirement of the new provisions, are
found non-compliant when examined against the criteria of other regulatory bodies or authorities,
including port State control;
Step 8 – considering an achievable time frame to test and consolidate a technology before deciding
on the implementation dates; and
Step 9 – evaluating potential conflicts of benefits and detriments between environmental, economic
and social issues, assuming safety and security as paramount, by applying risk-based approaches
(e.g. Formal Safety Assessment, Safety Level Approach), where needed, performance-based
methods and/or other qualitative or quantitative considerations.220

The proposals suggest that the assessment process would be undertaken at three stages,
namely when first submitted, at an intermediate stage (where deliberations extend beyond a
biennium) and final assessment of the proposed regulatory package “to assist the committee in
making a final decision as to whether or not the regulatory package is ‘fit for purpose’,
Discussion of the Principles and the Development of a Framework, Submitted by Greece, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, BIMCO, IACS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, IMO Doc C 117/14 (4 November 2016).
220
IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1, supra note 219, annex.
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proportionate and without excessive burden on industry.”221 In the final assessment, the criteria
applied include what ships will be subject to the requirement, proposed date of application,
whether there are suitable technologies, that approval processes and implementation guidelines are
in place, that impacts on manufacturers and operators are ascertained, and capacity-building needs
are identified.
3.5

IMO efforts in developing the industry’s contribution to mitigation

The issue of air pollution from ships was first considered in the IMO in the 1980s in connection
with the review of the quality of fuel oils, but it was not until 1988 that air pollution was added as
an MEPC agenda item. Subsequent committee discussions on fuel quality led in 1990 to inclusion
of the issue in the long-term work plan, followed in 1991 by a milestone Assembly resolution on
prevention of air pollution and pollution from garbage from ships222 which paved the way for the
future adoption of Annex VI.223 The first regulations appeared with MARPOL Annex VI through
the Protocol of 1997 adopted at a diplomatic conference on air pollution that year.224 By then a
number of initiatives in other fora had already addressed various forms of atmospheric
emissions.225
The Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I States Parties to the UNFCCC to pursue through the
IMO the reduction of GHG emissions from marine bunker fuels not addressed by the Montreal
Protocol.226 In 1997 an IMO air pollution conference invited the MEPC to consider what CO2
strategies might be feasible in light of the relationship of that gas with other atmospheric pollutants,
citing the IMO’s task under the Kyoto Protocol. 227 Since MEPC 42 there has been ongoing
cooperation between the Secretariats of IMO and UNFCCC, including SBSTA,228 for example
through the provision of information to the various sessions of the latter.229

221

Ibid.
Resolution A.719(17), supra note 199.
223
The initial Annex VI set a general cap of 4.5% m/m on the sulphur content of fuel (compared to 0.5% at this time!),
controls of nitrogen oxides, prohibition of deliberate emission of ozone depleting substances (halons and CFCs), and
prohibition of onboard incineration of products containing contaminated packaging materials and polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs). Annex VI also designated the Baltic Sea as the first emission control area with a higher standard
for SOx (1.5% m/m, compared to 4.5%).
224
Protocol of 1997, supra note 104.
225
For example: Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 13 November 1979, 1302 UNTS 217
(entered into force 16 March 1983), amended by Protocols to address emissions of sulphur (1985), nitrogen oxides
(1988), volatile organic compounds (1991), and further reducing sulphur emissions (1994); Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January
1989), amended by the Protocol of 1990 phasing out of halons and ozone-depleting CFCs 2000, and by the Protocol
of 1992 accelerating phase-outs and adding phase-out dates for HCFCs and methyl bromide.
226
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art 2(2).
227
Resolution 8 of the 1997 Air Pollution Conference, referred to in Report of the MEPC on its 45th Session, IMO
Doc MEPC 45/20 (16 October 2000), at 55.
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Following an initial request by MEPC 41. Report of the MEPC on its 42nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 42/22 (16
November 1998) [MEPC 42 Report], at 32–33.
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For example, see Report of the MEPC on its 44th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 44/20 (12 April 2000) [MEPC 44
Report], at 39–40.
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In 2000 MEPC 45 agreed to discuss GHG emissions after considering a study commissioned
by MEPC 42230 and prepared by the IMO Secretariat (the first GHG study)231 following further
submissions by Japan and the UK.232 MEPC 46 considered this issue and, following submissions
by Norway and the UK on the need to develop an IMO GHG strategy which received broad
support, it was agreed that a working group would be established at MEPC 47.233 The working
group was to evaluate emission reduction proposals, receive proposals from Member States,
identify appropriate IMO sub-committees for the issue and prepare materials for a future
strategy.234 The focus was on CO2235 although an intersessional correspondence group felt such
approach should be for the short-term and without limiting the future general strategy. 236 To
facilitate discussion of the proposed Assembly resolution, the correspondence group considered a
base document exploring possible elements of a future IMO strategy for GHGs.237 It proposed a
resolution on IMO Policies and Practices related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Ships238 which was subsequently adopted by the Assembly in 2003.239 The resolution urged
the MEPC to identify and develop the mechanisms needed to enable limitation or reduction of
GHG emissions from international shipping and to prioritize establishment of a GHG emission
baseline, development of a methodology to describe the GHG efficiency through an emission
index, development of guidelines for application and verification of a GHG emission indexing
scheme, and evaluation of technical, operational and market-based solutions. The MEPC was also
requested to consider methodological aspects of GHG emission reporting, develop a work plan
with a timetable, and maintain the item under review. It is important to note that the Assembly
resolution proposed to address all ships, rather than simply the States listed in Annex I of the Kyoto
Protocol, although this would become a divisive matter.240
Chaired by Norway, the correspondence group’s work, while important in advancing IMO
efforts on GHG, was characterised by increasingly diverse views on what a future strategy should
accomplish. By MEPC 51, a growing minority of developing countries vocalized their concern
that the Organization’s GHG work should be guided by UNFCCC principles and that Kyoto Annex
I countries should be taking the lead in reducing emissions.241 These concerns required additional
work in the correspondence group. At MEPC 52 the Committee divided consideration of the issue
into two steps, the first was to focus on technical matters and the second would address ‘political
230
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issues’ including NMFT and CBDR.242 With respect to the former, the Committee instructed the
correspondence group to continue technical work on guidelines for a CO2 indexing scheme as a
voluntary mechanism on the basis of interim guidelines. 243 In-depth work on CO2 indexing
proceeded at a Technical Workshop on GHG Indexing Scheme held at IMO in 2005 on the basis
of sea trials and studies by a few volunteering flag States, industry actors and the EU.244 The
conclusion was that technical guidelines worked, but that a number of issues needed to be
addressed, including the formula for calculation of indexing (specific to fuels with different
conversion factors), data standardization, and development of a method for the index for new
builds.245 As to the ‘political issues’, the sharp division of views represented on the one hand by
Norway246 for NMFT and on the other by China247 for CBDR led the Chair to conclude that “it
would be advisable to continue the common ground found on technical matters and defer the
application issue to a later stage when an agreement had been reached elsewhere.”248
The Working Group on Air Pollution was reconstituted at MEPC 54249 and its work led to
MEPC 55 deciding on an updated plan of work based on three main lines of action. 250 First, with
respect to the CO2 Emission Indexing Scheme, Member States and industry were urged to continue
to carry out trials with a view to improving the indexing method in the interim guidelines. Second,
242

Report of the MEPC on its 52nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 52/24 (18 October 2004) [MEPC 52 Report], at 26.
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work on the CO2 emission efficiency baseline and methodology would continue work with a view
to drafting a proposal. Third, technical, operational and market measures would be considered.
However, by MEPC 56 there was growing concern in the IMO at the protracted negotiations
without producing tangible outcomes and the concern that lack of progress might encourage
unilateral national or regional initiatives.251 The need for a new GHG study was agreed as an action
item.252 At this session Norway fielded a proposal that potentially simplified the development of
an IMO strategy by proposing a CO2 toll to apply to all international shipping, not dependent on a
baseline and which would lead to the establishment of an international fund.253 This was the first
proposal for an MBM and in essence consisted of a uniform carbon tax. Views both for and against
the proposal were expressed, but the Committee agreed the working group should consider all
options for technical, operational and market measures that may be submitted.254
Several Member States submitted technical, operational and MBM ideas to a correspondence
group and which were reported to MEPC 57.255 The correspondence group undertook an in-depth
and systematic discussion of proposed measures and their suitability for the short or long-term,
including pros and cons. The group identified policy issues, including the NMFT and CBDR duet,
considered if a global approach was not feasible whether regional or national approaches might
arise, and whether shipping could be considered under the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol. 256 A
collective submission by delegations and industry organizations with consultative status proposed
that any future regulations should be based on fundamental principles that would inform the future
IMO framework for GHG regulation.257 This was embraced by MEPC 57, concluding that the
framework:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

must be effective in contributing to the reduction of total global greenhouse gas emissions;
binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to avoid evasion;
cost-effective;
able to limit, or at least, effectively minimize competitive distortion;
based on sustainable environmental development without penalizing global trade and growth;
based on a goal-based approach and not prescribe specific methods;
supportive of promoting and facilitating technical innovation and R&D in the entire shipping
sector;
(8) accommodating to leading technologies in the field of energy efficiency; and
(9) practical, transparent, fraud free and easy to administer.258

The principles were adopted by a majority vote called by the chair after a difficult debate. The vote
raised a fundamental question as to whether the IMO will be able to adopt new rules and standards
for GHG regulation on the basis of the usual practice of consensus. Some Member States continued
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to be of the view that developed States had a special responsibility under the Kyoto Protocol, while
the majority placed faith in the culture of IMO regulation as it applies to all ships. The vote
reflected a deep rift between developed and some developing countries. China and Brazil reserved
their position on the principles, with Barbados, South Africa and Venezuela sharing their
concerns.259 India wanted to amend the first principle while rejecting the second and was supported
by Barbados, Brazil, South Africa and Venezuela.260
There was more unity in the various industry sectors. Discussions in the Tripartite Working
Group consisting of representatives of shipyards, ship owners and classification societies
supported a cross-industry-based goal. 261 This, as well as other proposals, including technical
submissions and a Danish proposal for a global levy on bunker fuel as a short-term measure,262
were referred to the working group. There was growing support for a mandatory CO2 design index
for new ships which was referred to the working group.263 In turn, during MEPC 57 the working
group on GHG emissions from Ships discussed the various submissions as guided by the nine
principles, while with some participating States reiterated their reservations on the application of
the second principle.264 Drawing on its previous work, the working group focused on a set of shortterm and long-term measures, with the former constituting the basis for new energy efficiency
regulations. 265 It proceeded to plan its prospective intersessional work for CO2 design and
operational indices and MBMs.266
The timing of MEPC 57 signified a sense of urgency to progress on the GHG issue because
of the need to coordinate inputs concerning GHG emissions reduction efforts in the maritime sector
into the UNFCCC process and the upcoming Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009.
In essence, the MEPC was tasked with developing the international shipping industry’s
commitment. The IMO Secretary-General proposed acceleration of work, namely completing
work on the CO2 Emission Indexing Scheme and the CO2 emission baseline(s) by MEPC 58.267 As
for deliberations on the technical and operational measures and MBMs, the Secretary-General
proposed completion of that task by MEPC 59 in 2009. Both suggestions were adopted.268
In June 2008 Norway hosted a major intersessional working group that significantly
advanced the IMO’s work on GHG emissions and enabled MEPC 58 to make progress.269 The
MEPC formed a working group to try to finalize work on the CO2 emission design and operational
indices (now renamed respectively as EEDI and Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI)
259
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on the basis of a proposal by Brazil) and considered proposals for a ‘Ship Efficiency Management
Plan’.270 This time the working group was tasked with a GHG-specific mandate, rather than to
consider all air pollution issues within the MEPC’s purview. A draft interim EEDI for new ships
was produced for trial purposes, but more work on the operational index and management plan
was needed. A key issue was what form new mandatory measures should take, i.e., whether they
should be developed as amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, a new Annex VII, or even a new
stand-alone instrument, but this was not resolved.271
The MEPC 58 deliberations on MBMs constituted the first in-depth substantive discussion
on such measures. As such, the discussion was less fruitful than on technical measures, in part
because of their controversy, and because not all submissions were considered due to time
constraints. Even so, a range of ideas were acknowledged as interesting and worth further study.
Although some were argued as reasonably straightforward to introduce, there was considerable
uncertainty as to how they would work, and that consequently Member States needed more
information. 272 Fundamental differences on principles remained, most especially whether new
emission requirements should bind UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Annex I States, a view now
shared by a growing number of developing countries, or whether all States should be making them
applicable to all ships. 273 The reality is that international shipping emissions cannot easily be
attributed to any particular territory and if ships registered under the flags of developing States
were to be excluded or given preference, the whole purpose of reducing emissions from
international shipping would be undermined. At MEPC 58 there was a growing understanding that
there could be other ways to address CBDR, for example through technology transfer and funds
generated from a prospective MBM. However the uncertainty around MBMs did not generate
confidence that the special needs of developing countries would be addressed in a satisfactory
manner. At this point, who should bear the bulk of the responsibility for GHG emission reductions
from international shipping highlighted a profound north-south divide. Moreover, there were other
divisions. For example Greece, a major ship owning State, opposed MBMs until their added value
to the efficiency of shipping could be demonstrated, and reiterated some views expressed at the
intersessional meeting hosted by Norway that the Danish proposal for a fuel levy was essentially
a tax that would impede international trade.274
On the eve of UNFCCC COP 15 in December 2009 and the inception of its 59th session in
July, the MEPC had not yet met the Secretary-General’s expedited agenda. COP 15 was expected
to adopt a new post-2012 agreement to combat climate change. The IMO had already submitted
ideas for international shipping to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
under the Convention (AWG-LCA).275 The IMO was under pressure to demonstrate commitment
to the international community, at least with respect to its work on energy efficiency. There
remained fundamental differences on principles and concern over insufficient information to
deliberate on some issues. Environmental NGOs added pressure by indicating their readiness to
270
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call upon other fora, such as the UNFCCC or the EU, to take timely and appropriate actions if
MEPC 59 did not produce agreement. 276 Even so, MEPC 59 produced a number of
accomplishments. The Committee instructed the working group to finalize work on the EEDI and
the EEOI.277 Work on the SEMP as a fuel efficiency management tool would continue in view of
finalization and a guidance document on best practices for fuel-efficient operations was
finalized.278
MEPC 59 resumed discussion of MBMs and new proposals were submitted in addition to
Denmark’s earlier submission. These included an emission trading scheme (cap and trade)
applicable to all ships proposed by France, Germany and Norway, 279 and a leveraged incentive
scheme proposed by Japan. 280 Although not advancing an MBM, the US proposed mandatory
efficiency standards for new and existing ships using the EEDI which could accompany an
MBM.281 These and other proposals are further discussed later in this report. Potential emission
reduction scenarios from MBMs were considered, but there was no agreement on whether targets
should also be set.282 It was noted that the discussion was still conceptual at this stage and would
need to be continued through future sessions.283 Earlier concerns regarding their uncertain impact,
especially on developing countries, were reiterated. 284 A majority of delegations agreed to
continue consideration of MBMs.285
The second IMO GHG Study, commissioned at MEPC 56, was completed.286 Among others,
it concluded that shipping emitted 3.3% of global CO2 emissions in 2007, and international
shipping circa 2.7%, mostly through exhausts, with CO2 being the most important contributor. By
2050, and in a business as usual scenario, ship emissions could grow by 150% to 250%
commensurate with growth in world trade. If technical and operational measures to enhance
efficiency (e.g., EEDI), which were deemed cost-efficient, were to be used, emissions could be
reduced by 25% to 75% below these projections. The report further “found that market-based
measures were cost-effective policy instruments with a high environmental effectiveness.” 287
Moreover, MBMs “captured the largest amount of emissions under the scope, allowed both
technical and operational measures in the shipping sector to be used, and could offset emissions in
276
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other sectors.”288 The environmental benefit of EEDI was limited because it only applied to new
ships and incentivised design improvements without including operations. In a business as usual
scenario for the industry and an emissions scenario where global temperatures stabilise at 2°C
above pre-industrial levels by 2100, ship emissions were estimated to constitute 12% to 18% of
the global total CO2 emissions in 2050.
The 2009 Copenhagen conference failed to produce the expected climate treaty, but this did
not eliminate pressure on the IMO. The Copenhagen Accord did not expressly mention bunker
fuels, however the reference to the need to reduce global emissions to maintain global temperature
to below 2 degrees from pre-industrial levels nevertheless raised the question “What would be a
fair contribution for the international shipping sector to achieving this long term goal?”289 MEPC
60 resumed this task and had before it over almost a 100 documents to consider. A significant
breakthrough was a proposal by Japan, Norway and the US to establish the EEDI for new ships
and the SEEMP for all ships in operation as a new mandatory part in MARPOL Annex VI. 290
MARPOL was already addressing ozone-depleting substances, some of which contributed to
climate change, and had a well-established survey and certification system. The convention’s tacit
acceptance process for amendments provided a fast route to implementation if Annex VI was used
as the vehicle.291 Not all delegations supported the Annex VI route as it was questioned whether
CO2 was in fact a pollutant within the meaning and intent of the convention. Some preferred a
stand-alone instrument similar to the BWM Convention and Hong Kong Ship Recycling
Convention. The Organization’s Legal Division advised that there were no legal obstacles to using
Annex VI for GHG regulation and, on the contrary, this regulatory route was consistent with the
annex’s purposes.292 Others, mostly developing countries, did not support mandatory regulations,
preferring to see further development and trials first.293 The issue was put to a vote and the majority
supported using Annex VI as the regulatory vehicle. The Working Group on Energy Efficiency
Measures for Ships, tasked with the development of mandatory legal text and consideration of
related guidelines, likewise did not find consensus,294 prompting an intervention by the SecretaryGeneral.295 The impasse was not only with respect to developing country concerns over mandatory
measures, but also with regard to convening a further intersessional meeting of the working group
to complete its tasks. This decision was put to the vote and the majority gave the working group
the green light to address outstanding tasks.
Consideration of how to move forward the discussion on MBMs led MEPC 60 to establish
an expert group to undertake a feasibility study and impact assessment of MBMs and report to the
288
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Committee296 while focusing on ten specific proposals and other submissions.297 The relevance
and application of the CBDR principle was underscored, but even so several major developing
countries reserved their positions on the terms of reference and the Expert Group on Feasibility
Study and Impact Assessment of possible Market-based Measures (MBM-EG) was established by
majority vote. 298 Also, subject of disagreement was whether the international maritime sector
should be subject to an express emission cap or reduction target for the world fleet. Norway
submitted scenarios for caps for 2020 and 2030.299 The industry response preferred an approach
that was consistent across the entire global transportation sector and aimed at improving efficiency
of the global fleet rather than imposing a cap. 300 The International Union for Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) argued for an approach that integrates a proposed rebate mechanism in the design
of an MBM and that this would help reconcile the principles underscoring the IMO and UNFCCC
regimes.301
Intersessional work on the details of the regulatory text of the EEDI and SEEMP continued,
identifying several issues and possible approaches proposed to MEPC 61. MEPC 61 was further
informed by important scientific documents that explored scenarios of likely reductions in
emissions by employing technical and operational measures, 302 using excess capacity in the
shipping industry as an opportunity to employ slow speed regimes, 303 and combining energy
efficiency and a proposed carbon credit trading scheme. 304 Speed controls could potentially
generate substantial savings depending on the type of ship or voyage segment. It was felt that no
such new dedicated operational rule was needed as this measure would be captured by the EEDI
296
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and SEEMP.305 However, at a minimum, it was important to ensure that sufficient reserve power
was maintained to retain full vessel manoeuvrability. 306 Proposals for introducing correction
factors to the EEDI were treated with caution as it was important not to create exceptions, other
than for weather and polar class.307 A proposal for flexing standards for remotely located and SIDS
was rejected for several reasons, including that substandard ships would be pushed into the trades
of those States. 308 Similarly, differentiating between ship construction in developed and
developing States was rejected.309 If EEDI and SEEMP were to be made mandatory, regional and
national capacity-building would be needed for implementation and enforcement.310 MEPC 61
also considered the report of the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of
Possible Market-based Measures. The report presented an analysis of the ten proposals submitted
by Member States aimed at targeting GHG reductions through in-sector emission reductions or
out-of-sector emissions reductions.311 The Committee could not reach consensus on the MBM to
pursue and left further deliberation of this issue to intersessional work312 with some delegations
expressing strong reservations.313
At MEPC 62 in 2011 the Drafting Group on Amendments to Mandatory Instruments (Part
II) completed final revisions for the proposed amendments to MARPOL Annex VI. 314 A new
Chapter 4 made the EEDI mandatory for new ships and the SEEMP for all new and existing ships,
and with entry into force on 1 January 2013. Breaking with the culture of consensus on the adoption
of new rules and standards, the amending resolution was forced to a vote and 49 out of the 59 (at
the time) MARPOL Annex VI State Parties voted in favour, with Brazil, Chile, China, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia voting against. The remaining five States abstained or did not vote.315 Further work
on capacity-building, technical assistance and transfer of technology, as well as finalization of
guidelines to accompany the EEDI and SEEMP was left to MEPC 63. The discussion on MBMs
also remained divisive and did not advance further.
MEPC 63 was similarly divided on the issue of capacity-building and technology transfer
and failed to adopt a resolution on the topic despite its significance and expectation it would
accompany the Annex VI amendments. 316 The EEDI and SEEMP guidelines to facilitate
305
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implementation were also not completed. There were several issues related to both the EEDI and
SEEMP that required future MEPC attention. Discussion on MBMs continued with respect to
assessment of impacts of such measures, possible consolidation of the various proposals, climate
finance and use of MBM revenue, and relationship between MBMs and world trade rules. A more
in-depth understanding of the direct and indirect impacts of MBMs on developing countries was
needed.317 A study conducted by India suggested that fuel price increases as a result of an MBM
could have substantial impact on that country’s oil, iron ore and coal trades.318 Views differed on
whether MBMs were needed, whether the various proposals should be consolidated to enable
focus, and whether the EEDI should be used as a basis for an MBM. A working group had
identified several possible uses for MBM revenues. 319 However, there were widely divergent
views on how revenues from an MBM in shipping might be used and whether there should be a
relationship to similar efforts under the UNFCCC, even though international shipping had been
listed as one of the possible sources for climate finance. 320 While some delegations saw no
incompatibility between an MBM and WTO rules, others expressed caution as they perceived
inconsistency issues.321
Discussions on a resolution on capacity-building and technology transfer continued, but did
not conclude at MEPC 64. As a consequence, and at the behest of States that felt further discussion
on MBMs could not progress before adoption of the resolution, the Committee postponed further
deliberation to MEPC 65.322 The progress to be observed at MEPC 64 related to the continued
development of the guidelines for the implementation of the EEDI and SEEMP.
MEPC 65 finally found consensus on the controversial resolution Promotion of Technical
Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of
Ships, but only after informal consultations undertaken by the Committee Chair.323 The key issues
that needed to be addressed were CBDR, transfer of technology and financing. Consensus was
reached without any mandatory stipulations and essentially providing a framework for the IMO to
offer technical assistance and for Member States to promote support for other States.324 An Ad
Hoc Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology for Ships was established
to assess impacts of the implementation of the new Chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex VI and to
maintain a list of green technologies and identify ways of access.325 Developed States secured the
protection of intellectual property rights. Implementation action would start at MEPC 66. This
consensus should have led to further deliberations on MBMs, but that was not to be. Instead MEPC
317
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65 suspended further discussion on MBMs to an undetermined future session. 326 Perhaps this
decision was not a total surprise as the Committee remained divided on MBMs, even though there
was progress on technical and operational initiatives, albeit not always on the basis of consensus.
In contrast, work on the finer details of the EEDI and SEEMP continued in a productive
manner at MEPC 65. Through its working groups and in plenary, the Committee resolved
numerous outstanding technical issues, such as the computation of the EEDI for different classes
of ships such as cruise ships, cargo ships, LNG carriers, ro-ro cargo ships and ro-ro passenger
ships, vehicle carriers, and distinguished vessels running dual fuel engines. Accordingly, the
guidelines to accompany the EEDI and SEEMP were finally completed and readied for adoption
at MEPC 65 and 66.327 Amendments to Chapter 4 were already needed, in particular to exempt
polar class vessels with independent icebreaking capability from EEDI because of their
considerably higher installed power and inability to meet that standard. 328 There were other
proposals for further action to enhance energy efficiency of ships, but the Committee left that
discussion for the next session.
With debates on MBMs on hold and work on Annex VI Chapter 4 guidelines largely
completed, the MEPC 66’s attention turned to implementation of the resolution on technology
transfer and capacity building, continued follow-up work on Chapter 4 guidelines, and
preparations for a third IMO GHG study and worked on the proposal to set up an EEDI database.
The Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology for Ships was
established and its first meeting convened.329 It was further able to report on its initial activities at
MEPC 67.330 MEPC 67 also continued work on conceptualizing the database and updating and
reviewing EEDI guidelines. 331 There was no progress on the discussion to explore additional
operational energy efficiency standards for ships accompanied by metrics.332
The Third IMO GHG Study was completed in 2014 and presented at MEPC 67.333 The study
noted that CO2 emissions from shipping were projected to increase significantly. The business as
usual scenarios projected an increase by 50% to 250% by 2050, although enhancement of energy
efficiency and reduced emissions had the potential to mitigate the increase to some extent.
Efficiency improvements were important, but the study concluded that “even modelled
improvements with the greatest energy savings could not yield a downward trend. Compared to
regulatory or market-driven improvements in efficiency, changes in the fuel mix have a limited
impact on GHG emissions, assuming that fossil fuels remain dominant.”334
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An ongoing key concern was the absence of reliable ship emissions data to facilitate adoption
of further technical and operational measures to enhance energy efficiency in international
shipping. The data issue was first flagged at MEPC 63335 and at MEPC 66 it was agreed that a Ship
Fuel Consumption Database would assist the IMO in its future reviews of technological
developments and in determining CO2 emissions. The debate was continued in successive sessions
because the information required to determine energy efficiency could be detailed with respect to
the transport work undertaken, rather than simply relate to the fuel consumed. In turn, efficiency
data potentially raised sensitive issues of commercial competitiveness if the raw data were to be
made publicly available.336 Other issues included whether reporting should be mandatory, vessel
size for reporting, impact on different cargoes carried, impact of change of ship ownership or
registration and responsibility for transferring data to the flag State.337
As observed earlier, the slow pace of work on GHG regulation at the IMO triggered EU
pressure. The EU welcomed the EEDI and the SEEMP, but considered these measures insufficient
because they would not lead to an absolute emission reduction of GHGs from international
shipping. 338 The EU agreed that a CO2 global data collection system for international shipping
was a necessary step and had in fact proceeded to adopt the EU Regulation on Monitoring,
Reporting and Verification (MRV)339(supra) as an example of what a global system could look
like. The data included detailed emission and transport efficiency and with an effective
enforcement date in European ports on 1 January 2018. The EU is currently considering the
appropriateness of the alignment of its MRV scheme with the IMO data collection system. The
effect of the MRV initiative was to exert regional pressure for global action, which materialized at
MEPC 70 by an amendment to Annex VI introducing a mandatory global data collection system
for reporting data on ships’ annual fuel consumption for ships of 5,000 gross tonnage and over.340
These ships are thought to account for 85% of all GHG emissions from international shipping.341
With entry into force in 2018, reporting of data will start in 2020.342
On the eve of the Paris Climate Change Conference, at MEPC 68, the Marshall Islands, both
a SIDS State and one of the largest open register States, proposed that the IMO commence work
to establish a GHG emission reduction target consistent with keeping global warming below 1.5°C
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and to agree on the measures necessary to reach that target. 343 The question whether emissions
from international shipping should have a defined emission reduction target has been an ongoing
issue in MEPC deliberations across sessions. The ensuing debate reflected the broad diversity of
views that had characterized past GHG discussions in the IMO.344 It was recognized that more
could be done at the IMO, because while substantial efforts were invested into enhancing energy
efficiency to reduce emissions and establishing a database, the Third IMO GHG Report did not
paint a rosy picture on the sufficiency of such measures. The remaining issues concerning the
proposed mandatory data collection system for fuel consumption of ships were resolved at MEPC
69 and amendments to integrate the system into the new Chapter 4 of Annex VI approved, paving
the way for tacit acceptance. 345 Guidelines to facilitate administration of the database and
implementation of the regulation were adopted at MEPC 71.346
The Paris Climate Conference in December 2015 may have provided the IMO a breadth of
relief by tacitly leaving the determination of the international shipping industry’s contribution to
GHG emissions reductions to the IMO for the time being. But it also renewed debate in the IMO
as to what was the Organization’s long-term GHG vision and how it should proceed in developing
the industry’s fair contribution. In a post-conference debate at the IMO, it was clear that although
the IMO had for years worked on and developed a framework for energy efficiency to reduce CO2
emissions, much more was expected.347 The IMO would need to develop, and be seen to adopt,
meaningful measures that would be periodically reviewable. That international trade should not be
undermined by new measures and the need for developing countries’ (especially SIDS and LDCs)
to have access to financial resources and technology were underscored. Reconciliation of CBRD
and NMFT had to be addressed. However, there were those that felt that the IMO should stay its
course on the database and following its operationalization use its data to proceed with analysis
and eventual decision-making on a long-term plan. Industry interests felt the IMO approach should
retain flexibility and consider aspirational rather than legally binding targets. It was felt important
to ensure the measures adopted to date, such as the EEDI and technology transfer and capacitybuilding measures be implemented first. Past differences of views persisted, but the Organization
opted for a disciplined approach. The discussion concluded by recognizing that priority should
continue to be given to the data collection system and for further work to proceed on the three-step
approach of maritime regulation, namely data collection, analysis and decision-making.
Convened in the wake of the Paris Agreement, MEPC 70 was under particular pressure to
demonstrate a game plan for the orchestration of the international shipping industry’s contribution
to the global response to climate change. An industry proposal348 was used as the basis for the
Committee’s adoption of the Roadmap for Developing a Comprehensive IMO Strategy on
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Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships. 349 The Roadmap consists of further GHG studies,
intersessional work subject to timelines, and ongoing Committee work on ship energy efficiency
improvements. The initial GHG reduction strategy will be adopted in 2018 and will lead to a
revised strategy in 2023 to include a range of measures and implementation schedules over the
short, medium and long-terms.350 MEPC 70 also adopted the finalized mandatory data collection
system for fuel oil consumption of ships, the 2014 Guidelines were amended, and guidelines for
calculation of the EEDI were updated.
For MEPC 71 the Committee had before it numerous new submissions by Member States
and organizations with consultative status, submitted to the Committee directly as well as to
ISWG-GHG 1. The ISWG-GHG 1 met in June 2017 for intensive discussions on the directions for
the strategy and work plan for consideration at MEPC 71. Following consideration of submissions
and the ISWG-GHG 1 report, the Committee adopted the latter’s proposals, including the outline
proposed for the initial strategy developed at a parallel meeting during MEPC 71.351 The outline
is nothing more than a provisional table of contents, set out as follows:
Preamble/introduction/context including emission scenarios
Vision
Levels of ambition
Guiding principles
List of candidate short-, mid- and long-term further measures with possible timelines and
their impacts on States
Barriers and supportive measures; capacity building and technical cooperation; R&D
Follow-up actions towards the development of the revised strategy
Periodic review of the Strategy
In using this outline as a basis of work at subsequent intersessional meetings (October 2017 and
April 2018), the MEPC further instructed the working group to consider the substantive issues set
out in submissions by various delegations and organizations with consultative status and to submit
a progress report in 2018.
The ISWG-GHG 2 concluded its meeting in October 2017 and commenced to populate
the strategy.352 The importance of the issue was demonstrated by the participation of 59 Member
State delegations and other associate members and organizations with consultative status. As
before, the meeting continued to evidence fundamental differences on the core elements of the
strategy, particularly on vision, levels of ambitions and guiding principles. On vision, there were
differences on whether the strategy should aim at decarbonization by the end of this century as an
end goal or as a process, but the term ‘decarbonization’ itself proved to be problematic. The
349
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alternatives appeared to be either an IMO commitment to GHG reductions to zero by the end of
the century or to a ‘best endeavours’ approach to reduce emissions.353 The levels of ambition
produced even more differences, which the ISWG Chair proposed to group as the following
approaches, and with each one of which having a number of proposals: “annual total GHG
emissions from international shipping to be kept below a defined level”; “GHG emissions from
international shipping to peak and then decline”; “carbon intensity of international shipping to
decline”; “carbon intensity of the ship to decline”.354 However, there appeared to be agreement
that 2008 should be used as the base year in determining future emissions reductions, and indeed
several proposals included targets using that as the base year.355 In comparing data between 2007
and 2012, the Third IMO GHG Study appeared to suggest that 2008 was the peak year for CO2
emissions.356
Equally substantial differences continued in regard to the guiding principles, with
proposals aimed to ensure that strategy principles reflected IMO and UNFCCC principles, as well
as impacts on States, in particular LDCs and SIDS. Other proposals are potentially more difficult
to reconcile in crafting a common approach, including: the nine MEPC 57 principles, the second
principle of which (NMFT) was particularly divisive;357 ten separate principles were submitted by
Argentina, Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey at
MEPC 71, which included coherence with the UNFCCC regime, alignment with the SDG goals
and no trade barriers; 358 and eight principles identified in ISWG-GHG 1. 359 Other proposed
considerations included that the strategy should be ‘in sector’, so that international shipping would
not become a source for general climate finance outside the sector360 and articulation of the CBDR
that would include emphasis on developed country lead, geographical considerations, low value
cargo, transportation costs, routes, phasing-in and readiness.361 There were substantial differences
with respect to measures, but it appears that there was converge on possible durations of the short,
medium and long-terms.362 The strategy would include short-term measures finalized in the 20182023 period, followed by mid-term measures in 2023-2030, long-term measures after 2030.
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Measures are conceived in terms of their direct application to ships as distinct from a
supportive function they may play. Some measures are based on enhancement of existing
regulation (e.g., ratcheting up of the EEDI and SEEMP, as well as other technical and operational
measures in the short-term), thus likely to entail greater potential for support because of their
familiarity in the industry. Other novel measures for which there is no experience in the industry,
such “new/innovative emission reduction mechanism(s), possibly including Market-based
Measures (MBMs), to incentivize GHG emission reduction” in the medium-term, 363 can be
expected to be accompanied by some reserve and possibly left for future review. Despite the
concerns that MBMs raise, they are likely to remain an option to achieve significant GHG
emissions reductions in the event technical and operational measures do not deliver sufficient
reductions.
Of significance, there was agreement on the need for the strategy to be subject to periodic
review, possibly every five years to coincide with the Global Stocktake or even every 10 years.364
Other measures would include addressing impacts on developing countries, barriers and supportive
measures, capacity-building and technical cooperation, and R & D. While the meeting succeeded
in progressing the discourse on key aspects of the strategy and explored a range of options, its
output was largely in square brackets (signifying areas as unsettled) at a high level of generality
and bereft of details, leaving substantial work to be accomplished before and during ISWG-GHG
3 in April 2018. There is much that remains to be accomplished by ISWG-GHG 3 to produce the
next iteration of the draft initial IMO strategy. Its mandate is to finalize the draft and further
consider how to progress prepare advice for MEPC 72 on how to progress further.365
In summary, the substantive regulatory achievements with respect to GHGs, and specifically
CO2, to date consist of 2011 amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, introducing a new Chapter 4
setting out the EEDI for mandatory new ships and the SEEMP for all ships, and accompanied by
guidelines,366 both of which are discussed further below, as well as a mandatory data collection
system for oil fuel consumption. These measures are expected to render all new ships 30% more
energy efficient by 2025 than those built in 2014, and mandatory reporting for vessels of 5,000
gross tonnage or more of oil fuel use to flag States and thereby to the IMO to commence in 2020.
3.6

Range of actual and potential measures considered

3.6.1 General
The categories of GHG emissions reduction measures considered to date by the IMO for the
maritime sector consist of technological, operational and market-based measures. Technical and
operational measures provide an incentive for shipowners to comply because of the greater
operational efficiency likely to be achieved. Enhanced efficiency translates into lower fuel
consumption and leads in turn to lower operating costs. To some extent, this is the “invisible hand”
363
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of the market at work, but it is limited in its utility, as shipowners will only invest voluntarily in
technical and operational measures to the extent that they expect to realize a beneficial return.
MBMs are different because they attempt to internalize costs through various tools, including
levies, trading schemes and offsets to induce shipowners to reduce emissions according to
prescribed standards.367 By promoting the internalization of costs, they constitute a potentially
useful tool for the implementation of the “polluter pays” principle. Moreover, some MBMs, such
as levies, generate revenue, which may be diverted by an administering body to further the goals
of the strategy. The work of the IMO with respect to these measures is discussed next.
3.6.2 Technical and operational measures
Technical and operational measures are closely interrelated. Generally, technical measures relate
to the standards of construction and equipping of a ship and usually entail long-term investments
in the form of retrofitting and new builds. Examples include new hull designs, new propulsion
machinery using cleaner fuels and new propeller technology which enhance mobility efficiency.
Operational measures concern how a vessel is in fact operated while trading or in port and usually
are capable of implementation in the short-term. Examples include speed optimization, weather
routing and hull maintenance. MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4 sets out technical and operational
measures for vessels of 400 GT with an effective date of 1 January 2013. The key regulations
concern the EEDI as a technical measure for new ships and the SEEMP as an operational measure
for existing ships. Collectively, these measures seek to increase the operating efficiency of ships
on international routes, thereby reducing fuel consumption and overall GHG emissions in the
sector.
In applying to new builds, the EEDI concerns vessels ordered as of 1 January 2017 or those
to be delivered after 1 July 2019. The EEDI also automatically applies to older ships that have
undergone major conversions from 2017 onward.368 The EEDI applies differently to the various
classes of vessels, namely bulk carriers, gas carriers, tankers, container ships, general cargo ships,
refrigerated cargo carriers, combined carriers, LNG carriers, ro-ro cargo ships (vehicle, general
carriers, passenger), cruise passenger ships and non-conventional propulsion vessels and in
accordance with transitional regulatory phasing set out in a regulation.369 Every class of ship is
assigned an attained EEDI that indicates an estimate of its real performance with regard to its
required EEDI. The required EEDI for a vessel is based on a “reduction factor” as well as its
reference line value.370 Reduction factors vary with the type and size of each vessel, becoming
more stringent over time with each five-year phase leading up to 2025. Reference line values are
based on ship type and size. Both reduction factors and reference line values are subject to
amendment based on technological developments. Changes in the market, such as a surge or
further decline in the price of oil, are not explicitly contemplated by the regulations. It is
conceivable that market changes might push shipowners to increase operating efficiency beyond
what is merely required of them. The approach of the EEDI is non-prescriptive and instead it
367
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embraces a performance-based approach. Effectively, and flexibly, this approach leaves the choice
of technologies to achieve stated efficiency goals to the shipowner.
The value of the SEEMP is that its scope of application is all ships, therefore including
existing ships that are likely not as efficient as new builds. The SEEMP requirement is
accompanied by guidelines to facilitate its implementation.371 All ships are required to have a plan
to enhance operational efficiency with respect to the particular ship’s capabilities. It is understood
that ships have different classes and operate under a wide variety of conditions. Through the
SEEMP, the shipowner, operator or charterer aim to improve a ship’s energy efficiency through
planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-evaluation and improvement, thus completing a
feedback cycle.372
In order to facilitate proper functioning of the EEDI and SEEMP models, MARPOL Annex
VI incorporates a mechanism to facilitate the collection and reporting of fuel consumption data.
Data is collected yearly by the flag State and transmitted to the IMO, with each ship’s performance
anonymously catalogued by the IMO and distributed among Member States for their consideration
and analysis.373
The MARPOL Annex VI Chapter 4 includes provision for promotion of technical cooperation and transfer of technology relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of ships,
based on State request. 374 This provision was included to address the concerns raised by
developing countries with respect to the need for capacity-building. As will be seen below, while
this provision is built on good intentions, it faces the challenge of intellectual property rights,
which are not readily transferred by commercial actors seeking to maintain market
competitiveness. These issues have been the focus of some of the efforts to address the role of
technology and technology transfer under the UN climate regime. The technology mechanism
was first announced under the Copenhagen Accord, but has since been brought under the Paris
Agreement, and work is continuing on the development and dissemination of climate related
technologies.
3.6.3 Market-based measures
As discussed above, the decision to consider MBMs as potential mechanisms for curbing GHG
emissions in international shipping sector, in addition to other measures, was first made in an IMO
Assembly resolution in 2003.375 Starting with the 54th session, the MEPC gave consideration to
MBMs through its working groups until discussion of the topic was suspended at MEPC 65. As
observed in the commentary above, the discussions revealed significant divisions. While the
majority agreed on the merits of the concept, several delegations expressed concerns with regard
to uncertain or adverse impact on developing countries, fearing that an MBM could adversely
affect their trade and development. China, India, Brazil, the Bahamas, Peru, South Africa, and
371
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Saudi Arabia, among others, voiced concerns on these issues. Despite the suspension of formal
discussions, occasional Member State submissions made since MEPC 65 suggest that the concept
of an MBM in international shipping is still an option for the IMO Strategy.
Following the initial MBM proposal of the UK at MEPC 55, several other submissions that
directly or indirectly supported MBMs were made at MEPC 59 and 60:
Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and the International Parcel Tankers
Association (IPTA) proposed the establishment of an International Fund for GHG
emissions from ships based on a global reduction target for international shipping. 376
Emissions in excess of the target would need to be offset through purchased and approved
emission reduction credits that would be based on a contribution paid on every tonne of
bunker fuel purchased.
Japan proposed a ‘Leveraged Incentive Scheme’ based on contributions from bunker fuel
purchases made to a GHG Fund.377 A ship’s meeting or exceeding efficiency benchmarks,
would be rewarded through partial refunds.
The US proposed mandatory efficiency standards for all ships and an efficiency credit
trading programme to induce compliance.378
Norway proposed a cap and trade system with a sector-wide cap on net emissions and
establishment of a global emission trading/auctioning system.379
Similar to Norway’s, a UK proposal was based on national rather than a global auctioning
system and with a long-term decreasing cap.380
Also similar to Norway’s, France proposed an emissions trading system, but with some
different elements.381
Jamaica proposed a uniform consumed bunker-based levy applied to ships on port calls.382
The World Shipping Council (WSC) proposed incremental mandatory efficiency standards
for all new and existing ships according to their class, and a fee per tonne of fuel consumed
would be levied from non-compliant ships.383
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The IUCN and WWF called for a rebate mechanism for a market-based instrument while
compensating developing countries for the MBM’s financial impact.384
Germany proposed a tool to assess MBM impacts in the form of an ‘Impact Assessment of
an Emissions Trading Scheme’ paying particular attention to impacts on developing
countries.385
At MEPC 62, the Third Intersessional Working Group on GHG Emissions organized the
existing MBM proposals into two groups as: (1) those focusing on in-sector maritime emissions
reductions; and (2) those opting to focus on out-of-sector reductions, or offsetting.386 The group
of MBMs focused on in-sector emission reductions will best serve to drive and incentivize
technological innovation by shipowners in order to increase efficiency within the shipping sector.
Shipowners who fail to reach gradually increasing standards would be liable to pay a penalty of
sorts, the proceeds of which would ultimately be used for administrative purposes, research and
development, or mitigation of ill-effects on developing countries.
The group of MBMs focused on offsetting would to some extent integrate international
shipping into the broader GHG emissions reduction effort. Shipowners would either purchase or
be allotted emissions credits which could be subsequently used, traded, or potentially banked for
later use. Additional credits would be available via out-of-sector offset programs. The many
detractors of the out-of-sector model point out that while such a scheme, if managed properly,
would ensure a net global reduction in GHG emissions, it might allow the shipping sector to
stagnate technologically. Indeed, it gives shipowners greater opportunity to use redirected capital
in the place of innovation. In principle, integration with or at least derivation from existing landbased emissions reductions schemes might serve to make a maritime solution easier to adopt
initially and administer as time goes on.
a. Focus on in-sector reductions
This group of MBM proposals is dominated by reliance on the EEDI. Two proposals that stand
out are Japan’s and the World Shipping Council’s, working jointly on the first, and the US, on the
second. The two proposals are strikingly similar. The first is known as the Efficiency Incentive
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Scheme (EIS);387 the second, Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT).388 A third proposal, the
Port State Levy, proposed by Jamaica,389 received less attention. The Bahamas, concerned about
harm to developing countries and adamant that any MBM would represent a penalty on
international trade, proposed non-intervention in the market, preferring to let natural market forces
incentivize technological development and efficiency.390
The EIS imposes a baseline efficiency standard on individual ships of each class and size.
Japan’s view is that a global industry-wide cap would cause an outflow of money from the sector
(more on this below in the discussion of the GHG Fund proposal). The baseline would increase in
stringency over time, and it could be tied to the existing EEDI. Any ship not meeting its respective
baseline would be charged a flat rate per ton of bunker fuel purchased. Thus, ships with an EEDI
rating in compliance with the scheme would not be penalized, whereas those that under-performed
would contribute to a global GHG shipping fund, the proceeds of which would be applied primarily
to research and development. The SECT proposal from the US is almost identical to the EIS, but
differs in that it incorporates a credit trading system. In short, vessels that outperform their
respective baselines would sell emissions credits to vessels that failed to reach theirs.
The US proposal incentivizes not only the achieving of baselines, but also further exceeding
them. However, a credit trading system will introduce inherent complexities of its own, such as
the price of credits will not necessarily remain stable or predictable. Further, if credits are not
available in sufficient quantities, it is unclear what would be the options for under-performing
ships.
Reliance of an MBM on the EEDI could pose an issue for older vessels, which may be
disproportionately penalized. A potential approach to alleviate the issue would have to balance the
387
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obvious desirability of existing ships serving out their full intended service lives while still being
pushed to operate as efficiently as possible and perhaps even retrofit to some degree. A further
issue is that under the EEDI, underpowered ships often achieve a high rating, whereas vessels that
rely on substantial power to operate are at a disadvantage. With the EIS and SECT it cannot simply
be presumed that the penalties for under-performance will not serve to stifle trade with developing
nations. The reality is that some routes are less profitable than others. Narrow margins coupled
with a monetary penalty may thus reduce traffic to some regions.
The Jamaican proposal of a Port State Levy appears as a decentralized MBM. It would
involve a uniform fee charged by individual port States on ships entering their ports. This fee
would be based on fuel consumed during the inbound voyage and could be structured towards
global emissions reduction targets, rewarding vessels that exceed targets. The revenues from this
scheme could be applied to purchase out-of-sector offsets for the shipping industry or may allow
for keeping revenues within the sector. While such a system would arguably be simpler than a
credit trading system, it would also burden port States and potentially result in uneven application.
b. Focus on out-of-sector reductions
Proposals in this category included the GHG Fund proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall
Islands, Nigeria, and the International Parcel Tankers Association,391 supported by South Korea
and Liberia,392 and the Global Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), proposed by Norway, the UK,
and France. 393 Germany released a relatively favourable impact assessment of the ETS on
developing countries and recommended that a portion of revenues be redistributed among them to
mitigate any negative effects.394
The GHG Fund would impose a levy on each ton of bunker fuel and establish a global
emissions reduction target for the entire shipping sector. Emissions beyond this cap would be offset
by a scheme in which ‘emissions reduction credits’ would be issued to shipowners who funded
391
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out-of-sector GHG emissions reductions projects. The levy could be adjusted regularly to ensure
sufficient funding for the payment of emission reduction credits to shipowners. Additional funds
could be allocated to mitigation of negative effects on the developing world, R & D, adaptation,
and technical cooperation. While the GHG Fund is preferable to industry investors in that it would
to some extent ensure stability of fuel and carbon prices, problems emerge when one considers
how and where to set the industry target. Furthermore, shipowners are encouraged to spend money
out-of-sector just as readily as they are encouraged to spend it on technological development and
efficiency in-sector.
The ETS has received a great deal of attention and enjoys formal support from a large
number of Member States, all of which are European. A relatively successful land-based ETS is
in effect in Europe, which has covered all flights between Member States since 2012, without
discrimination on the basis of nationality.395 In the shipping context, an ETS would impose a global
cap on emissions and create an international marketplace in which emissions credits would be
auctioned off. Unlike the SECT proposal, which also involves a credit trading system, the global
ETS could incorporate credits from other sectors, such as CDM credits, to allow shipowners to
better offset their emissions. Norway proposed a limited exemption clause for voyages to
developing countries, while France supported small, controlled side auctions to help facilitate the
participation of smaller shipowners. The carbon cap would be certain (though perhaps not easy to
set), but the price of emissions may not be predictable. This might deter investors and create
unwanted uncertainty in the shipping sector and could interfere with operational planning for
shipowners. Finally, in comparison to the GHG Fund, the ETS would be very costly and difficult
to administer and regulate. The potential for fraud and abuse would need to be addressed.
3.6.4 Expressed trade law concerns with MBMs
During MEPC 62 deliberations with respect to MBMs, the delegation of India raised the question
of possible incompatibility between proposed shipping MBMs then under discussion and WTO
rules. 396 While noting that other delegations were of the view that proposed MBMs were
compatible, India felt that such a conclusion was premature, given that the proposals lacked
sufficient detail to enable such determination. Instead, India proposed that the compatibility of
MBM proposals with international trade rules should be examined before the MEPC decided on
the adoption of any such measures.397 Several points of contention were enumerated,398 centering
on the GATS399 and GATT 1994.400 India reiterated its concerns at MEPC 63, but this time also
questioning the validity of the mandatory EEDI adopted under MARPOL Annex VI in the face of
the guiding UNFCCC principle of CBDR.401 In response, the Committee began by recalling the
395
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remarks of a WTO representative at GHG-WG 3 to the effect that the WTO could not challenge a
global agreement facilitated by the IMO and that the WTO Rules should not be invoked as a
mechanism for stalling progress on climate change action. Because of the contingent of delegations
that remained concerned about a possible WTO conflict, however, the Committee agreed to
continue the debate at MEPC 64, inviting further submissions.402
A second document was put forward by India at MEPC 64, this time with Saudi Arabia as
co-sponsor.403 The two Member States reiterated that, in their view, it was premature for the IMO
to conclude that all proposed MBMs were theoretically implementable, in part because “most of
the MBM proposals lack sufficient details and are not mature enough to lend support to any such
conclusion” and also because none had been satisfactorily assessed vis-à-vis WTO Rules.404 The
two delegations addressed four key principles of the WTO Rules that they felt had been threatened
by one or all of the proposed MBMs.
First, the concept of MFN treatment, set out in both GATT and GATS was identified as a
potential problem, although it was admitted that negotiations on maritime transport services under
GATS were still ongoing, and thus operation of GATS in this area had been suspended unless
Members had specifically opted for inclusion.405 In the WTO context, MFN treatment is designed
to counter discrimination (both de jure and de facto) by ensuring that all like products (or services
in the case of GATS) are treated equally regardless of their nation of origin.406
Another feature of GATT 1994 addressed by the two delegations was Article V, which
applies the MFN principle to freedom of transit of goods and vessels. 407 While none of the
proposed MBMs would affect transit of goods per se, the Indian and Saudi delegations cited this
provision to emphasize “that the MFN treatment obligation applies to all ships and vessels with
regard to their entry, exit or departure at ports irrespective of the origin or the flag.”408
Any MBM providing for port State detention of foreign ships (namely, the GHG Fund and
the ETS), argued India and Saudi Arabia, would amount to product discrimination and thus a
violation of the MFN principle. Of course, this interpretation requires that ships be viewed as
‘products’ under GATT 1994.409 Another cited MBM that might run afoul of the MFN principle
was the Jamaican Port State Levy proposal. The reasons here are difficult to follow, but the crux
of the reasoning seems to be that “levying a uniform emissions charge on all vessels, on a nondiscriminatory basis, would be administratively cumbersome”.410
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The two delegations also addressed a broader issue arising from the MFN principle: the
expected increase in freight costs resulting from the adoption of any MBM. Such an increase would
disproportionately affect the competitiveness of exports from the developing world, given that
developing economies export a substantial share of freight with a low value to weight ratio. This
would result in destabilization of the world markets, and could lead to “like products being treated
in an unlike fashion”, which is prohibited under WTO Rules subject to certain exceptions. Finally,
under any MBM, benefits would be conferred upon any nation able to modernize its shipping fleet.
Since developing world fleets are less likely to be modernized, this too would result in
discriminatory treatment under the MFN principle.411
Second, the National Treatment obligation prohibiting discrimination of imported goods in
favour of domestic ones, enshrined in Article III of GATT 1994,412 was addressed.413 Invoking
unnamed WTO Appellate Body holdings, the two delegations took the position that such
provisions are generally afforded a broad interpretation, applying to a broad range of
discriminatory measures. As in Article I, both de jure and de facto discrimination are covered.414
In addition to an alleged MFN conflict, it was argued that any MBM allowing for the
detention of non-complying foreign vessels might also run afoul of the National Treatment
obligation because it would have the potential effect of disadvantaging imports in favour of
domestic goods.415 Similarly, with regard to the PSL proposal, given that domestic goods would
not be subject to a levy of any kind, and given the broad interpretation afforded to Article III of
GATT 1994, a levy on foreign shipping emissions imposed by Port States, India and Saudi Arabia
have argued, might be seen as undue discrimination favouring domestic goods.416
Third, the two delegations pointed to WTO provisions respecting fees and charges on
imports and exports. 417 Such provisions allow member states to impose fees and charges but
restrain their amounts to the “approximate cost of services rendered” and explicitly prohibit
indirect protectionism or taxation of imports for fiscal purposes. 418 Given that the Jamaican PSL
would exact a levy on incoming foreign shipping while failing to render any tangible service, the
Indian and Saudi delegations argued that this MBM amounts to a taxation of imports for fiscal
purposes, and thus constitutes a violation of GATT 1994, Article VIII.419
Fourth, India and Saudi Arabia raised the general elimination of quantitative restrictions on
imports and exports as a potential issue. 420 The relevant provisions in GATT 1994 cover any
quantitative prohibition or restriction “made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
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other measures”.421 Any MBM giving Port States the power to exclude non-complying vessels,
they argued, could be taken to be in breach of the quantitative provisions of the WTO Rules, given
that the goods carried aboard excluded vessels would be effectively prohibited from importation.
Furthermore, the two delegations argued that the requirement for a vessel to carry proof of
compliance with any MBM could be taken as a requirement to carry a sort of import license, which
would violate the aforementioned provision in GATT 1994.422
One final MBM characteristic worth noting is a financial penalty imposed on a ship’s
operator as a result of non-compliance. With specific reference to the UK version of the ETS
proposal, India and Saudi Arabia argued that “[L]evying a penalty on the ship’s operator is . . .
equivalent to levying a penalty on the goods carried.”423 Such an interpretation would allow for an
argument to be advanced that the imposition of penalties violates each of the four enumerated
WTO principles.
The Indian and Saudi delegations concluded by arguing that “[S]hipping is a servant of world
trade,” and that “[T]he industry should not and must not introduce measures which would create
complications for world trade and trigger trade disputes.” Because the participation of the
developing world in international trade is essential to the continued generation of wealth in those
nations, and because a continued generation of wealth is required if those nations are to take
measures to combat global warming, the adoption of any MBM in the shipping sector would only
prove counterproductive and exclusionary.424
At MEPC 64, the Committee again decided to defer consideration of the potential WTO
issue to the following session, at which point an impact assessment of the various MBMs would
be available.425 At MEPC 65, the Secretary-General produced a document outlining the views of
the WTO Secretariat on the previous session’s submission by India and Saudi Arabia.426 While the
interpretation of WTO Rules falls within the exclusive purview of WTO members rather than that
of its Secretariat, it was noted that the document submitted to the MEPC was of a neutral character
and meant to “flag out what could be some of the main [WTO] disciplines to which IMO Member
States would need to be alerted.” 427 However, the WTO document stopped short of providing
substantive guidance and assistance to further deliberations on MBMs. Perhaps in light of the
observation with respect to the likely difficult relationship between the international trade and
climate regimes noted earlier in this report, it can be reasonably expected that the above issues,
and perhaps others, may again arise if the event of further consideration of an MBM for
international shipping.
The above discussion again underscores the value of coordination of the climate change
regime and WTO rules with respect to GHG emissions. The ideal scenario and least conflict-likely
421
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future for an MBM is one where its adoption is the product of consensus. An MBM adopted on
the basis of consensus within the framework of an international maritime convention, or an
alternative instrument, is less likely to generate conflict with the WTO regimes.
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4.

POSSIBLE LESSONS FROM OTHER SECTORS

4.1

International civil aviation sector

Not unlike other key contributors to global GHG emissions, the aviation industry, which according
to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was responsible for roughly 2% of global
CO2 emissions in 2010 and various non-CO2 climate effects,428 has its own unique challenges. The
2% figure requires explanation as international aviation accounts for 1.3% and because the bulk
of emissions from aircraft are released at cruising altitude and their effects are amplified. Taking
this effect into account, it has been estimated that aviation generally may actually be responsible
for as much as 3.5% of global anthropogenic radiative forcing, a more precise measure of climactic
effects.429 Furthermore, the steady and rapid expansion of the industry coupled with the difficulties
of introducing technological and operational measures in aircraft to significantly increase
operating efficiency have created unique challenges for the sector to reduce emissions in the short
to medium-term. In other words, growth in volume in the international aviation sector will make
it difficult for efficiency measures to stabilize and reduce GHG emissions in the foreseeable future,
let alone achieve full decarbonisation of the sector in the long-term.430 The industry has thus so far
taken a very modest approach to reducing its CO2 footprint by supporting an out-of-sector
approach of carbon offsetting which enables industry operators to purchase credits from the global
carbon market.
In 2010 the ICAO adopted two aspirational goals. First, the industry committed to a 2%
annual improvement in fuel efficiency for commercial aircraft on international flights. This was to
be achieved via operational and technological measures. According to a report issued in 2015,
however, the industry is lagging seriously behind with respect to this first goal. Efficiency has
improved at approximately half the targeted annual rate.431 This is likely due in part to low fuel
prices and the resulting lack of economic motivation for operators and manufacturers. The 38th
Meeting of the ICAO Assembly saw the adoption of an Assembly resolution for a ‘basket of
measures’ to facilitate the transition of the aviation sector, including: (i) aircraft technology CO2
standards; (ii) operational measures; (iii) promotion of fuel efficiency and alternative fuels; and
(iv) establishment of an MBM for emissions reductions of international aviation.432
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The second goal committed the industry to offsetting emissions above 2020 levels from 2020
onwards (‘carbon-neutral growth’). This differs from the approach to ‘carbon neutrality’ in the
context of Airport Carbon Accreditation, which means that “all the emissions under direct control
of these airports have been offset, on top of the reductions that have been made”. 433 With regard
to this second goal, it was clear in light of the challenges mentioned at the outset that carbon
offsetting was the preferred path forward. To that end, ICAO agreed to at the 39th Meeting of the
ICAO Assembly in fall 2016 to adopt an Assembly resolution to set in place the Carbon Offsetting
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), a global MBM scheme.434 Despite
the industry’s lacklustre performance since 2010 on the technical and operational front, ICAO has
maintained the original goal of carbon-neutral growth from 2020.
As adopted, CORSIA consists of three distinct phases. This phased approach recognizes the
differing capabilities of Member States and also seeks to minimize market distortion. A Pilot Phase
is set to run from 2021 to 2023 and is completely voluntary. There follows the First Phase (2024–
2026), which is also voluntary, but will automatically include any States that participated in the
Pilot Phase. Finally, participation in the Second Phase (2027–2035) is intended to be mandatory
for all States whose 2018 revenue tonne-kilometres (RTKs) will exceed 0.5% of the industry total.
Further, any State whose cumulative share of RTKs falls into the top 90% in the industry should
be included.435 The participation of LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs will be entirely voluntary. ICAO
plans to review CORSIA every three years from 2022 onwards, thus allowing room for
adjustments.
Although participation in the pilot and first phases is voluntary, the response of Member
States has been strong. As of 23rd August 2017, 71 nations representing 87.7% of RTKs had opted
to participate in CORSIA starting with the Pilot Phase.436 This places State participation already
at a level that is very close to the level mandated for the Second Phase beginning in 2027, and
appears to bode well for the implementation of the program. It should be noted, however, that
several States have declined to sign on to the pilot phase. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela objected to CORSIA for various reasons, including their view that
the measure will not further carbon neutral growth from 2020 and that its implementation will
disproportionately burden developing countries.437 It will be recalled that some of the developing
States in this group have taken similar positions at the IMO.
CORSIA has been designed to distort the market as little as possible. To this end, ICAO has
opted for a route-based approach, which should ensure that all operators are treated in the same
433
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way on the same route. Only flights between two participating CORSIA States are covered by
offsetting requirements. Operators are tasked with estimating their annual CO2 emissions (based
on fuel consumption) on such routes, and reporting them to their respective national authorities.
Every year, ICAO intends to calculate the sectoral growth factor on CORSIA, which it will
multiply by each operator’s applicable emissions to calculate required offsets. Using overall
sectoral growth as the key metric was seen as preferable, as it is expected to be more stable than
that of individual operators, whose fortunes are far more diversified. From 2030 onward, however,
the emissions growth of individual operators will be taken into account in calculating offsets.438
By 2033, each operator will be responsible for offsets on a 70/30 basis, where a minimum of 70%
of its offset will be calculated using its own growth from 2020, and a maximum of 30% of the
offset will be based on sectoral growth from 2020. This model is particularly beneficial to
established operators, and harder on new operators and others who expect to see a rapid rate of
growth in the period before 2030. It reasonably assumes that fourteen years’ warning is sufficient
for operators that might expect growth higher than the overall industry rate after 2030.
In early 2017, ICAO announced the adoption of an additional emissions reduction measure
to supplement CORSIA. This measure took the form of an amendment to Annex 16 of the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation.439 The standards vary depending on aircraft size and
type, and will apply to all new aircraft as of 2020. By 2023, all in-production aircraft in production
will be expected to conform to the standards, lest they be forced out of production by 2028.
With all this in mind, a pressing question emerges: what can the shipping sector learn from
the approach taken by ICAO? It is difficult to project the success or failure of a regulatory
mechanism for international aviation that does not enter its pilot phase until 2021, making it
difficult to draw lessons for the international shipping industry. At first blush there appears to be
some similarity in the measures considered in the two industries. International aviation embraced
a technical measure as well as an MBM, and international shipping has to date used technical and
operational measures and may yet consider an MBM.
However, there are significant differences between the two industries, potentially limiting
the utility of the experience of international aviation industry, most notably with respect to the
issues of nationality (ease of reflagging), jurisdiction and port State control. The conventional
wisdom is that shipping has an advantage over aviation in that technical and operational measures
are more easily adopted in the shipping sector. The practice of slow steaming alone can reduce
bunker consumption by up to 59%. 440 There are obvious logistical pitfalls inherent in slow
steaming practices, and the current low cost of fuel makes it far less attractive than it once was,
but it would appear that commercial aviation has no operational emissions reduction option that
comes close. Furthermore, at this time shipping enjoys a wide variety of fuel options, many of
which produce far lower GHG emissions than the traditional bunker ‘C’. Fuel switching may be
more difficult to implement for aviation. Thus operational and technical measures appear to be
438

Individual operator growth will be integrated progressively starting at 20% in 2030-2032 and increasing to 70%
over 2033-2035. Ibid.
439
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295 (entered into force 14 April 1947)
[Chicago Convention], Annex 16, Vol III.
440
Andreas Wiesmann, “Slow steaming: A Viable Long-term Option?” (2010) Wärtsilä Technical J 49 at 50.

75

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274

REVISED THIRD DRAFT REPORT
more readily available to the international shipping industry than they are to the international civil
aviation industry. As a consequence, the manner in which ICAO and IMO have engaged the GHG
discourse is different. ICAO has been more willing to consider exemptions for operators from
LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs, which would be a real issue for international shipping where reflagging
is an option. Hence the NMFT principle in the IMO has guided discussions to date on technical,
operational and market measures.
Given that CORSIA is still a number of years away from full implementation, it is not possible to
assess its effectiveness with any certainty. Many of its critics, however, have pointed out that there
is little incentive to reduce emissions in the short term, and that offsetting carbon emissions from
commercial aviation is a way of externalising costs and therefore merely a license for operators to
continue polluting. 441 The fear is that offsetting is an unreliable non-solution that ignores the
underlying problem (i.e., the need for all sectors to substantially reduce emissions and set on a path
towards decarbonisation) and encourages technological and operational stagnation while
emissions continue to rise within the sector. MBM proposals in the shipping sector that rely heavily
on offsets have been similarly criticized. Obviously, no matter what sector embraces an offsetting
scheme, it is essential to ensure the legitimacy and carbon value equivalency of the projects
receiving funding. As far as technological and operational stagnation is concerned, CORSIA could
well run into difficulty given its early focus on sectoral rather than individual growth. Not until
operators begin to be assessed by their own emissions growth or reductions in 2030 will there be
a genuine incentive to make individual reductions via technological or operational means.
Arguably, however, the recent amendments to the Chicago Convention should be expected to pick
up some of the slack left by the first decade of CORSIA. It is difficult to see how the emissions
path expected from full implementation of the CORSIA would be in line with the goals of the Paris
Agreement unless there are convincing reasons why the sectors fair share is considerably less than
the global average emission reductions needed to meet goals of the Paris Agreement.
4.2

Domestic transportation sector

Domestic, land-based transportation has been a particularly challenging sector for jurisdictions
around the world. GHG emissions in this sector have continued to rise, while other sectors, such
as the electricity sector discussed below, have been able to achieve significant emission reductions.
The domestic transportation sector has been particularly challenging for a number of reasons. 442
The challenges and potential solutions for domestic transportation are quite diverse. The
challenges are different for freight than for personal transportation. There are important
differences between urban and rural areas. Potential solutions will be different for each of these
transportation sectors and contexts. They will furthermore depend on regional differences in
441
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population density, distances between and size of urban centers, existing infrastructure, availability
of alternatives, and willingness to invest in alternatives, among other factors.443
Personal transportation offers a good illustration of the challenge of selecting appropriate
long-term solutions for decarbonization in at least three different categories, within urban centers,
between urban centers, and in rural areas. Within urban centers, public transit and active
transportation offer the most sustainable alternatives to the predominance of gasoline-powered
cars. Both active and public transportation, however, require significant investment of
infrastructure, further technological innovation and depend on acceptance by the population.444 At
the same time, a number of technologies, over the past decade or so, have offered potential
solutions that might not require the same level of investment in public transit or active
transportation infrastructure, and would not require the same level of behaviour change, but would
also be less optimal from a sustainability perspective. They all focus on reducing emissions from
private vehicles rather than shifting from private vehicles to other modes of transportation.
Options pursued have ranged from ethanol and fuel cell vehicles to hybrid and electric vehicles.445
To date, there has not been a clear winner among the technologies to reduce emissions from
private vehicles, with each potential alternative offering its own advantages and challenges.
Ethanol vehicles would require the least change in infrastructure or behavior, but there are serious
questions about the environmental and GHG emissions implications of this option. Fuel cell
vehicles would require significant new infrastructure, and have been plagued with delays in the
development of the technology, but would offer the end user a product similar to their current
expectations, so would be likely to find broad acceptance. 446 Hybrid vehicles are perhaps most
similar to traditional gasoline vehicles, but do not offer a complete solution. Finally, electric
vehicles hold much promise, but concerns over range, availability of charging stations and cost
remain, and their sustainability depends in large part on the ability to generate electricity
sustainably, which may differ from region to region.447
Partly as a result of this uncertainty within the private vehicle sector, the relationship
between private vehicles and public and active transportation in urban centers also remains
uncertain. Hesitancy to make infrastructure and technology investment in public and active
transportation contributes to the uncertainty. Solutions will vary between jurisdictions, and will
depend on further technological and economic breakthroughs, which in turn will depend on
regulatory and other measures taken by national and subnational governments in the respective
jurisdiction.
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Personal transportation solutions between urban centers would seem to involve a choice
between zero emissions personal vehicles, rail, bus services, or air transport. Electric vehicles
currently face concerns over range constraints and charging stations. Rail infrastructure is
expensive, making it a high-risk choice unless it is clear that it will be the mode of choice and has
the population density and support to warrant the investment. Bus service tends to be more
compatible with existing infrastructure in many parts of the world, but faces acceptance challenges,
and would still require technological advances to become truly sustainable. Air transport seems
the most difficult to transition to sustainability, but is quickly becoming the mode of choice for
travel between urban centers in many parts of the world.
For personal transportation in rural areas and from rural areas to urban centers, low
population density and long distances create unique challenges that often eliminate the otherwise
most promising options, such as active transportation, public transit and often even rail and air.
This makes personal vehicles the most likely choice for personal transportation in rural areas.448
The result is a situation where there is no one mode of transportation that is the clear choice
in solving the personal transportation challenge in all categories or subsectors. Which mode (or
combination of modes) offers the best hope of moving personal transportation to GHG emission
neutrality and sustainability will depend on local or regional conditions, on existing infrastructure,
on personal choices and preferences of the population, and on the willingness of the public and
private sector to invest in the infrastructure and research and development needed to facilitate the
transition. The multitude of options and circumstances make it less likely that private or public
actors will make the investments needed to facilitate the transition.449
Questions about the role of self-driving vehicles, car-sharing and ‘Uber-like’ services have
started to raise some doubts about the future dominance of public transportation in urban centers.
Until recently, it seemed clear that public and active transportation would be essential for low
GHG emission transportation in urban centers. There is no doubt both still have an important role
to play, but it seems more likely with the possible emergence of self-driving electric vehicles that
they will continue to compete with cars in many urban centers. Some cities are clearly committed
to a combination of public transit and active transportation as the solution to congestion and
pollution, but many others are still primarily designed for road transportation, resulting in difficult
choices ahead as self-driving electric vehicles, car sharing, and Uber-like services start to dominate
road transportation.450
There are similar challenges with respect to sustainable transportation between urban
centers. Does the answer lie in high-speed trains, or can short distance flights become a sustainable
option? Is the electric car a viable solution with improvements in technology and more sustainable
sources of electricity? Will electric busses gain the acceptance needed to become an important part
of the solution?451
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All this matters because some of the most promising options require significant investment
in infrastructure, in the form of charging stations for electric cars, or in the form of rail
infrastructure. All require further research and development (R & D) to become truly sustainable,
but also critical choices about the combination of options that offer the best solutions in each
context. One of the most challenging questions is when to make the decision which path to
sustainable transportation to take, and whether this is a decision for governments or for the private
sector. Until that choice is made, there will be a tendency to continue with the status quo, which
means minimal emission reductions in the transportation sector. Until there is an investment in the
infrastructure to offer viable and attractive alternatives, efforts to reduce emissions from
transportation from vehicles running on combustion engines will likely only yield modest results,
based on marginal changes in behavior and improved fuel efficiency of combustion engines.
Making the choice too late delays significant emission reductions in the sector, making the choice
too early, in turn, risks committing to an alternative that turns out to be sub optimal financially and
environmentally. Market mechanisms alone will not be sufficient in driving the transition to
alternatives that require significant infrastructure investment. What is required is either a public
investment in the infrastructure necessary to make the alternative viable and attractive, or a clear
and sufficient commitment to the alternative to motivate private investment.452
What lessons does the experience in transportation offer for the challenge of regulating GHG
emissions from ships and the ultimate decarbonisation of the transportation sector? It seems clear
from the experience so far that economic incentives, such as subsidies for electric vehicles or
public transit only get you so far. Other key elements include clear signals about the mix of modes
that are considered to be part of the solution in a particular jurisdiction, investment in
infrastructure, and incentives for the investment in research and development to improve the
sustainability performance of key elements of the solution. The transportation sector illustrates
the need to find effective ways to encourage research, development, deployment and
commercialization of technologies that offer meaningful solutions in line with what is needed.
More generally, transportation may offer lessons on the effectiveness and limitations of MBMs or
economic instruments more generally. The experience suggests that economic incentives are
essential, but that a detailed understanding of the sector is required to be able to assess what can
and what cannot be achieved with economic instruments, and what complementary measures are
needed.
Efforts to deal with transportation on a voluntary basis suggest limited effectiveness of
bottom-up approaches, voluntary measures, or aspirational goals. For example, voluntary efforts
to encourage improved fuel efficiency of vehicles have largely failed, both at the manufacturing
level and at the consumer level. 453 It is important to be realistic that unless there is a clear
economic motivation to influence human behaviour, there is little reason to expect voluntary
measures to work, especially when dealing with corporate actors concerned about short-term
452
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economic returns on investments. Voluntary measures, however, can work in combination with
economic incentives and binding measures if carefully designed.454
Finally, the transportation sector illustrates the challenge of regulating the transition to GHG
neutrality when there are multiple possible paths, and where the number of possible paths and their
relative merits may change over time. In such circumstances, governments face difficult choices.
They can rely on market mechanisms to avoid having to choose among the multiple paths, but risk
private actors reacting to the economic incentive by choosing a sub-optimal path. The alternative
is for government to choose among the possible paths, and risk making the choice too early with
government itself choosing a sub-optimal path. A mix of tools based on a detailed understanding
of the current conditions in the sector, the local circumstances and processes that are able to
identify and adjust to changing circumstances appear to be key ingredients of success.
4.3

Electricity sector

In contrast to the transportation sector, the electricity sector has been among the more successful
sectors in reducing GHG emissions in many jurisdictions around the world. This is in part because
there are both new and well-established low GHG emission sources of electricity that have made
significant technological and cost breakthroughs over the past two decades, due in large part to
aggressive policies in European and other countries that have spurred investment in research and
commercialization.455 Wind and solar energy in particular, along with conservation and efficiency
programs, have contributed to significant emission reductions in the electricity sector in
jurisdictions in Europe, Asia and North America.456
The transition has not been without its challenges, and in spite of all the progress to date, the
path to full decarbonization is far from clear. The fundamental challenge is that existing electricity
systems are designed to meet demand rather than to effectively manage demand to meet the supply
of less dispatchable power sources and their design is based on centralized production of
electricity. Fossil fuel based production tends to be more dispatchable than wind, solar, tidal, wave
and other low GHG emitting sources. In developed countries, significant capital investments have
already been made in fossil fuel-based production and in transmission and distribution based on
centralized production. This means that even where low GHG-emitting alternatives are
competitive, a switch to alternatives may require significant infrastructure investment and may
leave stranded significant assets, such as fossil fuel-based electricity generation systems.457
As is the case with transportation, there are challenges in identifying the most suitable
pathway to GHG neutrality. The state of electricity infrastructure will vary from jurisdiction to
454
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jurisdiction, as does the mix of potential sources of electricity. Population density, climate
conditions, and differences in electricity demand for heating, cooling and industrial use further
complicate matters. The potential to store energy in a manner that is easy to access when electricity
demand exceeds production from low emitting sources is also quite variable from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
All this adds up to a complex picture, particularly once the penetration of wind and solar
threatens the ability of current electricity systems to meet electricity demand. Some jurisdictions
may find an energy mix that allows them to integrate enough solar and wind to complete the
transition away from fossil fuels without fundamental changes to their electricity systems.
Jurisdictions with access to dispatchable hydropower may be able to phase out fossil fuels in this
manner.
For most, attention to the energy mix will not be enough. This leaves them with three basic
choices. They can invest in better interconnection with other jurisdictions to balance supply and
demand. Alternatively, they can shift from a focus on meeting demand to managing demand to
match the supply of electricity, using some combination of smart grid technology and storage.
Finally, they can try to implement a combination of these basic approaches to managing supply
from renewable sources. As is the case with transportation, the uncertainty around the relative
advantages and disadvantages of these choices has slowed down progress. For example,
jurisdictions may be reluctant to invest in transmission infrastructure to improve the ability to
integrate wind and solar into their electricity system over concerns that the infrastructure may
become a stranded asset as smart grid and storage technologies continue to develop and drop in
price. Uncertainty surrounding the respective roles of the various levels of government and private
sector in deciding on the appropriate path and investing in making it work, further adds to the
complexity in many jurisdictions.458
A key lesson from electricity is that governments struggle to take measures to internalize the
cost of GHG emissions from traditional sources of electricity (i.e., coal, oil) because access to
electricity is considered an essential service, so that governments tend to be sensitive to increases
in electricity prices. The end result is that electricity generally continues to be subsidized in
various ways, making it harder for conservation, efficiency and renewable energy initiatives to
compete. While there are those who would be unduly harmed by increased electricity prices, most
citizens in developed countries can afford higher electricity prices, and would take measures to
conserve electricity if the price more accurately reflected the true cost of generating and providing
it. So far, the predominant response to this dilemma in developed countries has been to resist
increases in electricity prices, rather than allow prices to increase to encourage conservation and
efficiency, and implement measures to ensure those unable to pay the increased cost of electricity
are treated fairly.459
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As stated at the outset, advances in technology have been critical to the progress in reducing
GHG emissions in the electricity sector. Effective regulation of the sector in turn has been critical
in ensuring the investment in R & D and in the scaling up of key technologies. Initial leadership
came from Germany and other European countries.460 More recently, other countries, such as
China and the US encouraged growth and advancements in these sectors through a combination of
subsidies and regulations. Similar efforts are now underway in other key countries, such as
India.461 Ultimately, and looking back, the leadership of developed countries with the capacity to
support the emergence of these new industries was key. Developing countries were then able to
follow suit, once the price of solar and wind had come down enough to make investment feasible.
The end result is the penetration of new technologies and new industries in both developed and
developing countries.462 Of course, all this has not happened without friction. There have been a
number of trade disputes over the implementation of measures to encourage renewable energy,
including WTO challenges of feed-in tariffs and local manufacturing rules in Ontario, and solar
policies in India and China.463
Another lesson from the electricity sector is that regulatory and economic instruments, such
as cap and trade systems, carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards, were
significant contributors to progress, though their relative contribution can be debated.
Concurrently, more directed measures were often necessary to ensure sustained progress. 464 For
example, the phasing out of coal, where it has happened, has not been achieved through the use of
economic instruments, but rather through top down regulation requiring the closure of coal
plants.465 Similarly, investment in R & D and infrastructure has generally been necessary as a
complement to economic instruments and renewable targets to sustain efforts to transition to GHG
neutrality.
The experience of the electricity sector suggests that economic incentives are important tools
in the toolbox, but a detailed understanding of the sector is required to be able to assess what can
and what cannot be achieved with economic instruments, and what other tools and efforts are
needed for an effective, efficient and fair transition. For example, experience has shown that
460
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economic incentives alone are unlikely to result in the closure of existing coal plants, or in
encouraging investment in expensive infrastructure.
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5.

DETERMINATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING INDUSTRY’S ‘FAIR
SHARE’ AND POTENTIAL LEGAL PATHWAYS

5.1

The challenge of uncertainty

International maritime regulation has always had to deal with complex issues and relationships
accompanied by degrees of uncertainty. The regulatory issues have tended to constitute a complex
mix of commercial, technological and political drivers. The public and private actors in
international marine transportation have been guided by national interests, commercial
underpinnings and community concerns. Often, the issues have cut across various international
regimes, not just the IMO conventions. The vital importance and dynamic nature of these factors
have produced complex multi-level relationships. The IMO has acted as a funnel of these interests
in its efforts to develop comprehensive and viable regimes based on regulatory compromise and
solutions to problems. The IMO itself has undergone institutional evolution to enable it to equip
itself and adapt to new challenges.
It is likely that never before has the IMO had to consider such a long-term timeline,
complexity and urgency in the development of regulatory strategy for a particular issue area. The
Organization’s experience in the long process of understanding GHG emissions from international
shipping and exploring a path to the determination of the industry’s fair share to GHG emissions
reduction can be described as a steep learning curve. While it is true that the regulation of air and
other sources of vessel-source pollution has been a labour of decades, GHG regulation constitutes
a much more complex mix of dynamic factors and related uncertainties over a much longer time
frame, indeed spanning across the 21st century. The longer the timeline, the greater the complexity
of interacting variables and relationships discussed in this paper, the likelihood of less capacity to
forecast the full economic repercussions, and the consequent heightened uncertainty. As MEPC
deliberations have amply demonstrated, there is genuine concern that GHG maritime regulation
may produce uncertain or unexpected direct and indirect impacts, as illustrated in the course of
discussions on MBMs with respect to impacts on trade and developing countries. Maritime
regulation in response to climate change can be expected to be shadowed not only by ‘knowns’
and ‘known unknowns’, but also by ‘unknown unknowns’. The ‘knowns’ have enabled the IMO
to adopt important evidence-based amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Chapter 4). The ‘known
unknowns’ have led to the establishment of the fuel database to build understanding on fuel use
and energy efficiency for further regulation. The ‘unknown unknowns’ are off the radar screen and
demand a flexible and adaptive approach with periodic review.
Against this backdrop, the pursuit of maritime regulation requires the Organization (through
its Member States) to position itself to be ambitious, nimble, manage uncertainty, learn, review
and respond to or further anticipate changing variables and potentially varying outcomes. Such an
exercise calls for a complex multi-disciplinary strategy that will provide directions for the
Organization, its membership and international maritime community to adapt to a new energy and
consequently novel business environment in search of constant innovation. To do so, the
Organization will need to conduct its work not only by employing the traditional approach in
developing technical and operational rules and standards, for which it has a well-established and
largely successful record. It will need to adopt an ambitious, integrated, systemic and reviewable
approach to GHG regulation as a long-term learning process, punctuated by periodic review to
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stocktake (and be part of the global GHG stocktake) and benefit from feedback loops by adjusting
its ambitions and approach as appropriate. It will need to work within its own treaty regimes as
well as interact with other international regimes. It will need to use its experience in pursuing
inclusive processes to produce largely consensus-based and ambitious mandatory rules and
standards, voluntary standards and recommended practices, in concert with efforts in combating
climate change under other regimes. Non-maritime regime rules may at times facilitate and at other
times constrain what the IMO is able to do, hence the importance of a systemic, integrated
approach to a complex global problem.
The actions needed cut across diverse economic sectors at national, regional and global
levels and engage regulatory bodies at all those levels, within the respective sector and at times in
relationship to other sectors and overseeing regulatory bodies. A challenge for the IMO will be to
define appropriate roles for Member States and for private industry actors in achieving emission
reductions in the international shipping sector. In the process of transition, it needs to maintain a
level playing field while sending a clear message to national maritime administrations and the
shipping industry.
In an emission reduction strategy that is narrowly focused on the shipping sector, it might be
somewhat easier than in a global climate regime to anticipate links between commitments of States
and the expected behaviour of industry actors in the shipping sector. Some of these industry actors
will be public, but most will be private. While the actors responsible for meeting emission
reduction commitments will be predominantly private industry actors, changes within the shipping
sector will have broader economic consequences, including consequences for the development of
economically vulnerable States. The international shipping industry will need to work with the
IMO in lock-step, not only because the IMO is the regulatory body, but also as a matter of corporate
social responsibility and joining ranks with other non-maritime sectors in the collective response
to climate change.
5.2

Towards a vision and timeline

5.2.1 The quest for the vision
The action required of the global community to respond to climate change is guided by the longterm temperature goal adopted in the Paris Agreement.466 The Agreement commits State Parties
to “strive to formulate . . . long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies” and to
communicate these to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC.467 The long-term vision entails a range of
long-term actions, such as the technology development and transfer framework and mechanism.468
At the time of writing, the IMO is working on implementing a roadmap and developing a
strategy, but has not yet adopted an express vision or goal for the international shipping industry’s
strategy to respond to climate change. The question what should be the goal of the future IMO
strategy was raised from time to time at MEPC meetings, but a collective vision has not yet
466
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emerged. Given the IMO’s commitment to developing the international shipping industry’s fair
contribution to the global response to climate change as defined in the Paris Agreement, the
industry’s emission reduction should be a meaningful response to the “global response” in the
Paris Agreement.469 The road towards producing the industry’s fair share should be principled and
designed to meet this global goal. This will require substantial commitment, not only to reducing
emissions significantly in the short and medium-term, even as global trade may continue to grow,
but also to pursue R & D and employ technologies that will place the industry on the path to
eventual complete decarbonisation.
The Paris Agreement’s approach to setting targets, the relationship between collective and
individual targets, and the process for reviewing progress and ensuring compliance all offer
potential guidance for the IMO as it seeks to move forward with an effective approach to achieving
adequate emission reductions in the international shipping sector.470 At the same time, there are
important differences between the UN climate regime and the IMO that have to be considered
when drawing lessons from the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement is an agreement between
States and it creates obligations for States for GHG emission reductions across the economy of
party States. The IMO strategy will focus on one sector, shipping, and it will target, much more
directly than the Paris Agreement, the key industry actors involved in the sector. Careful thought
will have to be given to the applicability of lessons from Paris in light of these key differences.
5.2.2 Development of the long-term goal
There is broad support for the proposition that the international shipping sector should make a fair
contribution to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. Ultimately, and as described earlier,
this means making a fair contribution to the following goal set out in Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris
Agreement: “… holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2° C above
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C above preindustrial levels…”.471 There are a number of challenges for the IMO Member States to turn the
global goals in the Paris Agreement into a concrete emission reduction target for international
shipping:
The IMO will have to resolve whether to use 1.5o C or some other global average
temperature goal “well below 2 degrees” as the starting point for its analysis.
Current analysis, including analysis by the IPCC, is focused on 2o C and therefore does not
accurately determine the global effort needed to meet the Article 2 goal. The IPCCs work
on 1.5o C is scheduled to be completed in 2018.
Other key elements of the long-term goal in the Paris Agreement, such as the goal to
achieve a balance of emissions and anthropogenic removals in the second half of the
century were inevitably based on the IPCC’s analysis on 2o C and will require updating
once the IPCC concludes its analysis on 1.5o C.
A determination will have to be made whether international shipping’s fair contribution
would be similar to the average reductions needed globally, whether there are reasons to
469
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expect the sector to reduce emissions more rapidly, or whether there are reasons to allow
the sector more time to reduce emissions.
The elements that would go into such an analysis have not been agreed upon either within
the UN climate regime or the IMO, and some likely elements, such as the effort needed,
the technology options available or expected to be developed, and the costs involved in the
shipping sector compared to other sectors are currently not all equally well understood.
The success of States in implementing and improving their NDCs over time may also
impact on what can be reasonably expected from the international shipping sector.
There is significant uncertainty about some of the assumptions underlying the IPCC’s 2o C
scenario analysis, most notably with respect to the role of future negative emissions in
keeping temperatures within 2o C. The same is expected to be the case with the IPCC’s
pending analysis for 1.5o C, as these uncertainties are not likely to be resolved for some
time. This does not mean the IPCC analysis should not form the basis for setting a longterm goal for the shipping sector, but it does suggest that adjustments may have to be made
as the IPCC refines and revises its analysis over time. In other words, any long-term goal
set by the IMO in the 2018-2023 period while developing the long-term strategy will likely
have to be adjusted as circumstances warrant.
A potential approach to a long-term goal for international shipping would be to use the
average global effort as confirmed or clarified by the 1.5o C IPCC analysis to be completed in 2018
(preferably in terms of emission reductions from current levels or the 2008 peak year) as a starting
point for the emission reduction efforts of the sector, and to revise it as circumstances warrant. It
would be important to be clear up-front about the factors that would warrant adjustments to the
long-term goal, and the process involved. Having set the process for adjustments, the sector would
then be ready to adopt, as its initial long-term goal, the timeframe identified by the IPCC within
which global emissions need to equal emission removal, also referred to as the GHG neutrality
date. For a 1.5o C target, the global GHG neutrality date can be expected to be sometime before
2050. GHG neutrality, in the context of the Paris Agreement, means net zero emissions. The
maritime sector would have to decide whether it will focus on the shipping sector in isolation
(referred to above as an ‘in-sector focus’) and turn the neutrality goal into a decarbonisation goal
for international shipping, or whether it wants to work collaboratively with other sectors and
integrate its efforts into the global GHG neutrality goal (referred to above as an ‘out-of-sector
focus’). Other key elements of a long-term goal for the shipping sector include the rate of reduction
from peak emissions to full decarbonisation or emission neutrality. These elements of the initial
long-term goal could all be based on the IPCC’s analysis, including in particular the 1.5o C scenario
analysis expected in 2018. This does, however, raise timing challenges in light of the IMO’s
timeline for developing its initial strategy.
This ‘approximation’ or initial long-term goals for the shipping industry could then be
regularly reviewed and updated as agreement is reached on the elements to be considered and as
more detailed information is available on the chosen elements. Adjustments to the long-term goal
could be made over time, based on clearly established factors. Such factors could include changes
to the way parties to the Paris Agreement approach and define the long-term goal in Article 2,
changes to the IPCC’s understanding of the potential contribution of negative emissions, and actual
global progress toward the Paris Article 2 goal.
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5.2.3 Development of the approach to meeting the goal
Having set out the long-term goal and a process for updating and revising it, the IMO would then
be in a position to work back from the long-term goal and develop steps toward meeting the
ultimate goal. We see two sets of short-term goals and steps in this process, the 2018 initial
strategy and agreement on the 2023 revised strategy. We see 2030 as a suitable medium-term
target, perhaps depending on whether the long-term GHG neutrality goal is closer to 2040 or 2050,
something that should be better understood once the IPCC releases its 1.5o C scenario analysis in
2018.
The key elements we see for the 2018 initial strategy are the following:
A commitment to a clear and fair long-term goal and a credible and transparent process for
reviewing and updating it.
Medium-term goals that offer a credible trajectory toward the long-term goal.
A credible and transparent process for reviewing progress toward the long-term and
medium-term goals, and a commitment and effective processes to implement and adjust
regulated technical and operational measures necessary to meet the long-term goal. This
should include commitments and effective processes to regularly review and update
technical and operational measures to ensure best practices to maximize efficiency at all
times.
Specific binding measures to aggressively promote R & D and to implement and
continuously improve best available technologies and operational practices to reduce
emissions in the short and medium-term, with an initial focus on operational measures that
are ready for immediate implementation. Continuous attention to hull design, propulsion
systems and fuels will be essential during all phases.
Gradual ratcheting of technical and operational measures, particularly through the EEDI
and fuel measures, but also other measures supported by new technological developments.
It is conceivable that with technological development, technical (ship design, propulsion
technology, etc.), operational and fuel measures could be sufficient in setting international
shipping on the path to decarbonisation. However, it is too early to dispense with the
possible need of an MBM. As concluded by the IMO’s Second GHG Study, 472 a
commitment to adopt an effective MBM as part of the revised strategy in 2023, with a
commitment to design and implement the mechanism to achieve the long-term and
medium-term goals, and review its performance periodically remains advisable.
A process of review and adjustment of the strategy and its implementation that is
effectively synchronized with the Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement, so that
information about progress in this sector can feed into the five-year review cycles under
Articles 13–15 of the Paris Agreement.
Confirmation of 2008 as the appropriate peak year for emissions from the sector.
The approach should recognize that efficiency gains through improved ship design and
operation have multiple benefits in the short, medium, and long-term, especially if the regulations
have a built-in mechanism for continuous improvement. In the short-term, they demonstrate that
472
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the sector is taking the issue seriously, and they will be critical to meeting the short-term goals of
the strategy, such as the goal of 2008 remaining the peak year for emissions from the sector. They
also help make the medium and long-term goals less daunting and less challenging from a technical
perspective. The more the energy consumption of ships can be reduced, the more likely it is that
solutions using alternative fuels such as electricity, hydrogen fuel cells or biofuels can contribute
to the full decarbonisation of the sector in the longer term. At the same time, efficiency measures
alone are clearly insufficient to achieve full decarbonisation within a timeframe that represents a
fair contribution from the sector. This means that progress in ship technology and operation should
be combined with a clear strategy for achieving the technology breakthroughs needed to fully
decarbonise the sector as soon as reasonably possible. This cannot be achieved without effective
measures to find suitable fuel alternatives to hydrocarbon-based bunkers, most likely through a
combination of regulated standards and other incentives.
Ports also have a potential role to play. In addition to performing critical spot inspections
under MARPOL and regional MoUs to ensure compliance with international standards, ports are
essential for bunkering and, assuming the necessary infrastructure is in place, are in a position to
provide key services such as cold ironing (shore-to-ship power). Because they enjoy sovereignty
over internal waters, port States are in a position to tighten emission control requirements while
the ship is in port. Effectively, they are in a position to determine whether a ship may trade with
their ports. However, it is advisable for port State measures to be as consistent as possible with
international standards, rather than be imposed unilaterally without reference to such standards,
because uniformity is important for maritime trade.
One way to conceive of the overall challenge for the sector would be in three phases, an
initial efficiency phase, a decarbonisation phase, and a negative emissions phase. In each phase,
the strategy would focus on a combination of achieving the primary goal of the phase, and at the
same time to prepare in a meaningful way for the following phase. The first phase would start
with the initial strategy in 2018 and would retain the 2008 peak year for the industry and strive for
further emission reductions, hopefully coinciding with the revised strategy in 2023 or following
shortly thereafter. The second phase would start with the implementation of the revised strategy
in 2023, which could include an effective MBM, assuming it is needed to supplement technical
and operational measures, designed to effect the decarbonisation of the sector within timeframes
consistent with the long-term goal and with a clear understanding of the rate of reductions needed
to achieve the goal. A pilot for the MBM could be implemented toward the end of the initial
efficiency phase, so that the MBM is fully operational by 2023. Toward the end of the
decarbonisation phase, as the sector gets closer to meeting its decarbonisation goal, the sector’s
role in the negative emissions phase would be clarified and facilitated.
5.3

The role of international maritime regulation

5.3.1 Choice of instruments
The IMO instrument of choice for the initial measures to regulate GHG adopted to date has been
MARPOL Annex VI. Alternative options included adoption of a new annex or separate
convention, the principal advantage arguably being the ability to provide dedicated treatment to a
particularly complex problem that may require more than technical and operational measures
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usually employed to prevent vessel-source pollution. The prolonged IMO deliberation on GHG
emissions and the consideration that technical and operational measures were practical steps that
could be adopted in the short-term likely favoured the use of an existing instrument to the creation
of a new one. The development of a convention or protocol or a new annex would have been a
lengthy multi-year process leading to adoption at a diplomatic conference. In contrast, amending
an existing annex could be undertaken using the much faster tacit acceptance process. Moreover,
a new annex would have had to be optional and would have necessitated years to secure broad
support by a sufficient number of State Parties representing the bulk of global tonnage. In
comparison, although Annex VI does not command the same high level of State Parties as other
annexes, what really matters is that the subscription rate and tonnage represented are very high.
Tacit acceptance of amendments has and will again in the future usher in new standards with the
usual period of a year, unless there is substantial objection to the amendment during the prescribed
period for objections in accordance with MARPOL’s amendment procedure.473
A further argument in support of Annex VI as the regulatory vehicle is the desirable unity
and coherence of the pollution prevention system. Characterising GHG emissions as vessel-source
pollution facilitates coordination of the regulatory requirements of the various types of pollution
from ships. There is likely to be greater consistency among technical standards, reporting
expectations and enforcement across the MARPOL annexes. As seen earlier, issues of potential
consistency across regulations and their purposes have arisen, as in the case of fuel requirements
for controlling NOx and GHG emissions. Thus with respect to technical and operational measures
the use of Annex VI facilitates an integrated and systemic approach to pollution prevention.
The adoption of an MBM may raise additional questions, in particular whether placement of
the measure in MARPOL annex VI, or a new annex, or indeed in MARPOL itself, would be the
appropriate legal pathway. MARPOL’s strength is its design as an instrument focusing on
technical and operational measures with an enforcement system to match. It is appropriate to
enquire whether it would be a suitable vehicle for the adoption, implementation, enforcement and
periodical review of market measures. The adoption of market measures would of itself be a
novelty for the IMO, whose work to date, although punctuated by occasional political
controversies, has been essentially technical. Its focus on technical aspects has generally enabled
it to avoid or manage differences and achieve regulatory consensus. MBMs are in essence
economic instruments aimed at market intervention or influence. MARPOL was not designed to
accommodate a framework for the collection of levies or to enable the Organization to introduce
market instruments. The IMO’s own constitutive instrument, while clearly broad enough to permit
consideration of any issue concerning international shipping and the environment, is unclear with
respect to whether the Organization’s power includes adoption of regulations concerning a carbon
levy and a related fund or establish a carbon credit system. Its express financial powers are limited
to budgetary matters and the scale of assessment of membership dues.474
Accordingly, in the event an MBM is a desirable component of the future strategy, the IMO
will need to consider how its constitutive instrument will support such an initiative and what legal
pathway would be the most suitable and practical for this purpose. It is useful to recall that the
473
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International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund was established by a separate treaty and has its
own secretariat and separate legal personality.475
However, on such a complex issue as market measures, the option of developing a new
maritime convention could be undesirable because of the likely lengthy process of development.
Much as MARPOL is essentially a technical and operational standards instrument, as a potential
candidate host for an MBM in Annex VI it carries the advantage of the tacit acceptance procedure,
which was precisely designed to avoid cumbersome diplomatic processes in maintain the
instrument up to date, as well as the substantial tonnage subscription already in place.
Should MARPOL not deemed to be the legal pathway, another potential alternative and
novel approach for an MBM for international shipping is to consider developing it in coordination
with the UN climate regime and perhaps even under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The
feasibility of such an option and its significance for the IMO mandate in its constitutive instrument
would need to be studied.
An additional question is what status should be given to the IMO strategy. One option is to
consider giving the strategy a legal status by bringing it under MARPOL Annex VI. This has pros
and cons. On the one hand it could cement its authoritative status and update it on the basis of the
tacit acceptance procedure. On the hand, it could add an additional layer of complexity to already
complex deliberations and in any case the GHG regulatory measures already have a home in Annex
VI. Giving the strategy a legal status might not necessarily carry much advantage. An alternative
and pragmatic approach is simply to consider the strategy as a ‘policy’ document, perhaps akin to
the Organization’s own strategy which is updated biennially and adopted by an Assembly
resolution. This approach has enabled the IMO to operationalize its mandate, set specific
regulatory targets and deadlines, and update the document as a rolling planning.
5.3.2 Applying the IMO regulatory process
Over the many years of successful regulation, the IMO’s culture of consensus has dominated
decisions despite the rule on majority decision-making in its constitutive instrument, enabling it to
find common denominators for a wide suite of decisions and ensuring broad support. The next
steps in the adoption of the IMO strategy and prospective GHG regulation will test the ability of
the Organization to rely on consensus to achieve a strategy that ensures a fair contribution from
this sector. The adoption of Chapter 4 on the basis of a majority decision has now established a
precedent on this issue and given the continuing divisions on sharing of responsibilities and role
of market measures, it is conceivable that further use of majority decision-making is possible and
perhaps necessary to achieve adequacy. The frequent concerns expressed by major developing
countries, most especially Brazil, China and India, can be expected to resurface and on which
compromise has to be reached, in particular because they are large GHG emitters, are among the
largest economies, and have high GDP growth forecast.476 Out-voting major States does not bode
475
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well for what is necessarily a complex long-term regulatory process, both in terms of fostering the
Organization’s culture of consensus and securing the support of all Member States, most especially
major economies engaged in maritime trade. The global consensus reached in the Paris Agreement
climate regime should provide the momentum and the substantive elements to achieve consensus
on an effective IMO strategy.
As seen earlier, the IMO has a well-defined three-step linear approach to the development
of maritime regulation. The approach is motivated by compelling necessity, guided by a goaloriented approach and employs a mix of mandatory and recommended practices. Given the longterm goal of IMO’s GHG regulatory efforts and the uncertainties that will serve as context and
drivers, it will be important for the three-step approach to be complemented by a subsequent step
of regular review and adjustment to complete the cycle so that GHG regulation will be seen as
cyclical and iterative rather than linear.
It will be recalled that the IMO Council has considered a proposal from a group of Member
States and industry bodies to further structure and tighten the three-step approach, in particular to
address data gathering, consideration of the necessity of a proposed new initiative, use of costeffectiveness and impact analysis for short and long-term benefits, availability of suitable
technologies, transparency and robustness of procedures, consideration of impacts on
manufacturers, criteria for assessing and surveying and testing technologies, implementation dates
based on achievable timelines and consolidated technology, and risk-based evaluation of potential
costs and benefits of environmental, economic and social issues. This proposal could enhance the
process of future GHG regulation by building on the learning needed to produce functional and
effective rules and standards. It entails a higher level of structured scrutiny of regulatory proposals
than is the practice at this time.
Experience shows that the regulatory process in the IMO is not always purely technical and
on occasions has been politicized, for example with respect to the development of guidelines and
decisions on the designation of particularly sensitive sea areas477 and, within the context of this
paper, the divisive debate on the application of the CBDR and NMFT principles in GHG
regulation. Arguably, a better structured rule-making process would help minimize the degree of
issue politicization by ensuring an in-depth technical assessment at each stage of the rule-making
process. It is also possible that the proposed tightened process could make it more challenging to
adopt measures to combat GHG emissions when the science does not provide sufficient clarity or
the technology on which they are based is not yet on the market or the long-term impacts of the
proposed regulatory outcome are not altogether clear. The proposed process could potentially
constrain adoption of a precautionary approach to regulation in the context of scientific and
technological uncertainty,478 unless flexibility is maintained.
ranking was: China (2nd), India (7th), Brazil (9th). “Gross Domestic Product 2016” (17 April 2017), World
Development Indicators database, World Bank, online: World Bank <www.worldbank.org>. The GDP forecast in
2017 is as follows (no numbers were presented for Brazil): India (7.2%), China (6.5%). Alex Gray, “These Are the
World’s Fastest-growing Economies in 2017” World Economic Forum (9 June 2017), online: WEF
<www.weforum.org>.
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Julian Roberts et al, “The Western European PSSA Proposal: A ‘Politically Sensitive Sea Area’” (2005) 29(5)
Marine Policy 431.
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In prescribing the precautionary approach to environment protection, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that
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While the IMO’s GHG regulation to date has been largely top-down, the goal-oriented
approach includes a measure of flexibility to enhance compliance. Annex VI’s Chapter 4 rules and
standards have been legislated for implementation and enforcement by State Parties with respect
to ships registered under their flags. Energy efficiency goals provide flexibility for shipowners and
operators to meet the standards through various means. Goal-oriented regulation has served the
IMO well, especially with respect to areas where diversity of technologies exist or further
technological development is expected, such as in ship design, propulsion machinery, energy use
monitoring and fuel technologies. There is also a role for bottom-up standard development as the
pioneering of new technologies and practices in industry could potentially serve as the basis for
new or for scaling up existing GHG rules and standards. The use of industry practices or standards
developed by industry associations is not unprecedented.479
5.3.3 Applying the principles of maritime regulation
The difficult MEPC discussions identified several issues concerning the principles and practice of
maritime regulation that will need resolution or adaptation if the international maritime community
(both IMO Member States and the shipping industry) is to produce a meaningful and realistic longterm collective response. The NMFT principle has played a key role in the development of all
international maritime regulation and has played no small role in building the IMO’s profile as a
successful regulatory body. This principle has helped to raise the standards of shipping around the
globe and is foundational not only to the international maritime conventions and their subsidiary
instruments, but is also central to the operation of the global system of memoranda on port State
control. These regional arrangements are increasingly coordinating practices and sharing data on
inspected ships to ensure compliance with safety and environmental standards and further
discourage deviance through flag hopping. 480 Watering down the application of the NMFT
principle will be counter-productive in maritime regulation because of the unique characteristics
of the mobility of ships.
The accommodation of the special needs of developing countries will need to be addressed
in ways that do not undermine the essence of maritime regulation. The CBDR principle emerged
as an important equity principle in international environmental law with respect to the performance
of environmental obligations by States and not with respect to individual industry actors as is the
case in international shipping. The legitimate CBDR concerns of developing countries need to be
addressed in ways that do not create winners and losers within the international shipping sector.
The principles for drafting maritime regulations will play an important role in GHG
regulation. There is no question that effective GHG regulation is necessary. What could be a
potential issue, because of the long-term technological uncertainty, is the degree of reliance on the
evidence-based approach. GHG regulatory work will need to be undertaken in the context of
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, 14 June 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I)(12 August 1992), 31 ILM 874 [Rio Declaration].
479
For example, the Requirements Concerning Polar Class, supra note 207.
480
“Port State Control Regimes Move to Boost Collaboration, Harmonization and Information Sharing”, IMO
Briefing (6 November 2017), online: IMO < http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/30-PSCworkshop.aspx>.
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varying degrees of scientific and technological uncertainties and will call for the employment of a
flexible and yet precautionary approach.481 The precedent has now been set for new GHG technical
and operational standards to be integrated into MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4. The location of
MBM regulation has options, as mentioned above. New GHG regulation will need to be consistent
with existing regulation and in particular avoid conflicting prescriptions or rules that produce
conflicting outcomes. Consistency can be facilitated trough an integrated approach to new
regulatory initiatives and assessment of direct and indirect regulatory impacts. The pursuit of
proportionality and fitness for purpose will be challenging, again because of scientific and
technological uncertainties. A pragmatic and functional approach will be necessary. Periodic
regulatory reviews (e.g., timed with the Global Stocktake and parallel five-year reviews within the
IMO proposed in this paper) will be helpful in ascertaining effectiveness of particular rules and
standards in producing the desired outcomes. While clearly important for maritime GHG
regulation, in particular because of the need to accommodate technological change, the trepidation
to adopt standards that will stand the test of the long-term would be significantly alleviated by the
proposed periodical reviews. Finally, clarity in GHG regulation will be vital, especially given the
concerns within the industry on how to adapt to a changing regulatory and economic paradigm.
The nine principles for GHG regulation adopted by the MEPC 57 discussed above provide
further guidance as well as additional challenges. In general, they represent a logical extension of
the three-step decision-making process and six principles of general maritime regulation, while
further addressing the particular challenges of GHG regulation. For example, logically principle 1
proposes that the regulation should be effective in reducing emissions, which after all is the
purpose of the entire IMO effort. Further, principles concerning the goal-oriented approach (6),
support for technology innovation and R & D (7) and accommodation of leading technologies in
energy efficiency (8) strongly buttress the necessary technical means and outcomes to achieve
emissions reductions for the short, medium and long-terms. Similarly, the principles of cost
effectiveness (3) and minimization of competitive market distortions (4) are aimed at ensuring the
economic viability of the proposed regulations. Principle (5) proposes a sustainable approach to
environmental regulation without penalizing trade, again a desirable goal. In similar spirit,
principle (9) ensures the adoption of regulation which is practical, transparent and easy to
administer.
Principle (2) is a reason why this portfolio of guiding concepts was not adopted by
consensus. The principle restates the NMFT application to all flag States, which as seen earlier is
central to the international maritime law conventions. The wording of the text is unfortunate and
perhaps served to fuel dissent. The actual MARPOL wording is that the Convention applies to “(a)
ships entitled to fly the flag of a Party to the Convention; and (b) ships not entitled to fly the flag
of a Party but which operate under the authority of a Party.”482 Through consistent text, “[W]ith
respect to the ships of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the
present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to
such ships.”483 The application and enforcement emphasis is on ships rather than State Parties.
This approach is similar in other maritime conventions. The purpose is to give direct application
481

Rio Declaration, supra note 478, Principle 15. It may be worth exploring a possible role for the IPCC to offer a
scientific basis for the regulatory work of the IMO on GHG emissions.
482
MARPOL, supra note 10, art 3.
483
Ibid art 5(4).

94

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274

REVISED THIRD DRAFT REPORT
of a particular rule to all ships engaged in international shipping, no matter where they are flagged
or reflagged. This principle will be critical for the effectiveness of GHG regulations in international
shipping. Of course, adherence to this principle does not suggest that vulnerable States who are
particularly exposed to negative economic consequences of GHG regulatory efforts should not
receive assistance. In other words, we see the NMFT principle of vital importance to ensure a
level playing field for all ships as private commercial actors. On the other hand, the CBDR-RCNC
principle addresses the needs of particularly vulnerable States, rather than the commercial actors.
5.3.4 Extent and reach of GHG technical and operational regulation
In order for the shipping industry to maximize the effectiveness of its fair contribution, it will be
important that GHG regulations will apply to as much of the world’s fleet as is reasonably possible,
and for domestic regulation to cover ships exempted from those regulation. At this time the IMO’s
regulation of GHG emissions from ships in MARPOL Annex VI does not address all ships and
those that are covered are subject to a transition period.
The new Chapter 4 concerning the EEDI and SEEMP rules applies to ships of 400 gross
tonnage or more. 484 This rule immediately eliminates many small vessels, such as numerous
fishing and recreational vessels, although a national maritime administration retains the discretion
to adopt measures to ensure compliance by vessels less than 400 gross tonnage with emission
control requirements of Annex VI requirements.485 In 2012 the number of fishing vessels was
estimated at 4.72 million, 57% of which were engine-operated. 486 Fishing vessels use energy
intensively and are an obvious and significant source of GHG emissions.487 Moreover, the IMO’s
regulatory focus in MARPOL and other conventions is on ships engaged in international voyages.
This limitation excludes vessels engaged in cabotage, unless a particular rule is extended to those
ships or is expressly extended to apply to domestic shipping by a State Party. Annex VI Chapter 4
applies the exemption to domestic shipping, but also stipulates that State Parties “should ensure,
by the adoption of appropriate measures, that such ships are constructed and act in a manner
consistent with Chapter 4, so far as is reasonable and practicable.”488 Hence, a lower level duty
(‘should ensure’, compared to the peremptory ‘shall’) applies to promote consistency in cabotage
to the extent possible.
Also excluded from application are offshore platforms regardless of their propulsion.489 Like
cabotage and most fishing and recreational vessels, offshore platforms once stationery at the
operation site, are not engaged in international voyage and rather are subject to the jurisdiction of
the licensing State. The offshore service vessels supporting them are deemed to be on cabotage.
Hence, because the excluded vessels will tend to operate within the territorial or resource-related
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jurisdiction of a State Party, in practice they will be expected to be captured by the NDCs under
the Paris Agreement.490
In addition to these exclusions, a State Party may waive compliance with the attained and
required EEDI for ships of 400 gross tonnage and above.491 Only existing ships may be granted
the waiver and all other vessels are subject to the full EEDI rules as of 1 January 2017. 492 The
intention was to provide State Parties with some flexibility to waive the requirements in an
exceptional manner, when appropriate. When a waiver is granted or withdrawn, the flag State is
required to report the action to the IMO for the information of the general membership.493
Also of note is the exclusion of vessels with a tonnage of 5,000 gross tonnage or less from
reporting fuel consumption to populate the IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database as of 1
March 2018.494 While, as noted earlier, the adoption of this tonnage threshold was motivated by
expedience and the fact that it captures 85% of shipping responsible for GHG emissions, the
reporting omits a substantial amount of small commercial shipping, in addition to the smaller
vessels not captured by Annex VI.
5.3.5 Regulatory fairness and consistency
Accompanying the reach of IMO regulation is the challenge of achieving regulatory fairness and
consistency with respect to the wide range of vessels engaged in international shipping and the
diversity of trades and functions they perform, while minimizing waivers, especially with respect
to operational measures. As discussed, some ships have particular build and operational
requirements that demand variable energy use, and this reality has already led to early amendment
of Annex VI Chapter 4 to exclude the application of EEDI to polar class vessels. This could be a
potential long-term concern while the fleet of polar class vessels grows to respond to the growing
transit and destination shipping in the Arctic as summer sea ice recurs to increasingly lesser
extents. Other types of ships use energy differently and are able to navigate long distances without
physical constraints such as ice presence and ice-breaking, although when encountering bad
weather energy consumption will tend to increase. Yet other vessels carry refrigerated or other
controlled temperature cargo which will entail additional energy consumption needs, while
passenger vessels require the additional energy to support hotel operations on board.
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These examples highlight the importance for the different approaches in the required EEDI
to account for the needs of different classes of ships.495 The prescribed rules and standards for
ships will inevitably entail a mix of common and differentiated rules. The future GHG regulation
of shipping will need to continue to distinguish between different classes of ships to ensure that
while they meet increasingly stringent efficiency requirements, they are able to function safely and
are fit for purpose.
A more technically complex issue of consistency is how to introduce measures meant to help
prevent GHG emissions without undermining or contradicting rules intended to address other types
of vessel-source pollution, as in the case of GHG measures that could conflict with air pollution
measures. Hence the earlier observation in this report that adopting an integrated approach and
regulating GHG emissions in the same convention facilitates coordination to achieve the desired
regulatory impact.
Another interesting angle on the invocation of the CBDR principle in GHG regulation in
shipping raises an issue of potential lack of consistency and fairness. The various types of vesselsource pollution addressed by the MARPOL annexes are all subject to the same NMFT principle,
and the Annex VI rules in particular concern NOx, SOx, PM and ozone depleting substances, some
of which are related to GHG emissions. The position advanced by some States that the distribution
of the responsibility for GHG emissions from shipping ought to be made subject to the CBDR
principle is inconsistent with the general and proven approach to the prevention of vessel-source
pollution, including atmospheric pollution. As observed elsewhere in this report, the role that the
CBDR principle, while critical for the effectiveness and fairness of the IMO strategy, needs to be
approached in a manner that does not limit the scope of application and effectiveness of technical,
operational and other future rules for ships depending on the socio-economic status of a State.
The implementation of CBDR-RCNC needs to target assistance to vulnerable States more directly,
while preserving the principle of NMFT for industry actors irrespective of flag.
5.4

The potential role of market measures

Should the IMO proceed along this path, the design of a suitable MBM will be a complex task that
will require consideration of many technical, economic and political factors. There are, however,
some fundamental considerations in the design of the MBM that can help shape the details of the
instrument. One is the choice of the tool. The MEPC discussions to date have considered a range
of possible MBMs, including a carbon levy, a cap and trade system, and variations of both, among
others. Another is the need for clarity around the goals of the MBM. The latter informs the former
and is connected to the previous discussion about the long-term goal for the sector, so is considered
first here.
The fundamental issue with respect to the goals of the MBM is whether it is primarily
intended to internalize the costs of the international shipping sector using up part of the remaining
global carbon budget, or primarily to incentivize private actors involved in this industry sector to
facilitate the transition of the sector towards decarbonisation by creating economic incentives for
such actions. Earlier in the report we referred to the MEPC discussion on MBMs having
495
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progressed to grouping of MBMs between ‘in-sector’ and ‘out-of-sector’ reductions, potentially
indicating a choice. This choice may depend in part on whether the decarbonisation of the
international shipping sector will be technically and economically more feasible than the
decarbonisation of other sectors, such as electricity, land-based transportation, agriculture,
manufacturing, and the built environment. This question may be difficult to answer at this time,
and that may attract different answers as efforts to decarbonise various sectors evolve over time.
For example, as technological breakthroughs are achieved in various sectors, they may become
more economically attractive options for decarbonisation than they were before. The choice
between internalizing the cost versus decarbonizing the sector as the primary goal of the MBM
also depends on which approach is more likely to achieve the level of support within the IMO to
ensure effective global implementation. Clarity on the goals can ensure that the discussion about
the choice of instruments and its detailed design is a principled one, and that there is transparency
and accountability for the design of the MBM.
By way of example of issues for consideration with respect to choice of an MBM, and
assuming for the purposes of this discussion that there is a choice between a carbon levy and a cap
and trade system, there are key design elements that are common to these instruments, such as the
actors captured, the activities captured, and the use of any revenues generated on the other. The
relative importance of revenue generation and the selection of actors and activities targeted will
vary with choice of instrument and detailed design in light of the overall goals of the MBM.
A carbon levy would most likely involve the collection of fees attached either to specific
fuels or directly to emissions and usually would involve a fixed price that treats all units equally,
although some differentiation is possible. A primary benefit of a carbon levy is that the carbon
price is controlled and predictable, offering certainty to investors considering investments in
emission reduction solutions and allowing for careful management of the economic impact of the
MBM on the sector as a whole and on individual actors within the sector and beyond. An effective
carbon levy would generate substantial, predictable revenues, so decisions would have to be made
on how to effectively use the revenues generated to further the goals of the MBM and to address
legitimate equity concerns. The initial levy should be set to an amount to influence energy use, but
will likely need to be adjusted over time to meet its stated goals. Thus the levy would be phased
in and adjusted over time.
Options on the allocation of revenues include using revenues to address specified inequities
associated with the implementation of the carbon levy, to further incentivize research,
development and dissemination of technologies seen as critical for the decarbonisation of the
sector, and potentially to support decarbonisation outside the international shipping sector (such
as through the purchase of credible offsets). At MEPC 63 the GHG-WG 3 had identified a number
of potential uses for MBM revenues.496 At MEPC 61, it was reported that the High-level Advisory
496

For example:
.1 incentivizing shipping to achieve improved energy efficiency;
.2 offsetting – purchase of approved emission reduction credits;
.3 providing a rebate to developing countries;
.4 financing adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries;
.5 financing improvement of maritime transport infrastructure in developing countries (e.g. Africa);
.6 supporting R&D to improve energy efficiency of international shipping; and
.7 supporting the Organization's Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme.
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Group of the United Nations Secretary-General on Climate Change Financing identified
international shipping and aviation as potential financial sources to aid mitigation efforts and
adaptation in developing countries 497 The contemplated sources included an emission trading
scheme, a fuel levy and an aviation ticket tax. More recently, the UN Secretary-General's HighLevel Advisory Group on Sustainable Transport recommended increasing international
development funding and climate funding for sustainable transport.498 The more MBM revenues
are used to support decarbonisation efforts outside the international shipping sector, the more
compelling the case for considering the alternative instrument, a cap and trade system, and linking
it with other existing cap and trade systems.
A cap and trade system is perhaps the most obvious alternative to a carbon levy. A cap and
trade system for international shipping could involve setting limits for the GHG emissions from
the international shipping sector as a whole, allocation of portions of the overall limit to individual
industry actors or subsectors within the sector (either through auctioning, sale of allowances at a
fixed price or through free allocations), combined with the right of captured actors to trade
allocations with other captured actors.499 The most obvious candidates for captured actors would
be fuel suppliers and vessel operators. With respect to fuel suppliers, it would need to be
determined whether they would be captured by the international shipping industry’s commitment
or by NDCs. The choice among free allocation, sale, or auction of credits depends largely on the
need to generate revenues to deal either with equity considerations, to achieve emission reductions
elsewhere, or to incentivize research and development into decarbonisation technologies. Free
allocation tends to reduce the short-term economic impact of the MBM, but it does limit options
to achieve emission reductions, deal with inequities and to incentivize the decarbonisation of the
industry. Allocation at a fixed price mirrors the carbon levy in the sense that it permits the
generation of revenues while carefully controlling the economic impact of the MBM.
A cap and trade system could be implemented just for the international shipping sector (insector, as considered above), or it could be linked to other sectors (through offsetting protocols) or
to existing cap and trade systems (out of sector, as considered above). In principle, the cap and
trade system should be better able to directly control the emission reductions achieved through the
setting of the cap for the international shipping industry sector. However, in practice, this very
much depends on the detailed design, as linking and offsetting tend to lessen control over the
emission reductions achieved and other design features, such as price floors and ceilings. Free or
fixed price allocations tend to control the economic impact of the MBM on the sector.
Furthermore, a carbon levy can, of course, be adjusted over time to control the emission reductions
achieved by changing the amount of the levy. With cap and trade, similar outcome can be achieved
by adjusting the cap. In short, the differences, in terms of the ability to control emission reductions
and economic impact are more nuanced than they appear at first glance. However, carbon levies
tend to be more transparent about the trade-offs inherent in their design.
MEPC 63 Report, supra note 316, 42.
497
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If there is a clear preference within the IMO to do everything possible to achieve the full
decarbonisation of the international shipping sector and for this purpose adopt the simplest
approach, a carbon levy would likely be the MBM of choice. The levy itself would provide an
incentive for a wide range of actors in the industry, including R & D institutions, naval architects,
shipbuilders, shipowners, charterers, ship managers, ship financers, cargo owners, etc., to support
efforts to reduce emissions. The nature and extent of the incentive would depend on the nature of
the levy (applied to volume of fuel, a percentage of the cost of the fuel, or to each ton of emission),
the amount of the levy, and clarity on the long-term trajectory of the levy, among other factors.
If there is a clear preference for letting market forces decide whether it is more cost-effective
to reduce emissions within the sector or support reductions elsewhere, a cap and trade system is
more likely to be the MBM of choice. It is important to recall, however, that the choice between
a carbon levy and a cap and trade system ultimately is not as obvious as it may appear on the
surface. Many of the differences that may appear fundamental are blurred in the detailed design.
Ultimately, either can be designed to effectively incentivize the decarbonisation of the
international shipping sector; either can be designed to address identified inequities; and either can
be designed to minimize the economic impact on the sector. Badly designed, either can be
ineffective at reducing emissions. More important than the choice between carbon levy and cap
and trade system, therefore, is the detailed design, and clarity and transparency with respect to the
relative priority allocated to encouraging low cost emission reductions, protecting the industry,
protecting vulnerable States from negative economic impacts, and ensuring the decarbonisation of
the sector.
In theory and assuming political will, legitimate concerns about the economic impact of the
decarbonisation of the sector on the economies of vulnerable States can be appropriately addressed
with either a cap and trade system or a carbon levy. The main function of either MBM can include
the generation of revenues to address inequities. In the case of the carbon levy, the generation of
revenues is a central feature of the MBM, so that the main issue will be the allocation of revenues
to specified and demonstrated inequities. In the case of a cap and trade system, the key will be to
avoid free allocation of allowances so as to ensure sufficient revenues are generated to address any
specified and demonstrated inequities. In either case, while the generation of revenues occurs on
the basis of the NMFT principle among industry actors, the use of revenues generated from the
MBM allows for their equitable utilization in addressing the needs of developing countries
adversely affected by the measures adopted.
5.5

Equity and fair sharing of responsibility

The nuanced Paris Agreement approach to differentiation in the form of CBDR-RCNC offers hope
that the past controversy within the IMO on the respective roles of CBDR and NMFT has been
largely resolved. It is important to recall that the concept of CBDR has evolved significantly under
the UN climate regime. It started in the form of CBDR-RC with a focus on responsibility and
capacity, and remained in this form from the inception of the UNFCCC essentially until the Paris
Agreement in 2015. In this form, it served as an important principle for developing countries to
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push for leadership from developed countries on a range of issues, from mitigation to adaptation
and finance.500
For a long time, CBDR-RC served to preserve the binary view of States as either developed
or developing. All this changed in the Paris Agreement, resolving a decade long impasse in the
climate negotiations. First, the Agreement alters the CBDR-RC principle by adding the concept
of national circumstances to signal that State Parties differ in a range of relevant respects, not just
with respect to capacity and responsibility for climate change. As importantly, the Paris
Agreement puts this revised version of the principle into practice with a very nuanced and practical
approach to differentiation. 501 The Paris Agreement applies a variety of approaches to
differentiation depending on the issue and circumstances. For monitoring, reporting, review and
compliance, for example, differentiation is minimal, and largely tied to capacity, encouraging State
Parties seeking to avoid differentiation to invest in capacity-building to support other Parties
struggling to meet monitoring and reporting requirements.502
Differentiation with respect to the substantive emission reduction commitments of Parties to
the Paris Agreement is largely based on self-differentiation, but with some direction to narrow the
potential scope of differentiation. For example, there is some explicit differentiation between
developed and developing States with respect to economy wide emission reduction limits, but this
differentiation is expected to diminish over time as developing countries are expected to take on
economy wide targets. This is done in full recognition that States have different levels of capacity
and responsibility, and that a range of national circumstances will affect States’ abilities to
contribute to the global effort. There is no explicit differentiation, in the Paris Agreement, of
private actors, though the impact of national efforts may, of course, affect private actors
differently.503
The main lesson from Paris in this regard is that the answer to the longstanding disagreement
about differentiation in the IMO’s approach to GHG emission reductions may be found in a
nuanced and pragmatic approach to harmonizing the application of the CBDR and NMFT
principles. The IMO approach that levels the playing field in the treatment of industry actors can
potentially be accompanied by measures to protect vulnerable developing countries from negative
economic consequences of efforts to decarbonize the shipping sector. The IMO’s technical
cooperation programme and the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnerships, GloMEEP offer
capacity-building on technical and operational measures. The potential impact of a carbon levy
can be mitigated by channeling the accrued monies to assist developing countries inordinately
affected by the levy and enable them to gradually transition to decarbonized transportation services
for their maritime trade. Other ideas for mitigating the impact for a cap and trade system have also
been suggested (e.g., IUCN, WWF). Such a multi-layered approach is consistent with the spirit of
the Paris Agreement, and a pragmatic way to avoid unfairness within the shipping sector while
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being sensitive to the economies of vulnerable countries. A key element of the solution will be to
make decisions based on evidence of impacts, rather than based on uncertainty or fear.504
The regulation of shipping has relied heavily on technology, both as a driver and as its
promoter. Indeed, the availability of technology is one of the principles of maritime regulation.
The promotional dimension has not always produced immediate satisfactory outcomes, as the
BWM convention demonstrates,505 but it has laid the groundwork for the forcing of technological
development. A flexible systemic approach to dealing with uncertainty should pay particular
attention to enhancing the environment for research and development by ‘stretching goals’ and
through catalytic measures (already proposed by industry actors) to enhance the design, powering
and operation of all classes of ships.506 Arguably new technologies and know-how are likely to
provide a greater measure of control over intended regulatory outcomes and better manage
particular uncertainties.
Enhancing the environment for technological development raises a related difficult issue in
terms of access to technological breakthroughs. On the one hand open or fair access could
significantly accelerate dissemination of new technological solutions in the shipping industry and
among regulators, while on the other hand intellectual property rights and the global competition
in the industry are factors that may militate against such initiatives. However, there is concern
marine technology developers may “have limited means available to prevent unauthorised use of
certain types of inventions” and “this situation may reduce the value of ‘maritime’ patents, leading
to less incentives to innovate and publish information on new developments.” 507 Efforts at
levelling the playing field in technology development and transfer have long bedeviled
international relations. The UNCLOS attempted to address this sensitive matter by developing a
regime for technology co-development and transfer in Part XIV. 508 States “shall cooperate in
accordance with their capabilities to promote actively the development and transfer of marine
science and marine technology on fair and reasonable terms and conditions,” either directly or
through a competent international organization such as the IMO.509 The technology mechanism
initially established under the Copenhagen Accord and affirmed in Article 10 of the Paris
Agreement is dealing with these issues in the broader context of climate technologies. It may offer
avenues for cooperation and coordination that would be valuable for the IMO to explore.
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The UNCLOS technology cooperation duty includes “the protection and preservation of the
marine environment … and other activities in the marine environment,” thus including emissions
from ships, and “with a view to accelerating the social and economic development of the
developing States.”510 Clearly, the duty is not to transfer technology, but rather to cooperate in
promoting its development and transfer. States have a further ‘best endeavours’ duty “to foster
favourable economic and legal conditions for the transfer of marine technology for the benefit of
all parties concerned on an equitable basis.”511 The rights of technology developers are further
protected by a due regard duty towards “all legitimate interests including, inter alia, the rights and
duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of marine technology.”512 Other provisions in UNCLOS
set out structures and processes for this type of cooperation, including the establishment of national
and regional centres and duties for international organizations, such as the IMO, to “take all
appropriate measures to ensure, either directly or in close cooperation among themselves, the
effective discharge of their functions and responsibilities” with respect to the Convention’s
provisions in this regime.513
From an IMO perspective, this duty buttresses the technical assistance mandate in its
constitutive instrument 514 and provides fiat to the work of the Organization’s Ad Hoc Expert
Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology for Ships. MARPOL Annex VI now
includes a specific provision promoting technical cooperation and technology transfer concerning
improving of energy efficiency of ships.515 In similar spirit to UNCLOS Part XIV and Article 10
of the Paris Agreement, State Parties have a duty to promote and provide support and to cooperate
in the promotion of development and transfer of technology and exchange of information to States
that request technical assistance. The caveat that States perform this duty subject to their own laws
enables them to protect the rights of intellectual property holders.
Should an MBM be introduced in the future strategy, it may provide the resources needed to
help make future technological developments subject to open access. For example, if a levy were
to be instituted, some of the funding could be directed towards R & D for the public domain.
5.6

Review, monitoring and compliance

Another interesting question for the IMO is whether the five-year review cycles contemplated
under the Paris Agreement could have potential application to international shipping.516 Whatever
the targets and their legal status, there is clearly value in a process of regular reviews of progress
in key areas, such as overall emission reductions achieved in the sector, progress in research and
development on long-term solutions, commercialization of key new technologies, efforts to retrofit
the existing fleet, reductions from improvement in new vessel design, reductions from operational
measures, etc. A regular exercise of gathering the latest information on progress in combination
with the necessary analysis to determine progress against stated goals and pathways would allow
510
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for regular adjustments to the overall approach that would offer more certainty that collective goals
for the sector will be met. The performance of individual actors, both industry actors and States,
would also be an important element of an effective review cycle.
Careful thought would have to be given to what information should be gathered, who would
provide the information, what analysis is required, who would carry out the analysis, and what
decisions are expected to be made based on the outcome of the review. Important questions include
under what circumstances would the collective goal or the expectations of individual State or
industry actors be adjusted, how to link the review to regulatory adjustments, and what would be
the consequences for individual actors of not living up to their commitments or obligations?
Consistent methodologies supported by the IMO and the UNFCCC would greatly facilitate this
level of cooperation and mutual support.
The recently adopted IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code), effective as of
2016, is important for enhancing the implementation of air pollution and GHG regulations.517 Its
significance lies in the introduction of a mandatory audit scheme for flag States, as well as port
and coastal States. MARPOL is one of the international conventions that has been amended to
provide a legal basis for the conduct of mandatory audits. 518 The IMO has a dedicated subcommittee (III Sub-committee) that assesses, monitors and reviews implementation of IMO
conventions on the basis of PSC reports and other data. While it spotlights issues that a Member
State may need to address, it also serves to inform the IMO committees regarding the need for new
mandatory or voluntary measures. This arrangement is supported by the IMO’s Integrated
Technical Cooperation Programme aimed at building capacity to facilitate compliance with the
maritime conventions and can be expected to potentially play a key role in capacity-building in
furtherance of GHG emission reduction goals.519
At the company level, there are other instruments that could be strengthened to encourage
vessel operations to minimize GHG emissions, such as the International Management Code for the
Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code).520 Operating under SOLAS, the
ISM Code aims at the promotion of safety culture in international shipping and includes an
international standard for pollution prevention as well as for maritime safety. However, at this
time, and apart from generic statements concerning prevention of pollution of the environment,
the ISM Code and its implementation guidelines do not contain express provision specific to air
pollution, let alone energy use and operations to reduce GHG emissions, although it is conceivable
to interpret appropriate measures in this regard as implicit.521 This is an appropriate instrument to
include express terms to promote a ‘GHG-reduction culture’ in international shipping.
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At the ship level, as in the case of other MARPOL regulations, the Annex VI air pollution
regulations are subject to the convention’s port State inspection regime and regional MOU system
described earlier. In 2018 the Paris MoU, which is the oldest PSC and possibly the most active
regional arrangement, will launch a Concerted Inspection Campaign (CIC) for Annex VI and will
provide insights into levels of compliance with the Annex.522 In 2016 inspectors found 41,857
deficiencies, 3,769 of which were detainable, amounting to 3.83% of all inspected ships.523 These
deficiencies were serious enough that the vessels concerned were detained in port until the
deficiencies were rectified. In the same year, 428 ships had Annex VI deficiencies.524 These reports
are potentially important for a vessel’s insurance cover. Deficiencies with respect to emissions
could affect a vessel’s seaworthiness.525 In addition to the implications for port State inspection,
the vessel’s insurance contract invariably includes express and implied seaworthiness warranties,
as well as warranties of legality, that is the assured undertakes to operate the insured subject-matter
in compliance with legal requirements.526
Finally, compliance could be further strengthened by providing incentives for additional
industry initiatives that take early pioneering steps to retrofit the existing fleet to enhance low
carbon operations, to the extent this is technologically and economically possible, or pioneer new
technologies that promise neutral or zero emissions, such as electrical propulsion and wind energy.
5.7

Inter-regime consistency and complementarity

Consistency and complementarity between international regimes is an important consideration in
any global response to a planetary challenge such as climate change. UNCLOS anticipates a
complementary relationship with other conventions. UNCLOS does “not alter the rights and
obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention
and which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of
their obligations under this Convention.”527 More specifically on the protection and preservation
of the marine environment, Article 237 states that the provisions on marine environment protection
… are without prejudice to the specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions
and agreements concluded previously which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine
environment and to agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles
set forth in this Convention.528

For example, MARPOL, as a specialised instrument on vessel-source pollution adopted prior to,
and the Paris Agreement, as an instrument which expands on the UNCLOS’ provisions on
atmospheric emissions adopted after UNCLOS are captured by this provision. The article
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continues that specific obligations under special conventions on the marine environment “should
be carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives” of UNCLOS.529
One practical consequence of this provision is that the obligations of States to mitigate climate
change impacts ought to be pursued consistently with the principles of UNCLOS.
Although pursued primarily by the MEPC and within the framework of MARPOL, the
IMO’s current and prospective regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping interacts
with other international regimes. The IMO’s constitutive instrument equips it to coordinate with
other agreements and international organizations as needed and the Organization has entered into
cooperation agreements.530 The actual or potential interactions are frequently complementary and
facilitative of IMO work. Examples of facilitative interactions are the UNCLOS provisions with
respect to global and regional protection and preservation of the marine environment, atmospheric
emissions from ships, technology transfer and the role of the IMO. In particular, UNCLOS
establishes a duty for State Parties to prevent and enforce atmospheric pollution from ships and
promotes technology transfer, as does the UN climate regime. These provisions provide context
for IMO’s efforts in developing the GHG strategy.
In other instances, the tasks assigned to the IMO require active efforts at ensuring
consistency and coordination with other regimes. At the level of overall goals, it is important for
the IMO strategy to be consistent with the overall goal and governance processes of the Paris
Agreement, such as increasing levels of ambition, transparency in reporting, five-year review cycle
for the shipping industry’s reported contribution aligned with the Global Stocktake, and so on. The
IPCC report on 1.5 C expected this year and the Talanoa Dialogue will provide further
opportunities for the IMO strategy to align with the climate regime.
Consistency between international regimes is also important at the level of operating
principles and processes. Division in and protraction of the GHG debate in the IMO was in part
due to the interpretation and weight given to the NMFT in MARPOL and CBDR in the climate
regime, even though the approach to CBDR in the Paris Agreement evolved from a list-based
approach (as in the Kyoto Protocol) to a more nuanced approach. As observed earlier, a consensusbased harmonized interpretation and application of the two principles is possible and could assist
harmonization between international legal regimes without weakening either regime. Similarly,
the perceptions expressed and concerns raised by some delegations about potential conflict of
MBMs with the WTO regime will need to be better understood so that the development of a future
market instrument, if feasible and desirable, will be undertaken with a view to ensuring
complementarity, thus reassuring all IMO Member States. The special needs of developing
countries could thus be addressed by using the structures and processes available in the regimes
concerned, including the UNCLOS provisions facilitating cooperation in technology codevelopment and transfer, IMO’s technical cooperation programme and revenues from a future
MBM, the climate regime structures and provisions in WTO agreements designed to assist
developing countries.
529
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A potential interaction between the IMO and UNCTAD may arise in the event MBMs are
adopted. The monitoring of MBM consequences for international shipping could involve the
efforts of UNCTAD in its annual reporting on international shipping and seaborne trade. If
UNCTAD’s mandate is engaged in this respect, it would provide a valuable information service
for IMO Member States.
If serious inter-regime issues of inconsistency or conflict remain unresolved, there is a
danger that some IMO Member States that are important for the IMO collective effort at GHG
reduction may object to future amendments to MARPOL Annex VI. Past experience with the
Organization’s policy and practice in its various conventions on ensuring consistency with the
UNCLOS, both when the latter was still under development and subsequently following its
adoption, indicate that the IMO is conscious of and well-prepared to ensure inter-regime
consistency.531
5.8

Multilateralism and IMO leadership

Finally, the development of the IMO strategy to respond to climate change presents both
opportunities and risks for the Organization and the maritime community it services. On the one
hand, the adoption of a credible and effective strategy will significantly fortify faith in the
Organization’s competence and effectiveness as an international leader and global regulator. It is
further conceivable that its mandate, which to date has largely focused on the regulation of
international shipping from technical and operational safety, environmental and security
perspectives, including accompanying private and public law regimes, could evolve to include the
regulation of market measures. If the latter occurs, GHG regulation potentially promises to be a
major milestone in the Organization’s institutional evolution. On the other hand, if it fails to
produce a strategy that represents a fair and acceptable contribution to the global response to
climate change, there is danger that the Organization’s credibility as an effective regulator could
suffer. It is imperative that the Organization develops a defensible principled approach to its
strategy to respond to climate change.
As mentioned earlier, some NGOs expressed their frustration with the slow process by
suggesting that the UNFCCC or the EU could be called upon to take appropriate action. If this
occurred, it would be preferable to avoid a confrontational approach and to always stress support
for the IMO as the leading global regulator and to continue to seek effective regulation of the GHG
emissions from a global industry. Moreover, in addition to the fundamental duty of good faith in
UNCLOS, the legal reality under UNCLOS and the IMO Convention is that the IMO is the
competent international organization in the Convention. The EU and IMO have at times had
convergent views with respect to accelerating maritime regulation, as was the case with phasing
531
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out of single hulls, and usually, despite the tension, matters were resolved with the EU supporting
global regulation of shipping and the IMO’s lead role in that regard. Even when the US launched
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, it always stressed its support for the IMO as the leading global
regulator and has tended to participate in its work in a manner to reinforce that position. Thus the
major maritime nations have, despite periodical hiccups, supported the key role of the IMO, even
if they are not parties to all of its instruments. The hope is that pressure and leadership from outside
the IMO will assist the IMO in its efforts to develop and implement an effective strategy that is
well integrated globally, regionally and nationally and that ensures a fair contribution from
international shipping to the goals of the Paris Agreement.
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6.

CONCLUSION

In investigating the international law and policy challenges to the determination of the international
shipping industry’s contribution to climate change mitigation efforts through the IMO, we offer
concluding observations on general, policy and legal considerations that we believe have a bearing
on the current and possible future directions of the nascent IMO strategy and its legal pathways.
6.1

General considerations for the strategy

As will have become apparent in this report, the development of the international shipping
industry’s fair share of GHG emission reductions through the IMO is an urgent matter. It is not a
simple regulatory matter that can be exclusively addressed through maritime technical and
operational rules and standards. The task is characterized by urgency, complexity and uncertainty.
Urgency because the current global response to climate change may be significantly
underestimating the process of change and that decarbonization likely has to occur at a much faster
pace. Complexity because of the global and transnational nature of the industry, ship technology
and operations, and financing structures. Uncertainty because the reduction of GHG emissions
must necessarily be a long-term process spread across the rest of the century and with highly
dynamic climatic, technological and economic variables.
This calls for an IMO strategy which is integrated: systemic in scope, flexible in approach
and adaptive in application. Systemic in the sense of employing traditional mandatory IMO
regulatory tools, supported with voluntary measures as appropriate, while also considering new
mechanisms that could be created or which are already available under other international regimes.
The Paris Agreement includes elements that offer important opportunities for collaboration among
the regimes (e.g., Articles 6, 10, and 13-15). The approach will need to be flexible in the sense that
the strategy is not considered a static structure, but rather a dynamic tool whose objectives and
measures will be periodically reviewed to respond to the long-term learning curve. It will need to
be adaptive in the sense that, and in consequence to flexibility, the strategy must not be rigid, but
should rather be considered a ‘rolling-strategy’ and regularly ratcheting up ambitions to match
newer understandings of the climate change challenge, future technological possibilities and
achieving effective long-term outcomes.
While it may be tempting to consider the measures and progress achieved in the collective
response to climate change by other regimes and sectors as potential models for international
shipping, the reality is that shipping is unique because of its context, diversity and complex drivers.
While the experiences of others may inform, it is unreasonable to expect transposition of solutions
from one sector to another. Each sector has its own characteristics and what really matters is not
replication of any class of measures, but rather that each sector is ambitious and bears its fair share
of the collective responsibility and within the context, culture, principles and processes of the
industry concerned.
While progress has been achieved on GHG issues in the IMO, a major concern in the
discourse to date has been the visible lack of consensus. While the Organization’s majority
decision-making rule ensures resolution of major controversies, this procedure tends to leave
winners and losers in its wake. One of the IMO’s traditional strengths is its culture of consensus,
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which while not always present in all forms of decision-making and has its own concerns (e.g.,
producing the lowest common denominator), in great measure helps to guide the discharge of the
Organization’s functions and secures a high degree of support and respect for its work and its
regulatory outcomes. Some of the most difficult substantive and procedural decisions in the GHG
discourse to date have been taken by a majority vote. Given its role as a long-term blue print for
IMO mitigation efforts, we argue that if the strategy is not backed by consensus, but adopted by a
vote, that this will not bode well for the long-term commitments by Member States needed to make
it effective.
6.2

Policy considerations for the strategy

It seems clear that a global strategy under the umbrella of the IMO is the preferred approach to
efforts to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping. The IMO has primary competency
over the sector, and the global nature and complexity of the sector clearly warrants a global
approach. It also seems that there are significant benefits of a cooperative approach between the
IMO and the UN climate regime. There is much to be said for a synchronized approach of State
efforts in the IMO and under the Paris Agreement, in particular with regard to the vision of the
IMO strategy, the level of ambition, guiding principles, timelines, as well as the review of and
adjustments to the strategy over time.
An essential element of a synchronized approach to the issue between the IMO and the UN
climate regime is a common vision. This means that the IMO strategy should clearly articulate its
intention to ensure the international shipping sector makes a fair contribution to the goals of the
Paris Agreement, and that the strategy is generally in line and, where appropriate, coordinated with
the Paris Agreement. While a global and consensus-based approach under the IMO is preferable,
it needs to be adequately ambitious to ensure that the sector makes a fair contribution to the climate
problem. IMO Member States, who at the same time are Parties to the Paris Agreement, have a
responsibility to ensure an effective industry contribution.
Working out the details of a fair contribution from the sector is complex. The answer to what
is a fair contribution can be expected to change over time. Further work is needed to clarify an
appropriate contribution from the international shipping sector based on its unique circumstances,
the likelihood and timing of technological breakthroughs, and how the circumstances compare to
those in other key sectors. However, debates over the details on what would amount to a fair
contribution cannot delay action, as the basic message from the Paris Agreement is that all sectors
must decarbonize as rapidly as reasonably possible, and that ultimately, all sectors need to make
all reasonable efforts to achieve full decarbonization.
Until the details of a fair contribution from this sector are worked out, we are of the view
that the strategy should be designed on the assumption that the international shipping sector needs
to decarbonize at the same rate as other sectors. In other words, the initial strategy should be
designed on the assumption that the sector is neither required to do more nor less than other sectors.
This means the rate of emission reduction should be the same as the rate of emission reductions
needed globally, and that the dates for key milestones such as peak emissions, GHG neutrality and
full decarbonization are the same as what is needed globally. These starting assumptions can then
be refined over time, as the unique circumstances of the sector, and how they compare to the unique
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circumstances of other sectors, are better understood.
The ultimate measure of what is needed globally is the long-term goal of the Paris
Agreement. Unfortunately, much of the analysis currently available on the global effort needed is
based on the pre-Paris goal of 2o C, not on the Paris goal of ‘well below 2o C’, with efforts to ‘limit
increases to 1.5o C.’ The IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report provides key parameters on what is needed
globally to stay within 2o C, and the Paris Agreement itself sets a long-term objective of reaching
GHG emission neutrality in the second half of the century that appears to be based on the 2 o C
analysis of the IPCC.
Until the IPCC releases its report on 1.5o C, a pragmatic approach would be to rely on the
IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report, but with a clear understanding that the long-term goals will have
to be updated in light of the 2018 IPCC report on 1.5o C. Key elements of a long-term vision and
interim objectives and targets based on Paris and the IPPC’s 4th Assessment Report will be a peak
year for the sector as soon as possible, rapid decline of emissions thereafter, leading to GHG
emission neutrality by or before 2050, with the details depending on the results of the IPCC’s
expected report on 1.5o C. The ultimate goal would be the full decarbonization of the sector.
It is also clear that innovative solutions are needed to deal with the longstanding rift within
the IMO process over the respective roles of NMFT and CBDR in the approach to GHG emission
reductions from the international shipping sector. Valid viewpoints have been expressed over the
years both by developing countries, concerned over the economic impact of GHG emission
reduction efforts and by others, concerned about the differential treatment of private actors within
the industry. The separation of the treatment of industry actors in the strategy from the treatment
of State parties offers an opportunity to resolve this longstanding challenge to an effective IMO
strategy.
Solutions should aim to preserve the principle of NMFT for industry actors within the
international shipping sector while finding ways to address legitimate concerns about economic
impacts on vulnerable developing countries. Their concerns, and in particular the LDCs’ and
SIDS’, must be taken seriously and measures in support must be properly resourced. Such an
approach would be in line with the aspirations of the UNSDGs and the nuanced and pragmatic
approach to CBDR adopted in the Paris Agreement, and may be key to overcoming the impasse
over the application of these two principles. Cooperation between the UN climate regime
generally in this spirit of the Paris Agreement, and utilization of the institutions and mechanisms
under the Paris Agreement in particular, offer promising opportunities to move forward
constructively in this regard.
Key among the efforts needed, either within the IMO or through the Paris Agreement, relate
to capacity-building, technical cooperation and technology access. Cooperation between the IMO
and the technology, capacity and funding mechanisms under the Paris Agreement have the
potential to overcome barriers to effective implementation of GHG reduction technologies in key
developing countries through proactive and supportive measures. If an MBM is introduced,
consideration should be given to channeling some of the funds generated to support R & D that
will produce innovations in the public domain. Ultimately, a critical ingredient of any solution is
the commitment to ensure the international shipping sector contributes its fair share to addressing
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the climate crises in a manner that is fair to vulnerable developing countries and fair to the private
actors involved in the industry. The application of NMFT and CBDR needs to serve this ultimate
goal of a fair contribution.
The report has considered the efforts of the IMO in three phases, short, medium and longterm, following the approach taken in the Organization’s discussions to date. The emerging
consensus in the IMO deliberations of the short-term referring to the time period between now and
2023, the medium-term from 2023 to 2030, and the long-term from 2030 to full decarbonization,
while appropriate at this time, might need to be reconsidered as the need for more ambitious
climate action becomes increasingly urgent. What is needed in terms of specific measures to guide
Parties through the three stages is the appropriate combination of ambition, flexibility, adaptability,
and transparency to meet the goals of the strategy in a timely, efficient, effective and fair manner.
A combination of technical and operational standards, market-based instruments, other
measures and effective compliance and enforcement will likely be needed to address the challenge,
carefully designed to motivate all key actors to take effective and adequate measures to
decarbonize the international shipping sector. The current technical measures offer an important
starting point, and will require effective and timely mechanisms to keep pushing for the
development and implementation of best available technology, to update the requirements on a
regular basis as technological breakthroughs are achieved. The EEDI, in particular, designed to be
scaled-up every five years, will play a vital long-term role. Market mechanisms or other novel
effective measures are needed primarily to motivate and enable the technological breakthroughs
that can then be implemented either through upgraded technical standards or through the market
mechanism itself to achieve the full decarbonization of the sector.
For any market mechanisms utilized as part of the strategy, the detailed design matters more
than the choice of instrument, such as the choice between a carbon levy or a cap and trade system.
The most fundamental question is whether the mechanism will focus on ‘in sector’ emission
reductions or offer (limited or broad) access to credible ‘out of sector’ emission reduction
opportunities. It is important to recognize that there are pros & cons to both, and that the choice
will have implications for how the long-term goals are framed and for the timelines. One
implication of this choice, for example, is the need and importance of the technical and operational
regulations. An in-sector approach to a market mechanism may serve to achieve full
decarbonization of international shipping, whereas an out-of-sector approach is more likely to need
an evolving and carefully designed technology mechanism to ensure the sector ultimately achieves
full decarbonization.
There are a number of elements of the IMO strategy and its implementation that will require
regular review and adjustment to ensure the goals are met, including the fair contribution from the
sector, the technical standards of vessels and their operation, and any market-based or regulatory
mechanisms designed to motivate technological innovations and their adoption. The five-year
review cycles under Articles 13-15 of the Paris Agreement, built around the Global Stocktake,
offer a valuable structure and timetable for reviews of progress and effectiveness of the elements
of the overall approach. A well-synchronized review that both takes advantage of the information
gathered and feeds appropriate information into the five-year review cycles under the Paris
Agreement would improve efficiency and effectiveness of the IMO strategy.
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Other elements to consider include existing efforts on transparency and review within the
shipping sector, including current efforts under the IMO, but also efforts outside the IMO, such as
the EU MRV. Ultimately, for transparency and effectiveness, regular reporting, review, and
enhancement of the approach in sync with reporting and review under the Paris Agreement and
elsewhere will be critical for the effective implementation of the IMO strategy.
6.3

Legal considerations for the strategy

While we are of the view that the general approach to GHG emissions reductions from ships in the
IMO strategy should be integrated, the backbone of the strategy will need to be a combination of
global maritime regulation and other legal and policy measures. While regulatory tools to assist
emissions reductions are obviously available to the IMO, there will be need to consider a basket
of mechanisms (maritime and other), in particular with respect to a prospective MBM. An MBM,
if adopted to complement technical and operational measures, will require legal support. To date,
IMO regulation has concerned technical rules and standards for maritime safety, environment
protection and security concerns in shipping. The IMO convention most directly relevant to the
regulation emissions from ships is MARPOL, focused on technical standards for technology and
operations, may need a novel addition, preferably through the tacit acceptance procedure, to enable
the introduction of a market measure in a reasonably timely manner. An MBM will require clear,
consistent and predictable requirements and conditions for trading emission credits, and upon
which private legal transactions will be based.
Alternatively, the MBM could perhaps be housed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
At a minimum, consistency between any MBM developed under the IMO and the market
mechanisms developed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement would be welcome. If IMO parties
decide to explore an MBM that includes access to out-of-sector reductions or offsets, it would be
helpful to seek consistency with the emerging new Sustainable Development Mechanism under
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement.
The IMO has a long history of a successful principled and structured approach to global
maritime regulation. This approach has usually been evidence-based, pragmatic, has employed
both mandatory and voluntary approaches, and has aspired to universalize its instruments and
facilitate uniformity in their implementation. While the GHG strategy is expected to be guided by
a vision at a high level of generality and accompanied by aspirational goals, the fulfilment of those
goals will require a mixture of mandatory (possibly concerning the EEDI and fuel requirements)
and voluntary rules and standards, and which would need to be periodically reviewed and scaledup to enhance their continued relevance and effectiveness. As an instrument with a high degree of
universal support, MARPOL’s tacit acceptance procedure will be important to enable the gradual
scaling-up of the EEDI (in addition to the current five-year ratcheting cycle) and other standards.
A challenge for GHG regulation will be coherency in maritime regulation. As observed in
this report, the pursuit of ship operation regulations in various domains may potentially raise issues
for the regulation of GHG emissions, such as other atmospheric emissions from ships (e.g., to
control NOx, SOx and PM emissions), particular technical and operational requirements for
environmental reasons (e.g., ballast water exchange operations), energy-use by particular ships
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(e.g., polar class vessels) and safety concerns (e.g., safe vessel speed). It is possible that efforts to
address GHG emissions may conflict with other regulatory efforts. While potentially adding more
complexity to GHG regulation, this concern calls for an integrated approach to GHG regulation
where regulatory impact on other regulated matters will need to be addressed.
The integrated approach to maritime regulation also calls for regulatory coherency and
fairness across the industry. Careful thought will have to be given in the detailed design and
implementation of the strategy to the public and private law impacts on the roles of the many actors
in the industry, from regulators and enforcers (flag States/maritime administrations, port States),
to ship operations (shipowners, charterers, operators, managers), to providers of services to ships
(port services, bunker suppliers, insurers). Ways of facilitating universal acceptance and uniform
implementation need to be anticipated at the design stage.
Coherency in GHG regulation should also be pursued across international and national
standards to maximize GHG emission reduction from all forms of shipping. As observed in this
report, the IMO efforts have focused on international shipping. Typically, the regulation of
cabotage, fishing vessels, small recreational craft and generally small tonnage is undertaken at the
national level and the regulating State may choose to extend international standards to domestic
shipping or regulate it separately. With respect to emissions of domestic shipping, we expect
overlap between the international regime and domestic regimes. There is much to be gained by
encouraging IMO Member States to coordinate the regulation of GHG emissions from all forms
of shipping in a consistent manner to enhance mitigation from this sector as a whole.
An interesting factor in the development and future implementation of the IMO strategy is
the relationship between the IMO conventions and the UNFCCC, its subsidiary agreements
(Kyoto, Paris), as well as other treaty regimes (e.g., WTO). The IMO has a legal mandate as the
competent international organization with respect to international shipping matters, and this has
been recognized by the expectation that the Organization will orchestrate the industry’s fair share
of emission reductions. The IMO has gone to great lengths in developing and maintaining a
constructive relationship with the UNFCCC process (including the UNFCCC Secretariat and
SBSTA) and has provided regular reports. A potential concern we have is the possibility that the
IMO strategy does not display sufficient ambition and does not deliver a substantial and effective
contribution, especially in comparison to NDC commitments and other industries. If this scenario,
however unlikely, arises, there could be an issue between, on the one hand the UNFCCC/Paris
Agreement mandate that includes all GHG emissions (including shipping), and the IMO mandate
as a UN special agency and competent organization under the IMO Convention and UNCLOS. If
a future Paris Agreement COP were to engage more closely with international shipping, they
would likely be able to do so only by establishing a target, while the IMO would retain the maritime
regulatory capacity (technical and operational as expected because of its competence under its
constitutive instrument and UNCLOS) to facilitate the achievement of that target. In any event,
IMO leadership at a high level of ambition on this issue is critical.
We see opportunities for coordination of and cooperation under different international
regimes to meet GHG emission reductions. UNCLOS has a complementary relationship to the
Paris Agreement and IMO maritime conventions. While it is conceivable to view the concerns of
some IMO Member States with respect to the potential conflict between MBMs and the WTO
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rules, we view the potential interaction between GHG emission regulation from international
shipping, or for that matter the formulation and implementation of NDCs, and the WTO regime as
less clear and deserving of further study. The idea proposed in a recent CIGI special report to
creating a ‘climate change exception’ to the WTO rules is likely worth studying further. In the
meantime, measures should be taken to avoid any perceived or real conflict with the WTO rules,
but that such measures cannot delay or undermine the implementation of an effective approach to
GHG emission reductions from international shipping. From another perspective, bearing in mind
that State Parties to the IMO conventions are also Member States of the WTO, an MBM developed
and adopted on the basis of consensus in the IMO might also render the matter a non-issue.
Finally, the IMO strategy will need to consider the approach to promoting compliance. At
this time the current version of the strategy is crafted at a high level of generality and with much
of the text in square brackets. The assumption is that any goals adopted will be aspirational and
non-binding. At this time the strategy does not contemplate provisions on compliance. This is a
weakness and can be expected to pose a challenge for promoting conduct which is consistent with
the spirit and letter of the strategy, itself a legally unenforceable instrument. Rather, the regulatory
teeth of the strategy will be any technical and operational rules, standards and codes adopted under
MARPOL Annex VI, especially if mandatory. Flag States will continue to have primary
responsibilities for ensuring effective jurisdiction and control with respect to GHG regulation of
their ships. Port State enforcement will continue to play an important role and likely instrumental
for the future success of the strategy.
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